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1 Introduction
A divided Europe? Solidarity contestation in
the public domain
Of the many crises that Europe faces today, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ is the
one that has had a profound impact on public debates about solidarity, reinvi-
gorating contestations and divisions within and between European member
countries (Krastev, 2017b). Since 2015, huge fault lines have opened up across
the European Union about the question of how this ‘crisis’ should be handled
and what the responsibility of European countries and populations is in regard
to the provision of humanitarian aid and assistance. While most research has
focused on migration movements and policy and security implications, there has
been little sustained and comparative analysis of how public attitudes towards
refugees and humanitarian dispositions are shaped within the public sphere by
political news coverage of the ‘crisis’ (Agustín and Jørgensen, 2018; Barlai et al.,
2017). Sociological research in the field of communication studies, in turn, has
mainly focused on the representation of refugees in the media, but less on how
discourses and contestations of solidarity in European receiving countries
inform, through the media, policy responses and public attitudes towards refu-
gees (Eberl et al., 2018).
This volume, composed of results from comparative media analyses about
transnational solidarity contestation in the public sphere in response to the so-
called ‘refugee crisis’, aims to provide systematic empirical data and theoretical
reflections about public contestations, and thus propose answers to the vital, yet
understudied question of the role of the media in contesting (promoting or
rejecting) solidarity towards refugees. To enhance such an understanding, we
propose a public sphere framework of solidarity contestation. The public
sphere is conceptualised as a place of political struggle (Cinalli and Giugni,
2013a, 2016a; Della Porta and Caiani, 2009; Koopmans et al., 2005), but at the
same time, as a space where the boundaries of solidarity are defined (Calhoun,
2002; Enjolras, 2017). We argue that such solidarity contestations in the public
sphere are not solely about the standing of Europeans vis-à-vis refugees and
migrants more broadly. They are also about a broader notion of European
solidarity among the member states and among the people of Europe in dealing
with the ‘crisis’, e.g., in terms of shared responsibilities and activities of mutual
assistance in sheltering refugees. In analysing the ‘refugee crisis’ as a media
event, we learn as much about the conditions necessary to construct solidarity
towards ‘others’ (the refugees) as we learn about the way we grant solidarity
among ‘us’ as Europeans.
Additionally, we argue that an accurate understanding of solidarity con-
testations has to do justice to the complexity of mass mediated public debates
by addressing the relations between news coverage and citizens’ comments. In
fact, the mass media provide an important arena of public contentions that is
highly patterned by news coverage routines and journalistic practices, thus pri-
vileging representatives of corporate actors (e.g., public authorities, interest
groups, scientific communities). However, online media have conquered the
public sphere, and this means that news audiences and consumers have become
part and parcel of the media system and mass mediated public contentions. The
analysis of public debates about solidarity with refugees has to acknowledge
this structural transformation of public contentions by focusing on both the
way public claims makers define and assess solidarity within the news, and how
citizens who read and comment on these news delineate what solidarity with
refugees means to them. The added-value of this dual approach is not only tied
to the empirical insights of two interlocked arenas of solidarity contestation:
claims-making by public, mainly organised actors vs. commenting by readers
and media consumers; this approach also enables us to learn more about the
relations between two distinct forms of public contestations that both have an
effect on the way solidarity with refugees is shaped, promoted or eroded in the
various countries.
Analysing public responses to the mass arrival of refugees in the European
Union from a comparative media perspective is timely and will allow us to
better understand why member states have reacted in very different, and often
contradictory ways to the challenges of migration, humanitarian aid and poli-
tical integration. The main aim was to survey mass mediated public debates in
very different national backgrounds – including the south, north, east and west
of Europe – in order to systematically map differences in the perception and
reception of refugees, and link them to differences in respective public debates
across Europe. Altogether, this will allow us to explain not only the variety of
public responses, but also to address broader questions about the role of the
media in their treatment of refugees and the respect of human rights, especially
at a time when media are considered to be responsible for spreading anti-
migrant sentiments. Our book thus also contributes to the current discussion
about the responsibility and accountability of journalism in important ways
(Gemi et al., 2013; Wahl-Jorgensen et al., 2016; Waisbord, 2013).
What is more, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ is the one that has had a profound
impact on the self-understanding of the European Union (EU) as a community
of values based on the respect of human rights and global solidarity. For a long
time in history, Europe has been a promoter of values that are held to be uni-
versally valid. In this tradition, the EU has also been built on a set of funda-
mental values such as ‘respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality,
the rule of law and respect for human rights’ (Art. 2 Treaty on European
Union). These values are meant to unite all member states. It is the goal of the
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European Union to defend and promote them both in its internal and external
action. As we will argue, beyond the lack of solidarity, the events that led to the
so-called refugee crisis in 2015 and 2016 stand for a clash of solidarities within
and across established member states, a clash about our moral and legal obli-
gations towards refugees and migrants, as well as a clash in our relationships
among our members, and with regard to the moral foundations of our com-
munity of states and citizens (Krastev, 2017a and b).
Raising such normative questions requires, however, a stock-taking exercise
to unveil a large array of variations in the public sphere, especially in terms of
how the news media actually cover humanitarian crises, inform about the
needs of those affected by them and involve readers and audiences in norma-
tive debates.
The European field of solidarity contestation
Our analyses shall help to develop a better understanding of the constitutive
role of (mass) media communication in the construction or erosion of solidarity
in modern society. We wish to raise awareness of the central contribution of the
mass media in channelling contestation of solidarity among citizens across time
and space. Solidarity in modern society can no longer rely solely on face-to face
encounters of intimate relationships, such as the family, but needs to be built on
the mediated relationships among distant people who begin to negotiate respon-
sibilities between each other. In historical terms, the construction of solidarity
relationships among distant people unfolded as part of the nation-building pro-
cess (Rokkan, 1999; Stråth, 2017) and was strongly attached to the idea of soli-
darity among citizens sharing equal (civic, political and social) rights (Banting
and Kymlicka, 2017). The establishment of a public sphere, primarily by means
of mass media, played a crucial role in promoting national identities and a sense
of national solidarity. This role has not lost power, given that feelings of
belongingness and claims for solidarity among co-nationals are constantly repro-
duced and reaffirmed in the public sphere. The mass media are still held respon-
sible for strengthening bonds of national solidarity among members of a political
community (Waisbord, 2004).
However, the mass media cannot be reduced to a functional instrument in the
promotion and stabilisation of national solidarity, given that the mass media
have fuelled public debates that have qualified, and in part even contested,
national solidarities in the name of international, humanitarian or cosmopolitan
visions. Public debates within the mass media are thus shaped by particularistic
and universalistic notions of solidarity. On the one hand, mass media systems
are structured primarily along national divisions, impacting on patterns of news
coverage and public discourse. Scholarly writing has provided ample evidence
on the ways mass media contribute to the reproduction of national identities
(Calabrese and Burke, 1992), and how news coverage of national and inter-
national events is driven by national media systems, interests and sensitivities
(Aalberg et al., 2013; Van Dijk, 1988). This affects the mass media’s approach
Introduction: A divided Europe? 3
in addressing solidarity within and beyond the nation-state, because relations
with co-nationals are dealt with differently than those towards distant others.
According to Walzer (1994), solidarity relationships as established within a
membership community of equals are described as thick or reciprocal, whereas
the support that is granted to distant strangers is often reduced to forms of
charity in a thin and non-reciprocal relationship of inequality.
Additionally, solidarity with distant ‘others’ is subjected to a strong sense of
conditionality, given that support depends on the assumed neediness, deserving-
ness or proximity of potential recipients (Van Oorschot, 2000, 2006). Non-mem-
bers of a national community might thus not apply or even discredit themselves
as legitimate targets of support. This limits the readiness of the mass media to
extend thick conceptions of solidarity to Europeans and European member states,
as evidenced by public debates during the Great Recession. Since 2008, the eco-
nomic crisis has placed fiscal solidarity on top of the policy agenda. However,
news coverage in member states has emphasised conflicts between different
governments about the necessary measures to combat the (budgetary, economic,
and social) consequences of the crisis (De Wilde et al., 2013), in part question-
ing the legitimacy of the Greek governments’ claims for European assistance
(Mylonas, 2012; Papathanassopoulos, 2015). Conditionality seems to be even
stronger in regard to non-Europeans, as the experience of public debates during
the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 and 2016 showed. While the mass media
were initially quite receptive to public solidarity towards the needs of refugees,
this momentum was overlaid by public debates stressing risks (security issues,
integration problems, social costs, cultural menaces), and qualifying deserving-
ness publicly (Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017).
The mass media tend to reproduce national solidarity, because the latter is firmly
institutionalised by the modern nation-state in terms of constitutional rights, poli-
cies and public oratories. However, public debates within the mass media are not
exclusively constrained to particularistic solidarities. On the other hand, there is
evidence that the mass media provide a voice to transnational, cosmopolitan or
universalistic notions of solidarity. The mass media raise questions of global soli-
darity and justice towards non-nationals. Through the coverage of distant suffer-
ing, they confront audiences with their moral responsibility to provide assistance to
strangers (Kyriakidou, 2009, 2015; Nash, 2008), even if these debates are marked
and guided by national agendas and interests. The notion of global solidarity
is therefore not only an abstract normative and legalistic principle. Following
Tönnies’ (2002) distinction between community and society, it is also linked to
different forms of sociation, and here in particular it is tied to the expansive logic of
solidarity relationships within modern society as an association of strangers. The
transition from solidarity, as enshrined in the private relationships of kinship, to
solidarity as a public relationship among strangers underlies the social struggles for
an expansion of rights, citizenship and equality. This contraposition of thick and
thin, communal and associational forms of solidarity is more often than not also
associated with liberal-cosmopolitan and exclusive communitarian values (Brändle
et al., 2019), and is a constant source of public contentions.
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The mass media thus play an ambivalent role in public debates about
(transnational) solidarity. This book aims to shed more light on this ambiva-
lence by focusing on solidarity contestations in regard to the so-called ‘refugee
crisis’. The empirical and theoretical analyses will be devoted to a number of
questions. What are the main topics, ideas and beliefs associated with solidarity
with refugees? Which actors are involved in these debates and who can be
considered as promoting and questioning solidarity towards refugees? How do
these contentions develop across time, and what are the main drivers of public
contention? How are citizens’ comments related to claims-making within the
news coverage, and can we speak of dissociated or integrated public debates?
What role do the mass media play in the construction of antagonistic visions of
solidarity, and are they receptive to discourses about transnational solidarity?
The book also aims to map the public solidarity contestations in a number of
European countries and wishes to advance our knowledge about the patterns,
drivers and implications of these solidarity contentions. Additionally, it wishes
to assess whether the needs and concerns of the others can be communicated in
such a way as to formulate reciprocal commitments between strangers. It is
here that we wish to contribute an original theory of the public sphere and the
media as open spaces for solidarity contestation through which our moral
responsibilities towards others are negotiated nationally, at a European level,
and globally.
The empirical data and theoretical reflections presented in this book emanate
from a research project funded by the European Union under the Research and
Innovation Programme, Horizon 2020. The project was devoted to the analy-
sis of ‘Transnational Solidarity at Times of Crisis’ (TransSol, available at www.
transsol.eu), and was conducted in eight European countries (Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). These
countries are representative of the broader European landscape, displaying very
different attitudes with regard to the question of transnational solidarity and
whether hospitality should be granted to the incoming refugees. TransSOL fol-
lowed a multidimensional approach and was interested in forms, drivers and
implications of (transnational) solidarity at the level of individual citizens (Lahusen
and Grasso, 2018), the organised civil society (Lahusen et al., 2021), public
policies (Federico and Lahusen, 2018) and the public sphere. The focus on the
public sphere was motivated by the assumption that solidarity is a social value,
political concept and legal principle that is discursively constructed in public
contentions. And this means that individual, organised and institutional forms
of (social, political and legal) solidarity are highly dependent on public justifi-
cations and/or susceptible to public criticism. In this sense, this book comple-
ments previous publications of the project, highlighting the prominent role of
the mass media in shaping national and transnational solidarity.
TransSol is also original in the way it deals with variations of public spheres
by combining a news media claims-making analysis with a social media recep-
tion analysis. On the one hand, comparative insights on solidarity contestation
are gained through standard claims-making analysis of a number of variables
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such as main contestants, issues, attitudes towards refugees, forms of actions,
polarisations, degrees of Europeanisation, justifications and ascriptions of respon-
sibility. On the other hand, TransSOL innovates through an exploratory user
reception analysis and inductive coding of citizens’ attitudes towards refugees
expressed on social media (Facebook). This latter analysis offers promising
results on the dynamics of social media contestation, and in particular, the
expression of pro- and anti-refugee sentiments by citizens-users, and the way
such sentiments are translated into political mobilisation in support and/or
rejection of solidarity.
Outline of the book
Given the expected differences in terms of public responses to the mass arrival
of refugees, this volume has four main objectives. First, we identify the extent
to which acts of solidarity towards refugees were granted public awareness in
national public spheres and what claims on behalf of or against hospitality
towards refugees were made, and by whom. Secondly, we reconstruct the
dynamics of solidarity contestation in the public sphere in terms of competing
interests and interpretations between EU-member states, their main lines of divi-
sion and allegiances. Thirdly, we examine the discursive construction of Eur-
opean solidarity in terms of its underlying conceptions, ideas and norms that
drive public debate, and how such different notions of solidarity are used in
contestations between various allegiances (e.g., proponents and opponents of
humanitarian solidarity, of national exclusive notions of solidarity, or of popu-
lism and xenophobia). Fourthly, we trace the different dynamics of media-driven
solidarity contestation from the perspective of public claims makers in the media
who make it into the news, as well as from the perspective of citizens who read
and comment on the news.
The chapters of this volume contribute to these objectives by providing the-
oretical and empirical insights into the dynamics and structures of solidarity
contestations in eight European countries. Our journey starts with a conceptual
and theoretical reflection of the role of the mass media in public debates about
solidarity. In this theoretical chapter, we argue that European integration has
expanded the field of solidarity contestation and opened up the spaces of media
communication through which we define our moral responsibilities towards
others. The expanded space of solidarity contestation is European, but at the
same time is open towards the global and segmented towards the national. We
argue therefore that our empirical analyses require an approach that examines
the European field of solidarity contestations in its relationships to alternative
national or transnational (global) notions of solidarity. Media contestations of
refugees and migrants suggest a tension between exclusive nationalist notions
of solidarity that are often defended by populist parties, an extended notion of
European solidarity among the member states of the EU in handling the ‘crisis’
propagated by some policy actors, and an inclusive conception of humanitarian
solidarity upheld by civil society organisations. In this regard, we propose to
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treat the mass media as a public space of (trans-)national solidarity contestation
that allow us to empirically analyse how this tension between national, Eur-
opean and trans-national-global dimensions of solidarity translates into dis-
cursive struggles that play out in the public sphere. Our approach moves
beyond the more traditional focus on the public sphere, because we contend
that an analysis of the mainstream media needs to be carried out by inquiring
into contestation within the social media. On this basis, we also introduce a
revised and extended conceptualisation of ‘media events’ to advance our case:
the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 and 2016.
Based on these conceptual and theoretical insights, Chapter 3 addresses
methodological issues by discussing claims-making analysis and its applications
in mass media and communication studies. The focus of this chapter is on
methodological choices taken during the development of the comparative
research designs used for the analyses of this book. The aim is not only to
document our methodology in a way that our own research becomes transpar-
ent and replicable. We also wish to give guidance on very concrete questions
(e.g., sampling strategies, coding practices and necessary steps to safeguard the
reliability of data) so that our research can become a source of inspiration for
other scholars. Our methodology draws on two methods of comparative media
analysis that are applicable to news media and to social media: the method of
media claims-making in news content and the method of social media com-
menting analysis regarding news reception. Overall, we will demonstrate in this
chapter how questions related to media functions and responsibilities in the
public sphere, which are derived from normative political theory and theory of
democracy, can be operationalised and turned into empirically measurable and
reliable indicators.
Before the backdrop of these theoretical and methodological reflections, we
will move to the presentation of our main empirical findings. In Part I, we will
engage in comparative analyses, both of the claims-making and the social media
commenting datasets. Chapter 4, on the one hand, takes a closer look at soli-
darity contestation in print media by analysing political claims covered by
national newspapers. The comparative analysis assesses the extent to which
claims of solidarity over the refugee crisis were granted public awareness, as
well as looking at the main characteristics of claims on behalf of or against
refugees, the dynamics of solidarity contestation, and the underlying con-
tentiousness in terms of values and justifications. We also consider the dia-
chronic development of claims-making across the eight countries in order to
assess the extent to which claims follow (or not) a similar cross-national pattern
over time. The chapter also assesses whether potential (mis)matching across
countries can be related to some particular explanatory factors. We consider
variations of ‘grievance-based’ factors, such as the number of asylum applicants,
as well as the potential impact of other domestic-based factors linked to national
political spaces and policies in the field. In so doing, we engage with a long-
standing tradition of scholarly debate that opposes ‘grievance’ and ‘opportunity’
theories in the field of contentious politics. From this viewpoint, given the nature
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of the ‘refugee crisis’ and its transnational implications, we aim to probe into the
relationship between Europeanisation and ‘re-nationalisation’ of solidarity con-
testations beyond an initial appraisal of similarities of debates across countries in
terms of attention cycles.
Chapter 5 shifts attention away from claims-making within news coverage
and centres on news readers’ comments of publicised newspaper articles in
order to analyse bottom-up solidarity contestations on social media. It is pri-
marily interested in the way social media dynamics influence and pattern the
mobilisation of support or opposition towards refugees. While the comparative
study of claims-making has allowed us to map the voice of organised publics
and powerful stakeholders capable of leading politics, our analysis of online
commenting by news readers allows us to shed light on the more hidden side of
the public sphere, where people seize the chance to express emotions and opi-
nions, and translate them into political action. This is particularly interesting
because the case of solidarity with refugees has divided public opinion through-
out Europe with advocates of human rights and open borders opposing suppor-
ters of exclusive national communities and welfare chauvinism. We analyse how
bottom-up contestation of refugee solidarity was triggered by a particular suc-
cession of events and their interpretation in the media: the humanitarian disasters
at Europe’s external borders that unfolded during September 2015. The chapter
presents findings from a comparative analysis of online commenting on Facebook
news sites in order to see how citizens ‘took sides’. In particular, we will show
how they advocated for solidarity with refugees or opposed any support, how
they voiced and justified their opinions, and in which ways they critically
engaged with the issues and claims reported in the news articles posted on the
Facebook sites. On these grounds, we are able to describe the tonality and
structure of solidarity contestations among news readers, and the way these
debates are interrelated with traditional news coverage in the national print
media.
The two comparative chapters highlight important similarities and differ-
ences between the eight countries under analysis, thus contributing to the
identification of key dimensions and factors of solidarity contestations within
the public sphere. These analyses, however, provide only a very rough picture
of the specificities of each of the eight countries. Part II of our book comple-
ments the comparative chapters by zooming in on each of the cases under
study. Chapters 6 to 13 are devoted to a focused analysis of the discursive
context of solidarity contestations and the main features of public debates
in terms of claims-making and news commenting. Each of our eight country
chapters addresses the specific exposure of the country to the events of late 2015
and early 2016, the way the ‘refugee crisis’ made its appearance in the public
sphere and how the mass media contributed to its construction. A closer look
at the structure of the print media is provided in order to indicate the poten-
tial imprint of the country’s national media systems on public contentions, in
particular by highlighting the potential impact of political divisions between
newspapers, the role of political tutelage and party allegiances. Against this
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backdrop, core findings of the claims-making and Facebook comments analy-
sis are presented in order to highlight the main lines of contention, the general
inclination of public debates and the role of key actors in shaping the tonality
and orientation of these discussions. These chapters underline the substantial
differences between the countries under analysis by identifying more hostile
and more moderate publicised public opinions, by highlighting the strong
impact of political parallelism between newspapers and political forces in
some countries, and by indicating the specific contribution state-actors play as
key definers of public debates, when compared to other, more marginalised
actors, such as civil society groups and the refugees themselves. Special
attention is also given to the relation between claims-making within the print
media’s news coverage and the news readers’ comments on the newspapers’
Facebook sites, in order to assess possible linkages and the degree of frag-
mentation of public contestations about solidarity with refugees.
The concluding Chapter 14 finally highlights the main findings of our analysis
and engages in a discussion with important implications. On the one hand, we
reflect on the role and responsibility of newspapers and the social media in trig-
gering conflicts about refugee solidarity. In so doing, we aim to address broader
questions about our public sphere framework of solidarity contestation, focussing
on the role of the media in the treatment of refugees and the respect of human
rights (especially at a time when the media are considered to be responsible for
spreading anti-migration sentiments). Against the standard argument about the
responsibility and negative impact of journalism, and social media more gen-
erally, we maintain that the media cannot be held solely responsible for pro-
moting anti-solidarity and anti-refugee feelings, frames and positions in the
public sphere. Mass and social media also contributed to the spread of news,
statements and discussions favourable to refugees, and they actively contributed
to the momentum of European solidarity that made its appearance during Sep-
tember 2015 throughout Europe. The chapter discusses this ambivalent role of
the mass media and highlights those factors that tend to encourage and limit the
mobilisation of solidarity. On the other hand, we reflect about the implications
of public debates within the mass media on the formation or erosion of solidarity
in the public sphere. We discuss how public debates amplify certain developments
within political debates among European institutions and member states in regard
to the essence and future of solidarity, underlining the particular importance the
principle of solidarity has and is still playing in the architecture of the European
Union. We critically examine political developments that tend to debilitate the
notion of solidarity among European citizens and European member states, and
indicate the importance of solidarity contestations – and the moment of gen-
eralised European solidarity during late 2015 – in the constant reproduction of
this principle.




2 Debating solidarity across borders
The public sphere and role of the media
Introduction: the public sphere as locus of contestations
Since the foundational work by Habermas on the ‘public sphere’ (Habermas, 1989,
orig. 1962), the idea that democracy is grounded in relational spaces of bottom-up
communication – by which citizens intervene through their public interactions on
the largest array of issues and daily concerns – has stood out as a new and more
meaningful framework guiding much sociological research on citizenship, includ-
ing their relationships of contestation and solidarity, beyond the more traditional
attention to main institutional actors and processes. Habermas himself took his
first steps within the disciplinary field of ‘critical theory’, drawing on the aston-
ishing technological progress in communication systems from the 1950s onwards,
and hence, the expanding media-based ‘culture industry’ (Adorno, 2001; Adorno
and Horkheimer, 2002). Accordingly, sociological research on the public sphere
has been developed side by side with the most extensive reflection over the func-
tions of the mass media in modern society, to the point that today, the way the
mass media contribute to the shaping of contestation of solidarity among citizens
in a large scale and anonymous society is a consolidated topic of sociological
inquiry (Lasswell, 1948; Wright, 1960). This strand of research has extended the
focus of attention from the public to the policy sphere, and to the relations
between them (Ambrosini et al., 2020).
In any large democracy, it is impossible for everyone to engage discursively
together in a single physical space. Consequently, individuals must rely to a con-
siderable extent on the mass media to make information available to them and to
debate over different positions, issues and choices within the sphere of politics
(Cinalli and O’Flynn, 2014). In turn, individuals contribute to democratic life by
engaging in public discourses within the mass media and the communicative
interactions these entail, irrespective of whether these interactions are conflictual
or consensual. This also applies to this book’s field of study: public contentions
about solidarity with refugees. The mass media play a decisive role in providing
individual and organised actors with information on related events and develop-
ments, but they also host public debates regarding how the issue of immigration
should be dealt with and the extent to which solidarity should be granted to
refugees. In fact, the number of organised actors engaged in public debates about
solidarity towards refugees is large, including political parties, unions, chur-
ches, as well as a range of charities, NGOs, social movements and groups of
refugees themselves. A comprehensive investigation of public debates thus
allows us to identify the conflictual or consensual relations of these actors over
issues of solidarity. It thus enables us to study ‘national publics’ that are the
object of policy-making (Cinalli, 2004 and 2007; Gray and Statham, 2005) in
connection with the policy sphere, which is composed of institutions and main
political elites that lead processes of decision-making (Ambrosini et al., 2020;
Cinalli, 2017).
While there is a growing body of research that seeks to assess in detail this
complex relationship between public and policy spheres on the one hand,
and, on the other, their display in the media (Cinalli and Giugni, 2013a,
2016a; Dolezal et al., 2010; Ferree et al., 2002; Page, 1996; Wessler et al.,
2008), the process does not remain private but claims generalised validity
(Calhoun, 2002). To assume that discourse in the media can be understood as
a form of ‘engagement’ and mutual ‘challenge’ among a panoply of actors
endowed with different opinions and strategic aims in terms of policy choices
might seem controversial or counter-intuitive, as the media and journalism
are first and foremost meant to be fact-based, objective and neutral (Löffel-
holz and Weaver, 2008). Yet this assumption is consistent with the idea that
the public sphere is an arena of relational exchanges over the definition of the
main issues of public relevance, within which individuals and actors of dif-
ferent kinds negotiate (and fight for) different meanings, construct political
issues and nurture public controversies. Accordingly, the mass media provide
spaces for a continuous and contentious process of communication through
which the participants create their preferred frames to understand social rea-
lity and try to impose the way they see it onto others (Goffman, 1974; Nelson
et al., 1997).
Moreover, in Western liberal societies, journalism and democracy have entered
a symbiotic relationship where news representation and critique are inter-
woven (Habermas, 1989; McNair, 2000). This is important for our under-
standing of how the media shape contestation over solidarity, because it helps
us to see the variable way in which they represent human suffering with nor-
mative critique and justification (Ambrosini et al., 2020; Boltanski, 1999). In
the public sphere, the moral mechanism of this form of engagement applies to
social relationships established by anonymity and distance (Habermas, 1989).
Public discourse is used to exchange information about the needs of others
and the moral obligations and commitments that follow on from it from a
perspective of social justice (Brunkhorst, 2005). Hence, the main point to
retain is that in any modern pluralistic society, different individuals will tend
to see the world in different ways. In turn, this opens the possibility of com-
municating (or denying) experiences of injustice of people who are not pre-
sent, or who even live at a distance but who are nevertheless included in a
discourse of moral commitment (or disengagement) and are thus recognised
(or not) as carriers of rights and legal subjects.
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Conceptualising the mass media as interlocked arenas of
solidarity contestation
The mass media play a crucial role in constructing solidarity. This has been
evidenced repeatedly in regard to the national level, where nationally structured
systems of news coverage facilitate public debates about national solidarity
(Aalberg et al., 2013; Calabrese and Burke, 1992; Van Dijk, 1988). Even here,
solidarity remains a contested object, as will be explained below, given the
diverse views and interests associated with the principle of solidarity. Contestations
within the public sphere develop more complexity once we move to transnational
solidarity. Mass mediated arenas are structured into national compartments, thus
addressing transnational solidarity – e.g., within Europe – from the perspective of
national agendas, preconceptions and interests. However, this does not necessarily
hold true for the public debates they facilitate and guide. Particularly in regard to
debates about European solidarity towards refugees and asylum seekers, we see an
interlocking of national arenas of solidarity contestations. Not only do they host
debates about the readiness of national governments and fellow citizens to act in
support of refugees, but also expedite deliberations about each other’s readiness to
engage in mutual support within the EU. Solidarity contestation thus develops a
relational aspect that transcends national borders (see also Lahusen, 2021).
Driven by the expansive logic of the public sphere, solidarity engagement
has a potential to become transnational. To the extent that such external linkages
become institutionalised and translate into solidarity practices beyond the
national, we can speak of transnational solidarity as discursive links that define
commitments among distant groups of people. Such a widening of our horizon of
moral commitment relies on the availability of a mediating infrastructure that
helps to bring distant events to our attention and make them relevant to us. The
solidarity of the public sphere builds on the mass media, which are not just a
neutral transmitter of information about what is happening at a distance, but also
a forum of critique and of normative debate about the interpretation of these
events and their relevance for our moral self-understanding.
This transgression of a national frame of reference is partly due to the nor-
mative underpinnings of the principle of solidarity. Solidarity can be defined as a
disposition and practice of support towards others (Bayertz, 1999; Deken et al.,
2009; Stjernø, 2012: 88). Solidarity is practiced at the level of individuals within
kindship or friendship relationships (Komter, 2005), organised at the level of civil
societies in terms of philanthropic organisations, welfare associations or advocacy
groups (Giugni and Passy 2001; Lahusen et al., 2021; Smith et al., 1997; Zschache
et al. 2020), and institutionalised within the welfare states through constitutional
principles and public policies of redistribution (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017;
Federico and Lahusen, 2018). Solidarity contestations within the public sphere are
essential for all these forms of lived solidarity, given that the mass media provide
a highly patterned arena of voicing and debating ideas and claims about the
content and scope of solidarity. In this sense, one element merits special atten-
tion: the notion of group-bound rights and obligations of mutual support. In fact,
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solidarity as a norm or rule transcends the unilateral orientation of concepts such
as care, empathy or altruism, because it is more strictly tied to the idea of
reciprocity. Solidarity does not only entail the idea of (personal, organisational
or institutional) obligations to help others in need, but also the notion of rights
of recipients to be helped by others. Solidarity might be restricted to national
communities (particularistic solidarity) that exclude outsiders (e.g., migrants),
but solidarity can also refer to a wider community of equals (e.g., humankind –
universalistic solidarity) that questions the distinction between insiders and
outsiders, and promotes the idea of shared rights and obligations among all
humans. Overall, the different conceptions of solidarity converge in a political
component that stresses the notion of shared rights, responsibilities and obli-
gations (Lahusen, 2020) to be applied to particular and/or universal groups.
The mass media provide us with the communicative infrastructure that
allows for the formulation of mutual obligations and responsibilities among
individuals, and for the validation of claims for (or against) particular or uni-
versal solidarity. This mediating role relates to different dimensions of solidar-
ity contestations. The public sphere of the mass media facilitates an almost
instant and global dissemination of distant events, but also turns this informa-
tion into news that is discussed by underlying common criteria of relevance
(Michailidou and Trenz 2014; Neidhardt, 1994; Risse, 2014). The shared world
of news is in this sense also a world of shared concern and commitment.
Responses to images of the pain of distant others, and their translation into a
political language of commitment, follows established and institutionalised
narratives that structure our social relationships to strangers and justify our
moral stance towards them (Boltanski, 1999). Solidarity debates in the news
therefore follow established narrating structures that are held valid over time
and across social context.
In this regard, it is important to highlight that the mass media do not confine
solidarity relationships to national communities of citizens (Habermas, 1996),
but they also continuously confront us with the suffering and the needs of dis-
tant people, who are primarily defined as strangers (Bohman, 1998). As such,
they unfold a critical force to put to the test established solidarity relationships
within this horizon of (global) social justice (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2013;
Silverstone, 2006). In this sense, they also play a crucial role with regard to
European solidarity. On the one hand, the coverage of European news can be
a discursive challenge, because it can provoke an engagement with the needs
of others. On the other side, it facilitates contestations about the extent to
which solidarity in Europe and among Europeans should be either promoted
or opposed. For these reasons, it is advisable to focus attention on these extensive
interactions across Europe, its states and regions, with the aim to uncover, if any,
evidence of Europeanising synergies across very distinct national publics, which
would otherwise remain apart owing to differences in geographical distribution,
language, and cultural and political conceptions.
The analyses of this book underline the necessity to transcend the nation
state as the only pertinent arena of solidarity contestation. Seminal studies on
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immigrants and policy-making have tended to privilege a national framework,
for example, by highlighting the strength of policy actors and institutions
(Freeman, 1998; Joppke, 1996), and by looking at the ways national publics
have had an impact on policy actors and decision-making (Faist, 1994; Husbands,
1994). In this sense, scholarly research has put emphasis on the prominence of
nationally based mass media, institutions and policy elites since the alternative
notion of a pan-European policy domain with an integrated European-wide
public sphere is still unrealistic (Chabanet, 2008; Hooghe, 2008). However,
interest has been growing for the two-way interaction between national and
European public spheres, given that both arenas of public and policy debate are
interlocked, for instance, in terms of actors, issues and claims. In fact, studies
have unveiled that the divide between dominant and marginal actors within
public debates runs across the national and supranational arenas of contesta-
tion. Some inquiries have centred on top-down relations between discourse
participants by emphasising the impact of EU institutions, policy elites and their
interventions on public debates at the national or local level (Favell, 1998). In
this case, scholars have gone beyond the limits of the migration field, engaging
with both normative and empirical analyses (Curtin, 2006; Maloney and van
Deth, 2008; Smismans, 2006). Others have insisted on bottom-up relations
between discourse participants, for instance, when addressing the role of Eur-
opean civil society in the public sphere (della Porta and Caiani, 2009; Ruzza,
2006) and its ability to raise a voice of solidarity with refugees (della Porta,
2018). In particular, investigations have focused on the inclusion of a European
civil society within the new modes of EU governance (Armstrong, 2002; della
Porta, 2008), even though some studies have called into question the tight rela-
tionship between the public and the policy spheres in Europe (Magnette, 2003;
Saurugger, 2008), showing that governance dynamics in Europe are not neces-
sarily inclusive of weaker interests (Beyers, 2004; Eising, 2004).
Out of this flourishing field of scholarship inquiring across the national and
the transnational level, our book takes a prudent stance that acknowledges the
importance of national arenas of solidarity contestations, while inquiring into
potential intersections and interrelations. Here, we follow evidence generated
by studies of contentious politics that has insisted on the ability of political
activists and protest groups to unleash dynamics of mobilisation across the
national and the transnational levels (Balme et al., 2002; della Porta and
Tarrow, 2005; Imig and Tarrow, 2001; Smith et al., 1997), as shown also by
studies dealing specifically with the migrants and refugees (Giugni and Passy,
2000, 2002; della Porta, 2018; Lahusen et al., 2021).
Beyond social movement analysis, scholarship with a bottom-up approach
has also testified to the increasing use of transnational frames and justifications
in normative and ethical debates about rights, justice and solidarity (Soysal,
1994; Sassen, 1999). Norms and ideas spread on a global scale due to intensified
communicative exchanges across national public and media spheres (Meyer,
2000). Within the European Union, a European communicative space has con-
solidated not only in the way EU actors and institutions regularly feed the
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media with news content, but also in the way formerly dispersed publics follow
the same news stories through their national media, and discover issues of
shared concern (Trenz, 2005 and 2015). The Europeanisation of public debates
in the media does not necessarily lead to a convergence of views and opinions
expressed by journalists and shared by audiences, but is frequently driven by the
new politicised dynamics of European integration that enhances the salience of
EU issues and debates in the media, and gathers actors from different national
backgrounds as protagonists of ‘mediatised conflicts’ (Michailidou and Trenz,
2010). The making of a European public sphere can, in this sense, be observed
with regard to the intensified dynamics of public claims-making that evolve
through vertical and horizontal exchanges among actors who engage in con-
troversial debates about issues of focused attention within and across national
media spheres (Koopmans and Statham, 2010).
Following scholarly writing, we can thus assume that solidarity contestations
do not only evolve within a vertically intersected space of national and Eur-
opean arenas of claims-making, but also within a horizontally interlocked space
of diverse national debates. This is why the analysis of this book is put in the
context of the broader debate about the various pathways to the formation of a
European public sphere. Accordingly, we are interested in evaluating the effects
of the refugee crisis on solidarity contestation of Europeans, looking more spe-
cifically at the effects of how the main organised actors and news readers
intervene across the public and policy spheres, as well as across the national
and the transnational level, to raise their voices and thus contribute to the for-
mation or erosion of solidarity among Europeans with incoming refugees.
The contentiousness of solidarity towards refugees in the news
Solidarity towards refugees as ‘distant others in need’ remains contested in the
news media. On the one hand, national media organisations and journalism
will often give preference to a nationalist-exclusive framing of solidarity that
distinguishes between insiders and outsiders (Williams and Toula, 2017). Espe-
cially in the case of the refugee crisis, we can expect a contentious politics in
defence of a nationally exclusive understanding of solidarity against European
or global humanitarian commitments (Della Porta, 2018). On the other hand,
the media and journalism have the potential to defend an ethos of transnational
and global solidarity (Brunkhorst, 2007; Calhoun, 2005). In our case, the news
coverage of the ‘refugee crisis’ facilitated not only almost instant global dis-
semination, but also turned information about distant events into news that
raised questions of solidarity and moral responsibilities. Sharing news about the
European ‘refugee crisis’ is, in this sense, also a way of sharing concern and
commitment.
In tracing these contentious dynamics of solidarity discourse in the news
media, we build on a specific research design of claims-making that links actors’
positions to public justifications. Solidarity contestation in the public domain
manifests itself in public claims-making within the media. Media claims are
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partly related to social actors’ (individuals, political representatives or institu-
tions) strategies of agenda-setting. As such, they relate to power positions of
moral entrepreneurs, who compete for attention in the public arena (Koopmans
and Statham, 1999, 2010). Media claims are, however, also given selective salience
by media actors who filter and frame public discourse in such a way as to draw
audience attention. As such, media claims follow a particular media logic of
publicity (Altheide, 2004; Couldry, 2012). This is important to stress, because
there is always an infinite number of potential targets of solidarity, which are
only brought selectively to the attention of the public. Calls for solidarity or its
rejection are, therefore, dependent on successful strategies of agenda-setting that
relate to the power positions of the respective public claims-makers, who in turn
compete for attention in the public arena. Selective attention of the media insti-
tutions further narrows the horizon of pity and compassion, and what passes
through the media as a solidarity filter encounters an audience that is not neces-
sarily interested and/or willing to engage.
A focus on refugees and asylum seekers as a particular target group of soli-
darity contestation is particularly interesting because the case of solidarity with
refugees and asylum seekers has divided public opinion all over Europe. News
media report about advocates of human rights and open borders opposing
supporters of exclusive, nationalist welfare (Della Porta, 2018). But also online
commenting joins these debates as a form of bottom-up mobilisation, by voi-
cing opinions that take shape either as a politics of fear or a politics of pity
(Boltanski, 1999; Wodak, 2015). We expect that public claims-makers and the
social media community of news readers is divided on these issues, and that
top-down and bottom-up contestation of refugee solidarity are triggered by
particular events and their interpretation in the media, such as the humanitarian
disasters at Europe’s external borders (Triandafyllidou, 2018). The dramatic
events brought into focus by the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 and 2016, are
particularly interesting because they were staged in many countries as direct
confrontations between citizens and refugees (Thomas et al., 2018). It is there-
fore all the more interesting to zoom in on solidarity contestation at the peak of
a heated debate, when media claims-making was most intensive.
The focus on the so-called refugee crisis allows us to investigate the con-
tentiousness of public debates. It is to be expected that the dramatic growth of
migration flows, which were associated with humanitarian tragedies, uncon-
trolled border crossings and unresolved problems of asylum and integration,
provoked substantial conflicts between contending parties. Accordingly, we will
be able to unveil potential normative biases that dramatise the conflict between
contrasting interests at stake during the crisis. In particular, the element of crisis
enables us to provide more evidence regarding the major changes that have
(allegedly) been produced, the way issues are debated in the public domain, the
position of different actors, and the forms these public interventions take. Our
data allow us to pay special attention to social actors such as charities and
NGOs, social movements, group organisations of different types (including refu-
gees themselves), traditional political actors along the right/left spectrums, public
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institutions and policy elites. And it also opens insights into the importance of
both national and transnational politics in terms of structures, actors, and stra-
tegic interventions.
The case of the ‘refugee crisis’ also enables us to dig deeper into contestations
among Europeans, as the crisis has reinforced old geographical cleavages in
Europe (the south vs. the north; the east vs. the west) with new reasons for
division. The main point is social – whether the increase in humanitarian
emergency has indeed loosened social bonding across the European countries –
but also political, since the increasing clash between the winners and the losers
of the crisis, the strengthening of populist and extreme-right wing parties, and
in particular, the retreat of expansive citizenship regimes, may have struck a
final blow to European solidarity, whose effects will be more visible over time.
The refugee crisis: a media event
How can we account for this constitutive role of the news media in solidarity
contestation? The functions of the media in the promotion of debates can be
summed up as follows. First, the media portray the world for us. News jour-
nalism creates publicity: It brings possible subjects of solidarity to our attention
by representing their (often distant) suffering and their need for assistance and
help; for instance, the image of a drowned boy on the beach in Turkey. Sec-
ondly, the media interpret the world for us. Journalists provide interpretations
of the causes and effects of human suffering; for instance, they divide the world
into victims and perpetrators. Yet, media coverage is not simply objective and
classificatory. A third function which journalism often fulfils is to engage us in
normative debates and critique: they turn us into witnesses of human suf-
fering and discuss the deservingness of victims or the responsibility of per-
petrators. Finally, the media tell us what to do, for instance by helping us to
understand the possible option of expanding and/or restricting our solidarity
engagement. They confront us with the urgency ‘to do something about it’ and
to take action against perceived injustices. Such calls for action can address us
as citizens and thus trigger our personal engagement in solidarity action, but
more regularly, they address our political representatives, nationally and
transnationally (Michailidou and Trenz, 2019; Mortensen and Trenz, 2016;
Trenz, 2020).
To understand how relationships of solidarity towards non-present others
are extended and/or restricted, it is of crucial importance to unveil whether all
these issues are debated consensually or controversially in the media. Do var-
ious media outlets portray the same events and help us to focus our attention
on the same instances of human suffering? Do they converge in their inter-
pretations of the causes and effects of these instances of injustice, and do they
address political representatives in the same way? As mentioned above, the
political space wherein solidarity relationships are expressed and agreement can
be reached about our normative commitments towards others is commonly held
to be identical with the nation state. This does not foreclose the possibility that
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the confines of solidarity are constantly contested between different social groups
and political actors, and possibly also extended beyond the nation state. In this
context, it is important to remember that public debates within the national
public spheres are exposed to controversies about a complex set of legal entitle-
ments and obligations. Nation-states have established institutional and proce-
dural prerequisites – in particular, social rights tied to citizenship – that commit
both citizens and political representatives to solidarity, e.g., through social assis-
tance and redistribution (Miller, 2007). This commitment to citizenship, however,
comes with a commitment to human rights that is equally constitutionally
enshrined and drives journalistic orientations and working practices (Hannerz,
2004). From the latter perspective, contestations of solidarity always extend
beyond, or even question, the boundaries of the national community.
The mass media exhibit a Janus face, because they are a transmission belt for
universal notions of justice (they represent the world), and a filter for the con-
solidation of thickened and contextualised relationships of solidarity (they speak
on behalf of a national community of equals). This double nature offers oppor-
tunities for transnational solidarity mobilisation. There is, in other words, a
transnationalising mechanism built into the mass media, because they provide an
arena to constantly challenge politically confined solidarity relationships and
voice criticism by reference to the justificatory requirement of global justice
(Habermas, 1996). In light of this criticism, the political space within which
solidarity relationships are established can always be considered to be transitory
and amenable to be opened up to external linkages. According to this expansive
logic of the public sphere, solidarity engagement might become transnational in
the sense that it establishes discursive links that define moral commitments
among distant groups of people. Such a widening of our horizon relies on the
availability of a mediating infrastructure to bring distant events to our attention
and make them relevant for us. The mass media fulfil this mediating role, as
indicated above, because they are not just a neutral transmitter of information
about what is happening at a distance, but also a forum of critique and of nor-
mative debate about the interpretation of these events and their relevance for our
moral self-understanding.
In this volume, we will focus on this often-overlooked role played by the
media in establishing solidarity relationships among individuals across estab-
lished borders of national communities. We will empirically investigate and
compare mediated solidarity discourses within national public spheres in which
mutual obligations between states and the equal rights of individuals across
borders are discussed controversially. Given that special interest in solidarity
contestations within the public sphere, we will focus our attention on the spe-
cific opinions and positions that become relevant within these debates. In this
regard, we will be interested in a number of elements or variables that may help
to operationalise the notion of solidarity contestations within the public sphere.
First of all, we will take a closer look at the entrepreneurs who call for the
extension of solidarity relationships or their rejection. There are those, for
instance, who provide the basic information about distant events and the needs
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of others, or those who emphasise the primacy of locals over people in distant
places. This typically comes along with different moral values and justifications,
for instance, in how claimants express a behaviour of benevolence towards
these others, or perceive them as threats to their national community. There are,
secondly, the targets of solidarity, usually particular categories of social actors in
need of assistance. These targets are mainly treated as objects, whose needs are
defined by others and represented in public discourse; yet they can themselves
take a more active role as subjects with the power to self-define their needs and
negotiate the conditions under which they receive assistance. There are, thirdly,
media organisations and mediating institutions, such as newspapers and journal-
ists, that facilitate flows of information, create the conditions for the selective
visibility of the suffering and the needs of others, and thus selectively amplify the
calls for solidarity. Finally, there are the passive and not so passive audiences of
those who listen to or are addressed by solidarity discourse. Particular attention
will be granted to those members of the audience who decide to post comments
on published news articles and thus raise their voice through social media in
response to media discourse.
For the analysis of solidarity contestations, it is important to stress that the
thematic scope of these debates is highly selective and focused. In the first
instance, there is an infinite number of potential targets of solidarity, who are
only brought selectively to the attention of the public. Calls for solidarity, or
its rejection, are further dependent on successful strategies of agenda-setting
that relate to the specific interests, agendas and power positions of the various
entrepreneurs competing for attention in the public arena. The selective attention
of the media institutions further narrows down our horizon of pity and com-
passion, and what is transmitted through the media filter encounters an audience
that has its own sensitivities, preferences and opinions. In sum, it is highly
plausible to assume that ‘focusing events’ play a pivotal role in the arousal of
transnational solidarity debates in the media that are able to draw the atten-
tion of national as well as transnational/global audiences.
Media engagement in transnational solidarity debates is usually linked to the
salience of particular events like war actions or earthquakes that bring the
needs and suffering of distant others to our attention. The exceptional character
of news coverage about selected instances of distant suffering follows the rules
of the media attention market. As such, transnational solidarity contestation is
typically linked to forms of humanitarian campaigning through old and new
media, which can be very efficient, for instance, in mobilising humanitarian aid
in cases of disaster or famine (Baringhorst, 1998). The reliance on the drama of
external events is characteristic in the way the mass media trigger transnational
solidarity contestations, and this approach is distinct from the more routinised
reciprocal solidarity among citizens. This might be the reason why these event-
specific forms of transnational solidarity mobilisation often find expression in
public charity campaigns that are conditional on the selective attention paid to
distant events and instances of distant suffering (Andersen and de Silva, 2017;
Pallotta, 2012). Through media campaigns, ad-hoc assistance in emergency
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situations can be mobilised quickly, without necessarily evoking more long-
lasting reciprocal commitments. This form of selective aid remains bound to
particular circumstances, and as such, needs to be distinguished from the
solidarity of mutual obligations and commitments.
Online and social media communications have enhanced the potential of
solidarity contestation around events of distant suffering. What these platforms
have in common is that they engage users with media content that conveys
information or messages about the needs of other people. Through the con-
frontation with such content, social media users become witnesses of instances
of distant suffering by others. Such witnessing creates a situation of moral
spectatorship (Boltanski, 1999; Silverstone, 2006). This spectatorship can build
more immediate relationships between online users/citizens and the objects
of suffering, while at the same time it can activate their critical capacities
(Mortensen and Trenz, 2016). The witnessing of human suffering through the
media can be, on the one hand, paired with the expression of strong emotions
such as pity, indignation or hatred. On the other hand, it can arouse moral
commitments that can motivate and encourage media users to commit and
group around a cause. In contrast to the more passive reception of political
news through legacy media, social media exposure to controversial, shocking or
concerning news content can easily arouse more personal reactions and com-
mitments (Chouliaraki, 2013; Mortensen and Trenz, 2016). Forms of moral
spectatorship can, for instance, create new opportunities for global solidarity
mobilisation through visuals that are shared through social media and trans-
lated into political speech that claims solidarity with victims in other parts of
the world, while ascribing responsibility (Chouliaraki, 2013; Chouliaraki and
Stolic, 2017). In contrast, it can also fuel perceptions of stigmatisation, threat or
hatred towards minority groups – particularly when combined with the cir-
culation of inauthentic material (Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017). In both
respects, they mobilise emotional debates. By expressing this commitment through
posting or liking, for example, the expression of emotions is translated into
forms of political speech. Instead of an emotion or sentiment analysis of poli-
tical debates, we propose paying attention to these translations of sentiment
into political speech. Such political expressions of emotion in response to media
encounters with refugees indicate clear preferences about whether or not the
concerned person or group deserves solidarity, and in expressing them in such a
controversial way they ascribe political responsibility and thus urge for political
action.
In this volume, we wish to argue that the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015 is to
be treated first and foremost as a phenomenon that was constructed within
the public sphere by and through the mass media. The ‘refugee crisis’ is a
‘media event’, which means that its salience and its political repercussions
need to be discussed in relation to the debates triggered within the mass media
and the way media audiences were addressed by politicians and public inter-
mediaries, such as journalists. To emphasise the event-like and exceptional
character of the ‘refugee crisis’ might seem controversial as one might argue
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that the ‘refugee crisis’ is not a new and recent phenomenon. Besides the fact
that Europe’s eastern border has always been porous to the inflow of undo-
cumented migrants, large numbers of refugees have made their way to Europe
by boat through the Mediterranean since the early 1990s and throughout the
2000s, with increasing inflows following the Arab Springs in the 2010s. Why,
then, were European politicians so alarmed at the rise of asylum seekers in
2015? (Lucassen, 2018).
The reference to real events provides possible answers, and our analytical focus
on the ‘refugee crisis’ as a media event is not meant to invalidate an interpreta-
tion that refers to facts and causal effects such as the civil war in Syria, the
political unrest in the Middle East and the flight of many citizens these events
prompted. However, real events matter only partially for the unfolding of the
‘refugee crisis’, because they do not determine the way they are debated and
interpreted within the public sphere and by the media (Triandafyllidou, 2018).
The focus of this volume is therefore not on the causality of flight, but on the
patterns of perception and commitment: online and mass media grant organised
actors and individual readers with opportunities to voice their opinions, but
they also contribute to public opinion formation through the way they inform,
highlight and interpret events and developments. The ‘refugee crisis’ was thus
highly mediated. This observation can be corroborated by the patterns of recep-
tion, given that refugees were welcomed, rejected or simply met with indifference.
The arrival of refugees thus triggered quite different responses, which were not
just context bound, but in addition also heavily contested. For these reasons, we
will thus focus the analyses of the following chapters on how the media created
the contextual conditions for the public perceptions of refugees as ‘deserving’
‘our’ attention (making ‘them’ ‘relevant’ for us). Additionally, we will be inter-
ested in unveiling the role of the mass media as the principal arena of public
contestations, where different attitudes towards ‘them’ are shaped, given expres-
sion and translated into policy alternatives that define ‘our’ collective responses
towards ‘others’.
To talk of the ‘refugee crisis’ as a media event might seem cynical or even
unethical for some. In fact, media images are not necessarily ‘fake’, but often
reflect the real suffering of the people behind them. Refugees are not only
objects of media coverage, but real persons who became victims of violence,
terror and war. Moreover, what needs to be taken into account is the possi-
bility that the enhanced visibility of the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ is also to be
explained by real life encounters between the European population and
incoming refugees. Many Europeans drew on lived experiences of encounters
with refugees and their needs in the streets, at train stations, in schools or at
work and not just on televised images, when they made up their mind on
whether they deserve our help or not.
Our interpretation of the refugee crisis as a ‘media event’ does not devalue the
relevance of real encounters. On the contrary, we assume that encounters with
human suffering do have a significant impact on shaping individual and col-
lective responses. Higher numbers of incoming refugees increase the likelihood
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of real-life encounters, but by doing so they also shape media images, even
though this transferal comprises an element of translation and transformation.
The misery of refugees and their basic needs become a frequent topic of media
stories, both in the form of visuals with often strong content (such as muti-
lated or dead bodies), and of textual narratives that translate our experiences
as witnesses into collective feelings and reactions. In the same way, our daily
encounters with the arrival of refugees are turned into media stories, for
instance, the photographs or videos taken at ports and train stations in Greece,
Italy, Hungary and Germany.
The ‘reality’ behind the refugee crisis is also evidenced by the impact of mass
media coverage on civic engagement. Many have argued that the ‘refugee crisis’
of 2015 was distinct in the way it triggered at least a momentary civil society
bottom-up mobilisation in support of solidarity with refugees (Della Porta,
2018). The ‘real events’ that accompanied the so-called refugee crisis of the
summer and autumn of 2015 personally engaged many people in European
countries like Greece, Italy, Austria, Germany or Sweden in humanitarian
action. The ‘real’ was made visible in the elementary needs of the refugees, and
in the personal confrontation with their ‘real’ suffering. A ‘welcoming culture’
was made possible in some parts of Europe through the direct and/or mediated
confrontation with human suffering, and in the end, it mattered little whether
public perceptions were shaped by live encounters of the local population with
refugees on the streets, or through televised live broadcasting. The emotions
and the engagement of thousands of ordinary citizens engaged in humanitarian
action created their own media images and stories, which played a crucial role
in the collective mobilisation of solidarity.
The events of summer 2015 stand out in the way they enhanced the visibility
of human suffering for western viewers. However, international and humani-
tarian organisations had attempted to mobilise practices of public mourning
during previous instances of shipwrecks in the Mediterranean (Albahari, 2015).
These attempts had a limited impact and remained confined to the periphery of
Europe’s southern borders, where municipalities, civil society groups or jour-
nalists appealed to politicians in the capitals of their countries and to larger
audiences to pay attention to the events on their remote islands. These cases
unveil that the shift of attention from the local to the national and transna-
tional requires a massive intervention of mass media organisations. This shift of
attention is all the more difficult if national politicians resist the humanitarian
agenda of structural injustice by emphasising uniquely such aspects as the so-
called war on human smuggling, and by depicting refugees not as ‘victims’, but
as non-deserving economic migrants to be swiftly processed and deported.
If we wish to specify the conditions for the refugee crisis to become a wake-
up call for the moral consciousness of a transnational, European public, we
therefore need to turn our attention to the public mobilisation for humanitarian
concerns through mainstream media channels. In this regard, the ‘crisis’ frame
is crucial to understand how media events are staged and how the media help to
focus the attention of audiences. This ‘crisis’ frame, however, is ambivalent. On
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the one side, the ‘crisis’ frame can evoke feelings of compassion and pity with
victims, which offers opportunities for humanitarian mobilisation out of an
emergency situation. On the other side, it is used by those who express concern
with mass arrivals of refugees as a security threat, or as a threat to national
culture, identity and material resources. In this volume, we are interested in the
way media events around the refugee crisis were constructed, and how they
were communicated in such a way as to facilitate such a turn from humanity to
security, or from security back to humanity. Along these lines, we will be
interested in unveiling how the media events aroused solidarity commitments
and how long they were able to last.
The analyses of this book are thus committed to better understanding the
refugee crisis as a media event that drew its specific dramatic effects precisely
from the symbiosis of the ‘real’ and ‘palpable’ human suffering and the moral
framing tied to the media stories. Media and cultural studies have insisted on
the importance of these media stories, because they emphasise that real events
need expression in terms of cultural frames and narratives. In particular, they
insist on the dramaturgical elements of ‘staging’ or ‘orchestrating’ media events
(Dayan and Katz, 1992). This insight is helpful to better understand the rele-
vance of non-media actors, who interact with and for the media as protagonists
in the public performance. These performers are professionals, for instance,
celebrities, royals or sportspersons, who do not work for the mass media, but
are strongly familiar with them and know how to perform in front of them.
Dayan and Katz especially stress the ritual character of such performances.
These events are usually announced at a fixed date in such a way as to arouse
expectations, and they are carefully staged and marketised. Audiences as well
develop their rituals of celebrating the events by holding the time of broad-
casting off, inviting family and friends or organising public viewing. As rituals,
media events have, first and foremost, an integrative function. In television,
such media events have the potential to gather the whole nation, or even a
worldwide viewing public (Dayan and Katz, 1992).
This conceptualisation of media events requires prudent reflection (Couldry
et al., 2010), because media communication in a globalised media environment
does not seem to emphasise the ritual, but rather the exceptional character of
these events. The latter are not necessarily routinely staged. The attention is
drawn instead to the extraordinary character of occurrences, in the sense that
media events are something that are not expected and/or that are particularly
dramatic, potentially affecting large parts of the audience. Couldry et al. (2010,
p. 12) criticise the media ritual approach for disregarding other phenomena like
moral panics, conflicts, scandals or crisis, which are regularly staged by the
media. In all these cases, events are no longer routine, but disruptive. This
brings to the attention the contentiousness of media events, because the media
are a stage for the performance of rivalries among actors, who have an interest
in pushing their competing interpretations about the event, about its relevance
and about its lasting consequences. Media events can serve the purpose of
drawing the public’s attention to potential harm for the community, or harm
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for others, from which follows the urgency to take action. Accordingly, news
coverage around such ‘focusing events’ can open ‘windows of opportunity’ for
diverse actors to push for policy change (Kingdon, 1984). An adequate analy-
sis has thus to consider not only the media event’s agenda-setting function
(Birkland, 1998), but also needs to examine the drama of the actors who compete
for attention and the heightened attention of audiences. From this perspective,
media-staged conflicts are often staged as a media-morality play about the inter-
pretation of the events and its political consequences (Wagner-Pacifici, 1986).
This does not necessarily lead to the confirmation of norms, because these norms
can be contested during these debates, thus affecting the self-understanding and
identity of the political community.
The solidarity contestations under analysis in this book provide a particularly
interesting case, because the media events reach beyond national borders and
achieve a broader cultural significance. On the one side, they resonate with
global values and cosmopolitan narratives, and provide evidence for the need to
engage in solidarity with refugees. In this sense, they provide opportunities for
the manifestation of shared visions of brother- and sisterhood in reaction to
humanitarian disasters. On the other side, they are often interpreted as essential
threats to the local community at stake. The way such disasters or threats are
defined is itself part of the media spectacle, where it is often not the single
event, but a sequence of events over time that is used to build drama. Previous
studies examining migration related debates have shown that mediated events
are typically organised around competing normative discourses that guarantee
the consistency of the debate over time (Fiske, 1994) and allow audiences or
electorates to identify with the different positions at stake. News events do in
this sense not necessarily trigger new debates but rather keep the narrative
going. In fact, established narratives require constant renewal in terms of nor-
mative arguments and justifications in order to reassert their general validity.
This applies to the case of immigration, because nationally exclusive and
transnationally inclusive narratives constantly refer to and reinterpret events
from their own perspective, portraying them as an opportunity for the arousal
of global solidarity, or a threat to national communities (Helbling, 2014).
Beyond the commonly held assumption of media events as ‘routines’, we thus
arrive at an interpretation of ‘crisis’ as media staged and media constituted
(Michailidou and Trenz, 2015). ‘Crisis’ is an attribute of media discourse, not a
core feature of the natural course of events. The notion of crisis is so central to
a media event because it provides the opportunity to focus public attention and
to stage public or collective reactions in response to a particular grievance tar-
geted by public and media discourse. Media are in this sense seen as constitutive
to the ‘refugee crisis’, both in terms of offering core mediating capacities and
providing the public stage for the crisis conflicts. Crises unfold through the
available media spheres and infrastructures in Europe – new and old media,
offline and online and news. Delving into the media perspective of the crisis is
paramount for understanding how the refugee crisis is interpreted either as a
major threat to security, or as a humanitarian disaster. Mediating capacities
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are needed to arbitrate between the security threat and the humanitarian
dimensions of the crisis and to sustain vital information and communication
flows between and across the different space dimensions of the crisis, namely, the
subnational, the national, the European and the global. The media play a fun-
damental role in this process, not only in shaping the perceptions and develop-
ment of the crisis itself, but also in driving political and social (re)actions to the
crisis, and any measures taken at the elite level to counter it. They function as
agenda setters (e.g. highlighting particular aspects of crisis and actors who are
dealing with the crisis); as crisis actors themselves (e.g., exacerbating a critical
situation or creating moral ‘panics’); and, perhaps above all, as the general
‘interpreter of public voice’ (e.g., amplifying popular perceptions of blame for
the crisis, and often reinforcing collective identity stereotypes). These ‘blaming
dynamics’ are of crucial importance within the ‘refugee crisis’ debate, because
they amplify popular perceptions and stereotypes about the deservingness of
refugees, on the one hand, and of countries as recipients of solidarity on the
other, and thus have a direct impact on the reaffirmation or erosion of trans-
national and/or European solidarity.
The unfolding of the media-refugee crisis: how the media contribute to
the ‘reality’ of a European media event
The analysis of this book starts from the assumption that the ‘refugee crisis’ is a
media event and should thus also be investigated in these terms to better under-
stand its patterns and dynamics. For such an examination, we need to lay down
what the distinct characteristics of this media event were, and what allowed
European audiences to identify the refugee crisis as a rupture to how immigration
debates unfolded in previous times. Staging the refugee crisis as a distinct media
event is a complex phenomenon that involves participating actors, different legacy
and social media, as well as wider audiences. The fact that this crisis was per-
ceived and enacted as a common European emergency situation even underlines
the complexity of the phenomenon under study, evidencing that the crisis unfol-
ded as a synchronised, interlocked or transnationally integrated media event. In
order to prepare the empirical analysis of the following chapters, it is thus advi-
sable to highlight those factors that seem to have contributed to the distinctive-
ness of the media events of summer 2016. Four points must be highlighted:
1 The disruptive event: The definition of immigration events as incidents of a
larger crisis was facilitated by the disruptions created by the civil war in
Syria. The commotion was extraordinary, because 13.5 million Syrians
were mentioned by the UN as requiring humanitarian assistance, thus more
than half of the pre-war population (22 million in 2015).1 While the
majority of these people were hosted inside Syria or in its neighbouring
countries, an unprecedented number of people left the war-torn region
during the summer of 2015 to make their way to Europe. Many of these
people opted for the new Balkan route, which – compared to the barrier of
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the Mediterranean Sea – provided a less dangerous route to Europe. The
disruption allows us to delimit the ‘crisis’ in time and space and to trace
the movement from its point of departure to the expected places of arrival
within Europe. The unprecedented and exceptional character of these
events was constantly emphasised by all actors involved, which contributes
to a crisis rhetoric as an important element of the media drama.
2 The live coverage: The mere size of the phenomenon matters when
explaining how the ‘crisis’ came to the attention of western publics, but the
arrival of the refugees brought the war victims much closer to the television
cameras. Large numbers of journalists were deployed to cover the journey
of the refugees and to deliver live images from the Turkish shores, the Greek
islands, the Macedonian border and the train stations in Hungary (Feinstein
and Storm, 2017). The dramatic moment was amplified by televised images
of ‘sudden’ departure, ‘mass exodus’, ‘coming closer’ and a general sense of
‘losing control’. The crisis unfolded as a real-time event, so to speak, on
the screens in front of our eyes. This was made possible by a flow of
journalists who accompanied the flow of refugees, thus delivering live cov-
erage en route. Media-staged closeness also allowed for a combination of
eye-witnessing and media witnessing. Once the war refugees crossed ‘our’
own borders, their presence was no longer virtual and media stories could
be authenticated and enriched through personal encounters.
3 The activation of audiences: Through the representation of human needs
and suffering, a mediated public sphere can turn into a humanitarian space
of personal involvement, where passive members of the audience take
active responsibilities as citizens (Andersen and de Silva, 2017). Media
stories do not simply activate the moral consciousness of western viewers
directly, as this requires exemplary or illustrative action. Media stories do
this by addressing witnesses of human suffering as protagonists of human
aid. The ‘welcoming culture’ is part of a ‘politics of pity’ (Boltanski, 1999)
with role models of ‘ordinary citizen heroes’ – as conveyed by the media –
providing their spontaneous assistance to the needy. Pity, which is to be
defined as an emotional reaction to the witnessing of human suffering, can
be considered as an important element in the mobilisation of solidarity,
because it allows for rapid changes of opinion from indifference, or even
antipathy towards the object of solidarity, to attention and personal emo-
tional engagement that might be followed by individual or collective support
action. Especially in Germany, the so-called ‘welcoming culture’ became a
story of national pride that expressed the collective will of the local people to
assist the needs of the refugees. Hospitality and empathy towards refugees
were encouraged by mediated images of human suffering, such as the image
of the drowned boy, Alan Kurdi, on the Turkish beach. They contributed
to rapid shifts in opinion in the receiving countries and to considerable levels
of political mobilisation (Mortensen and Trenz, 2016). A ‘politics of pity’ is
the reversal of the ‘politics of fear’, a strong emotional involvement of the
audience that was directed against the incoming refugees, stimulated western
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publics to assign for themselves the role of victim, and seemingly legitimated
them to mobilise resistance and fight against expected short-term or long-
term negative consequences (Wodak, 2015). A ‘politics of fear’ can be dis-
tinguished as a proper style of political mobilisation because it portrays
refugees in the media as threats to be excluded from the solidarity com-
munity. In line with such a discourse, media coverage often builds on fear-
appealing metaphors such as flood, swarms or marauders, or on attributes
such as unwanted, irregular or illegal.
4 The internalisation of negative consequences: Approaches to crisis differ,
depending on whether negative consequences are externalised or internalised.
As long as the refugee crisis remained confined to Syria, aid remained
optional. Care-taking assumes a different meaning, when people in need
are among us. Rules of care-taking apply at first reception as they are not
only codified as responsibilities of states, but also bound to moral obli-
gations of hospitality (Benhabib, 2004). Such moral codes of hospitality
regulate, in particular, our relationship towards people we encounter at
the borders of our community. Once they are among us, hospitality cannot
be escaped, care-taking can no longer be delegated, but becomes our respon-
sibility. From the European perspective, the refugee crisis was marked and
staged as a series of events of border crossings. First, the symbolic act of
crossing the border between Asia and Europe in the Aegean Sea and,
secondly, the crossing of the border between Hungary and Austria and
Germany marked the refugees’ final entry from the periphery right to the
core of what defines the Europeans’ ‘own world’. The predictable arrival
of the refugees made it inevitable for Europeans to discuss their own atti-
tudes towards hospitality. The internalisation of negative consequences
implied acceptance of a collective responsibility for the fate of the refugees,
which again justified the mobilisation of political capacities and resources
to take control of the process.
These different elements and processes contributed to the formation of the
refugee crisis as a distinct media event that was perceived as a common experi-
ence across the various European member states. This distinctiveness is of par-
ticular relevance, because it contributed to the salience of solidarity as a core
topic of public debates about the crisis. It needs to be added, however, that the
mediated experience with the ‘refugee crisis’ was perceived as a shared and split
experience. Differences between countries prevailed, given the specific transit
routes and destinations of most refugees, but also given the different ways this
reality was arbitrated by national media systems, policy debates and citizens’
mobilisations. The experience of a shared crisis often triggered these national
differences, because it raised awareness within European countries of different
national sensitivities and priorities, thus encouraging the various governments
to either look for European solutions or insulate their country from European
developments. The analysis of the refugee crisis thus requires a nuanced empirical
investigation that is able to disentangle solidarity contestations as a complex
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phenomenon that is segmented in national public spheres, interlocked trans-
nationally and embedded into the shared experience of a European crisis of
humanitarian aid. In this sense, we require an analysis that is able to simul-
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3 Claims-making analysis and its
applications in media and
communication studies
Solidarity contestations in the public sphere are based on public interventions
by a variety of actors, and can thus be examined by retrieving and analysing
claims made during these occasions. For this reason, we have made use of claims-
making as a methodology of standardised content analysis to dissect public
debates on solidarity, thus adopting an approach that has been widely used in
media and communication studies. Claims-making analysis is predominantly used
to analyse mediated (political) discourse. This does not preclude other applica-
tions, for instance, the analysis of political speeches (Kinski, 2018; Severs, 2012),
of documents or web site publications (McCright and Dunlap, 2000), or of pro-
test events (Rucht et al., 1999). But the analysis of public claims seems particu-
larly promising for the examination of public contestations about solidarity with
refugees.
The specific methodology applied in single claims-making projects is gen-
erally well-documented and granting open access to codebooks is considered
good scientific practice. Among the frequently referenced codebooks is the
Handbook for the Analysis of Representative Claims created in the framework
of the RECONNECT project (Gora and de Wilde, 2019). Other examples include
the ‘Codebook for the analysis of political mobilisation and communication in
European public spheres’ (Koopmans, 2002) and the ‘Codebook for the ana-
lysis of political opportunities’ (Castelli Gattinara et al., 2015) documenting
the claims analysis conducted in the EUROPUB and LOCALMULTIDEM
projects respectively. The ambition of this chapter is similar to these, i.e., to
make transparent how the TransSOL solidarity claims-making analysis was
conducted. Yet, we also aim to provide general guidelines for researchers who
are considering applying the method of claims-making, provide them with a
toolkit for its application and to share lessons learned regarding sampling,
coding and data analysis.
In the following, we start by discussing the definitions of a claim and the
underlying assumptions regarding the process of public opinion formation
processes and contestation in an increasingly mediatised world. After this, we
discuss several strategies for its application and typical problems of its imple-
mentation. This includes a consideration of the tedious process of building inter-
coder reliability within a team of researchers, who typically run the coding in a
claims-making project. We will express some words of warning about the risks of
errors in the codebooks and the organisation of coding processes, but also give
advice on how to manage them. After this follows a description of how we cap-
tured social media debates through claims-making analyses and how we adapted
the method for these purposes. We conclude with a brief summary of what to
expect and not expect from a claims-making analysis.
What is a claim and why do we analyse it?
From political protest to public discourse
Claims-making analysis originates from the field of contentious politics and
social movements research as a response to the then dominant focus on insti-
tutionalised politics. Its aim was to expand the focus and include the perspec-
tive of public contestation and civil society (Cinalli and Giugni, 2013b, 2016b;
Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Kriesi et al., 1995; Rucht et al., 1999). With the
digitalisation of media, politics and society, with the growing mediatisation of
political conflicts (Hepp, 2014; Hjarvard et al., 2015) and with the turn from
‘collective’ to ‘connective action’ (Bennett and Segerberg, 2013), the investiga-
tion of public contestation requires further adaption. One limitation of the
original approach is that claims-making analysis was often too protest-centric.
It focused on ‘organised publics’, thereby privileging actors such as state insti-
tutions, political parties, main NGOs and social movements, which have the
resources to effectively place their statements in the public sphere. In so doing,
claims-making analysis disregarded the role mass and social media increasingly
started to play when expressing contestation (see Koopmans and Statham, 1999).
Yet, mass and social media have enabled strong public contestation beyond
organisations or visible forms of collective actions, such as street-protests and
demonstrations, by opening space for the direct intervention of digital users in
the public sphere.
In order to adapt to the changing face of contestation and its diversifying
locations, claims-making methods were expanded beyond physical sites into
mediated public spaces where public contestation gains visibility and finds reso-
nance, e.g., through take-up in news coverage or, more recently, social media
debates. Social movement and protest researchers coalesced with media and
communication researchers to develop a whole array of instruments to measure
forms of mediated actions as indicators of political contestation, including
simple speech acts in the forms of statements in public debates (Koopmans and
Statham, 1999). Scholars also emphasised the need to deal with the relational
aspects of public interventions, by retrieving the way claims react to each other
in terms of shared or contested arguments, values, and so forth (Cinalli and
O’Flynn, 2014). These methodological expansions have at least two advantages.
First, claims-making can now be applied to all kinds of media sources – most
often those which cover a broad range of issues and reach broad audiences,
e.g. broadsheet newspapers and the online debates they often feature. Second,
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it enables us to investigate the claims raised by both institutional and non-
institutional actors (e.g., civil society), as well as by individual citizens them-
selves. This inclusion of claims beyond the sphere of institutionalised politics
can help us to gain a more detailed picture about contestation, the roles and
positions of diverse actors in the public sphere, as well as the ways in which
these actors relate to each other and compete for media visibility.
Claims can be conceptualised in at least two ways. First, claims can be defined
as ‘strategic communications in the public sphere’ (Bentele and Nothhaft, 2010)
or as a ‘unit of strategic action’ (Koopmans et al., 2005: 25). This definition
views claimants as interest- or power-driven actors who strategically aim to place
their claim in the public sphere in order to achieve a certain interest (through
persuasion), or make their performance visible (e.g., in the news). In this way,
claims-making is considered to follow an instrumental logic. Secondly, claims can
be understood as basic speech acts, and thus as units of analysis of a broader
discourse through which meaning is generated, communicated and validated –
not by single actors driven by their interests, but through the binding forces of
shared public discourse. Claims-making can therefore be seen as norm- and
culture-driven. Such a relational model emphasises that the public discourses
generate intersubjective meaning, as formulated by Jürgen Habermas in his
theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1985). Claims are not simply con-
sidered as ‘strategic acts’, but as communicative acts, or in the words of
Habermas, as ‘validity claims’ (ibid.) through which actors provide arguments
to endorse the truthfulness and moral rightfulness of an assertion in a public
discourse. In this case, the main focus of claims-making analysis lies in the
reconstruction of argumentative exchanges between actors in normative debates
that are of constitutive importance for democratic politics (Vetters et al., 2009).
A similar approach, yet with a less explicitly normative intention, has been
deployed by cultural studies, where claims are used to identify cultural reper-
toires of meanings and interpretations distinctive of the field of politics, as
they are employed in the process of defining and constructing social problems
(Best, 2001; Gusfield, 1984; Loseke, 2017).
These two understandings of a claim do not necessarily have to be mutually
exclusive. We can, for example, frequently observe how claimants raise issues,
such as abortion or healthcare in the US, or immigration and the EU in Europe,
which then become the subject of heated normative debates before elections.
How claims are conceptualised, then, is the task of the researcher who needs to
decide which type conforms to the research purpose most appropriately. Focusing
on claims as strategic communication might, for example, help to scrutinise
dynamics of power and socio-political hierarchies regarding access, visibility
and agenda-setting in news-making. The choice of claims as communicative acts
might be more appropriate if the research objective is to better understand how
the meaning and relevance of issues for society are constructed and interpreted
by different actors across social groups, thus looking at processes of public
opinion formation. The first focus will become relevant later on, when we dis-
cuss how media and political logics relate to each other; the second one will be
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highlighted when we consider questions about legitimation and public opinion
in the next section.
In sum, communicative and strategic understandings of the role of a claim in
contentious politics are linked to each other, and the researcher might want to
decide which one to prioritise without completely excluding the other. In Trans-
SOL, we have focused more on the construction of meaning and different inter-
pretations of solidarity in the public sphere. Our analysis therefore highlights
how different actors take sides, define and justify solidarity or its rejection. In
our case, this concerns the hospitality towards refugees and asylum seekers, but
also contested notions of deservingness/undeservingness towards these groups
as ‘objects of solidarity’. A solidarity contestation often takes its starting point
in citizen protests, e.g. in protests against the allocation of refugees or in man-
ifestations of solidarity with them (della Porta, 2018). Claims-making analysis
does not only enable us to map these public interventions. It allows highlighting
the inclusive and exclusive dynamics of media discourse within the public
sphere, for instance, when showing how proponents and opponents of solidar-
ity selectively appear in the news and relate to each other. Additionally, it can
be adapted to wider societal contexts by digging into the way citizens or users
react and challenge social media.
Before this conceptual backdrop, we define a solidarity contestation in the
media as a mediated relationship between an opponent and a proponent of soli-
darity (towards an ‘object’ of solidarity, in our case refugees). As we know from
existing research, such debates in the media are shaped by the intervention of
organised publics, which in most cases can be expected to be elite and not civil
society driven (Koopmans, 2010; Statham and Trenz, 2013; Vetters et al., 2009).
Applied to our case, it is thus essential to explore who dominates mass media
debates on solidarity, and to what extent they open a window of opportunity for
the mobilisation of civil society. Alternatively, we can ask whether refugees and
asylum seekers are a target or object of public contestations that arouse a more
bottom-up mobilisation of solidarity through the media.
Analysing the ‘making of’ public opinion: The theoretical foundations of
legitimation and political representation
Another motivation for researchers to develop the methods of claims-making
analysis was the dissatisfaction with public opinion research (Koopmans and
Statham, 1999). Public opinion surveys typically aggregate individual attitudes
and usually aim for a representative cross section of a population’s attitude at
certain points in time. Claims-making analysis instead reconstructs the dynamic
aspects of public opinion formation by focusing on the role of established
actors, which are not abstract aggregates of individuals, but a concrete part of
(organised) publics. How such public opinion processes take shape, depends on
the particular media outlet, the quantity and quality of news and its salience,
and on the form of participation, i.e. the dynamic aspects of public debates
(Cottle, 2003). The advantage of claims-making is that it allows us to study
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public opinion formation processes in the making. The focus shifts from the
study of populations as passive and aggregate ‘containers’ of opinions to the
study of public opinion formation within organised publics as they articulate
and convey their claims in the public sphere. The ‘making of’ public opinion, so
to speak, is centre stage.
This focus on the opinion formation process is relevant to building democratic
legitimacy. Frequently, however, degrees of legitimacy are measured through
attitudinal or behavioural indicators such as the passive support for political
institutions, or levels of trust in government, while neglecting the commu-
nicative dimension in the ‘making of’ democratic legitimacy (Schneider et al.,
2007). Text-analytical approaches can help by emphasising that legitimation is
also a product of political communication and debates, which unfold over time
and which allow political representatives to contest political choices, provide
good arguments and justification and (ideally) include citizens in the process of
political opinion and will formation (Gaus, 2011). Claims-making analysis
allows researchers to open up the spectrum of public debates expressed and the
justifications delivered in the public sphere through the media. Such mediated
opinions are considered to be a horizon for interpreting politics and thus
become decisive for public opinion formation and for perceptions of political
legitimacy (Schneider et al., 2007). Public debates unfold as an exchange of
claims through which organised publics and audiences formulate their views on
contested issues, and through which they are also exposed to opposing views
and arguments (Michailidou et al., 2014, p. 43). One important function of
news media is therefore to stage contestations among claimants in the form of
debates in the public sphere. Claims-making is the form that keeps such public
debates going whenever actors bring in new arguments, shift their positions or
apply different justificatory logics to contest a political issue (ibid.).
More recently, scholars of claims-making analysis have engaged with theories
of political representation (De Wilde, 2013; Guasti and Geissel, 2019; Saward,
2006, 2010). Political representation is understood in this case as not necessarily
in its institutionalised forms, i.e., established through, for example, elections,
but more fundamentally as a ‘claim to represent someone else’. The actual legiti-
macy of such attempts of political representation is not necessarily settled; it is
yet to be decided and therefore contested. In many cases, decisions to allow
representatives to speak for somebody might be formally legitimised, but in
terms of substance, such a legitimacy is never accomplished, or remains settled
only temporarily, highlighting again the dynamic element of contestation that is
so crucial for claims-making analysis. For this reason, representation materialises
in discourse. The importance here lies not in the characteristics or virtues of
political representatives, but in the arena of contestation within which claims-
making takes place and the way this contestation manifests itself. Since its
legitimacy is always up for discussion, claims for political representation become
contestable and contested: ‘there is no claim to be representative of a certain
group that does not leave space for its contestation or rejection by the would-be
audience or constituency, or by other political actors’ (Saward, 2006, p. 302). The
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world of political representation is therefore to be understood as a world of
political contestation of ‘would-be’ representatives who always need to renew
their claim to represent someone, make it credible through their arguments and
appearances in the struggle over public attention. This also concerns the claims
of elected representatives, given that their legitimacy is subject for debate when
based on majorities (e.g., ‘Should 52% count as the proclaimed will of the
people?’) and electoral processes (e.g., ‘Is the first-past-the-post system fair?’).
Methodologically speaking, claims-making analysis is built on indicators that
allow us to systematically reconstruct the triangular configuration of political
representation: as claims-makers, an object actor (the constituent) and an addres-
see (the audience) (De Wilde, 2013; Saward, 2006). Object actors and audiences
in claims-making are often identical, e.g., when a head of government addresses
the nation in a speech to explain how well she serves the interests of the country.
They can, however, also be distinct, for instance, in the case of an NGO that
addresses donors (their targeted audience) to contribute to their struggle for the
defence of refugees’ rights (their targeted constituent). This latter case is of par-
ticular relevance to understand the role of non-elected representatives, who may
use the media to present themselves in the public sphere as the legitimate repre-
sentatives of a certain cause and/or constituency. While Parliament is typically
the arena for the contestation of elected representatives, both claims by elected
and non-elected representatives gain visibility in the public sphere through the
news media. Claims-making analysis is a way to shed light on the contributions
of such non-elected representatives in democratic politics, for instance, when
looking at the way civil society organisations or social movements intervene
within the public sphere via the mass media (della Porta, 2009; Gleeson, 2009),
alongside with the claims of elected representatives. We argue that claims for
solidarity, as we analyse them in this volume, are tightly related to questions of
(legitimate) representation, because they frequently build on moral causes or the
common good that grant their ‘representatives’ legitimacy that is as valid as the
one granted by formal procedures and political majorities through an electoral
system.
Making actors and their contestation measurable and comparable
Researchers who are interested in understanding opinion formation processes
often have similar intentions when adopting claims-making analysis. First,
researchers share an interest in the role of actors and their positions in political
events or public debates. Claims-making analysis tries to reconstruct the public
appearance of actors, their public performance and their public relationships,
meaning that this method enables us to reconstruct the mediated expression of
(collective) action. However, the method is poorly equipped to analyse mobili-
sation strategies behind such actions. It does not, for instance, allow us to dig
into the participating actors’ political interests, their broader political strategies,
whom they hope to reach, how and why. Unlike other methods, such as inter-
views or surveys, claims-making analysis does not talk to individuals or draw
Claims-making analysis and applications 37
on direct observations of their actions. Instead, it analyses actors’ stances and
actions that are visible through mediation in the public sphere. In so doing, it
categorises their political or social affiliation or public persona by relying on
information related to the claim and the direct circumstances of that claim.
This may include an analysis of other arenas where political struggles are carried
out, such as Parliaments or rallies of a political party, as filtered through the
(news) media. Claims-making analysis is thus a study of politics in its encom-
passing expressions, as viewed from the perspective of broader audiences that
do not directly witness the session of Parliament or participate in a political
party rally.
Secondly, claims-making analysis is used by researchers with a genuine
interest in the conflict dimension of collective action, that is, how actors relate
to each other. It also allows for studying the field of political conflicts within
a public arena that creates most visibility for political actors: the mass media.
Claims-making analysis provides a whole set of variables to reconstruct the
dimensions of political conflict. It enables us to determine, for instance, the
relationship between claims-makers and addressees, to distinguish between
various forms of actions and/or to explore the driving forces of conflict, which
can be interests, norms and identities. Claims-making analysis thus allows
counting (e.g., the frequency of the appearance of certain actors) and cate-
gorising (e.g., the position or tone of actors about a certain issue in the public
sphere).
Thirdly, scholars who engage in claims-making analysis often share an interest
in comparison. Given the expression of public discourse as numerical data, claims-
making analysis allows us to design different strategies for comparison. We can
think of cross-sectoral comparisons among different news products, temporal
analyses that compare how debates unfolded in different periods and over time,
issue-specific inquiries that evaluate how collective action is mobilised with
regard to different topical debates, and most commonly, cross-country compar-
isons that contrast how debates with regard to specific topics unfold in different
national public spheres.
Ideally, claims-making analysis is a way to turn text into numbers and, on
the premise that reliability of data can be established (see later), to describe
trends in public debates and test hypotheses by means of statistical methods.
Claims-making analysis therefore seeks to reconcile the continuous struggle
between positivist and constructivist paradigms, because it wishes to provide
a refined and solid method to measure and analyse processes of meaning pro-
duction and opinion formation within the public sphere. It can rely on elabo-
rate codebooks that have been tested over time, that are available as templates
for future researchers. These codebooks contain variables that allow us to recon-
struct strategic elements of communication, such as ‘identification of actors’,
‘attribution of intention’ or ‘forms of action’, but also variables that focus on
intersubjective meaning, such as ‘exchange of arguments and justifications’, or
the complex reconstruction of actors’ relationships as represented by public
and media discourse.
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Shifting between political logics and media logics in the expression of
democratic politics
Claims-making analysis has been developed as a method of standardised media
content analysis that oscillates between quantitative and qualitative methods.
Most proponents of the method would emphasise their efforts of standardisation
of variables as a tool to reconstruct the reality of public contestation in an objec-
tive and verifiable way. Numbers as retrieved from claims-making analysis are
meant to represent the world of politics, and stand for actors and their relative
power in the political struggle. The underlying assumption is that the news media
constitute the principal arena of political contestation, where actors compete
between each other and try to influence public opinion. Expressing claims-making
in numbers is also a way of quantifying the salience and influence of different
actors in their attempt to impact on the public sphere, and thus gain commu-
nicative power.
This analytic and methodological aim, however, requires critical reflection,
because standardised measurements and quantifications make implicit assump-
tions about the ontological status of the news media, which have unleashed a
controversy among proponents of the claims-making approach: the ones defend-
ing the neutrality of journalism in mirroring social reality and balancing political
opinions (Statham, 2008); the others insisting on the active role of journalists and
media organisations in giving selective salience to political actors and shaping
public opinion (Trenz et al., 2009). This results in two competing explanations of
media agenda-setting: one side explaining it with reference to a political logic,
according to which visibility in the news is a result of successful agenda-setting
strategies of political actors, their relative power and their visibility in the game
of politics (Birkland, 1998; Kingdon, 1984); the other side explaining media
agenda-setting with reference to the constructed character of political news
and the inherent media logic driving mass-mediated public contestations. Such
a media logic is not only held accountable for the selective and framing bias of
political news; it also penetrates the political system, because political conflicts are
increasingly staged for the media and thus mediatised in a double sense, i.e., by
both the political actors and the mass media (Cottle, 2006; Hjarvard et al., 2015).
This scholarly controversy is ongoing, as it reflects two traditions of research —
social movement studies, media and communication analysis – that have informed
the claims-making approach since its inception, the former focusing on political
opportunity structures and actors’ strategic mobilisation (Kitschelt, 1986), the
latter focusing on gate-keeping by journalism and information filtering through
the application of news selection criteria (Cappella and Jamieson, 1997;
Hamilton, 2004).
Claims-making analysis cannot make any direct inference about which of
these two logics applies because it neither investigates political actors’ mobili-
sation strategies directly, nor analyses the working practices of news journal-
ism. As such, the paradigm struggle remains inconclusive, and we do not intend
to take sides in this book. It is useful, however, to remind students and scholars
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who wish to develop a project based on claims-making analysis that both
political and media logics might be at work in news agenda-setting. Claims
raised by political actors are filtered through, and framed for, the media; they
cannot simply be explained as causal effects of agenda-setting (Entman, 2007;
McCombs and Shaw, 1972). The fact that an actor’s claim is reported in the
news is not a sufficient indicator of a successful strategy of agenda-setting, nor
is it sufficient proof for the application of news criteria. We always need to take
into consideration the possibility that actors’ statements are de-contextualised
or misinterpreted by journalists, but we cannot measure the accuracy of poli-
tical news through the method of claims-making.
If claims-making fails to inform us directly about either political actors’
mobilisation strategies or journalistic working practices, the strength of the
method lies in the reconstruction of the public expression of politics through
the struggles and debates that are made publicly visible for larger audiences, i.e.
the process of contestation on which political opinion formation builds.
Claims-making’s first and major task is the description of contestations about a
publicly relevant issue, which gains its importance from the above discussed
aspects of legitimacy. The method further offers an accountability tool for
researchers and others to document the claimants’ speech acts. The claims-
making approach should therefore always be considered as part of public
sphere and political legitimation research (Statham and Trenz, 2013).
This method is also relevant for our investigation of media and solidarity,
because solidarity contestations in the public sphere always touch on issues of
political legitimacy. Claims-making enables us to analyse, in the first instance,
the contested nature of public debates about solidarity, because it provides
instruments to measure and map controversies between political actors related
to the question of whether and to what extent others require private support or
public assistance. Additionally, it highlights the implicit conflict about political
legitimation that permeates these controversies. Solidarity contestations also
contribute to the construction and definition of social problems – in the case of
our study the so-called refugee crisis – that await solutions or remedial actions.
They are eminently political because they mobilise and engage actors in strug-
gling against public policies and measures to be taken or to be refuted. Clai-
mants do so by making claims on behalf of refugees’ rights or needs, or by
refuting such demands in the name of the alleged rights and needs of a national
community or public opinion. They thus claim to legitimately speak on behalf
of – and thus represent – a larger group or population. The claims-making
approach assists us in highlighting that all these opinions about refugees and
our relations to them – as expressed in the news media – do not represent
public opinion. They guide, however, public opinion formation processes
through emotional expressions of pity and compassion, competing interpreta-
tions about duties and responsibilities, and various arguments and justifications
about required actions and remedies (Boltanski, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2006).
Claims-making allows us to take a glimpse at the role of public contesta-
tions within the media in constructing the deservingness of refugees and the
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responsibilities of (sub-)national and international politics (Silverstone, 2006;
Wagner-Pacifici, 1986). We therefore consider claims-making as a window
providing essential insights into public opinion formation processes during a
period of heated debate about the high numbers of refugees and asylum
seekers arriving in Europe during 2015 and 2016.
How to conduct claims analysis?
Counting, interpreting, or both?
Claims-making analysis was established in the early 2000s as a merger between
protest event and political discourse analysis (Koopmans and Statham, 1999),
and combines the qualitative and quantitative aspects of both (Kluknavská
et al., 2019, p. 7). As such, it reflects a more general trend in the development of
social science methods to overcome the quantitative–qualitative divide in the
struggle over paradigms (Punch, 2014), and in textual analysis more specifically
the struggle over the validity of standardised-quantitative content analysis and
inductive-qualitative discourse analysis (Franzosi, 2004). More broadly, one
lesson to be drawn for content analysis is that the question of either quantitative
or qualitative analysis should be considered as a question of weighing and bal-
ancing the different elements in the research process. The choice between quan-
titative or qualitative methods is never an either–or question. Ultimately, there is
no quantitative analysis without qualitative elements, and any qualitative analysis
always relies to some degree on generalisations and standardisations.
The strength and popularity of claims-making analysis can be explained by its
capacity to bridge paradigms, among them most notably political science and
institutional studies, media and communication studies and political sociology.
This allows for the integration of relatively heterogeneous research commu-
nities. Scholars who previously investigated, for instance, political party com-
petition or journalism with separate research agendas and objectives could now
meet, engage in common debates and exchange their views and findings. As a
unified methodological framework, it even allowed for scholars from different
backgrounds to commit to a single transdisciplinary project – a requirement
that became increasingly important in the competition for research funding,
for instance, in response to funding criteria set by the European Research
Programmes of the European Union.
Claims-making analysis requires some degree of standardisation, achieved
through the development of commonly accepted definitions of a claim as units
of analysis, and of coding instructions delimiting a set of variables to define the
different empirical components of a claim. This general agreement on standard
definitions and practices has greatly benefitted from the debates among research
teams and their readiness to share experiences, coding instructions and code
books (e.g., in regard to early analyses in the RECONNECT and EUROPUB
projects), which gave guidance to subsequent projects. This praxis can be trans-
lated into a first recommendation for future researchers, who plan to develop a
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claims-making project: Coding practices and codebooks should be transparent
and made publicly available to the whole research community.
Standardisation of coding practices is a central requirement for coding in a
team that often involves diverse researchers dealing with different texts and
languages. At the same time, however, standardisation in claims-making ana-
lysis has its limits and should not be conceived of as just a mechanical process
of assigning numbers to words. This might be a common misconception of the
method, according to which claims-making (and content analysis in general) is a
purely quantitative method that counts the number of times a specific descriptive
variable has been detected in a text. On the contrary, claims-making analysis
requires active interpretative efforts from researchers who read text and bring in
their own understanding. This starts with the identification of a claim in text – a
topic of fierce controversy among researchers – and continues with the use of
every single variable that is defined in the codebook. Claims-making research is
ultimately quantitative in the way data is processed and analysed, but it includes
important interpretative elements when generating data through a process of
coding. Claims-making might be built on coding, but this practice is more than
counting evidence in a text, because counting assumes prior interpretation. This
‘interpretative moment’ might be less evident in some variables, because we can
relatively safely agree on the date a claim was raised. However, the element is
very visible in many other variables, for instance, when researchers have to
decide how a specific issue is ‘framed’. The same is true even in regard to the
position of a claim. In our case, we were interested in coding the position of a
claimant towards refugees, which implied quite an interesting process of trans-
lating a coders’ interpretations into numerical data – in this case, a measure-
ment assigning an opinion to a position on a scale of -1 to +1. We believe that
this hybridity between quantitative and qualitative approaches is one of the
strengths of claims-making analysis. We thus formulate a second recommenda-
tion for future researchers, by highlighting the necessity of careful design of
claims-making projects. In particular, researchers should invest considerable
efforts in reaching a common understanding among coders, who are always
reading (and thus interpreting) text.
Identifying a claim
A claim was defined as ‘the actual, strategic actions of the claims makers in
the public sphere’ (Koopmans and Statham, 1999, p. 216). This definition was
later expanded to include communicative acts, i.e., contributions to public
speech in the form of statements promoted by actors in the media, among
others (Koopmans and Statham, 2010, p. 55). This latter definition links
claims-making analysis to other discursive approaches in political legitima-
tion research. These studies define their unit of analysis either as a ‘legit-
imation statement’ to understand the public evaluation of specific actors or
institutions such as the European Union (Hurrelmann, 2007; Hurrelmann et al.,
2009), or they describe it as an ‘attribution of responsibility in the public
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sphere’, as in the case of ‘Discursive Actor Attribution Analysis’ (DAAA)
(Roose et al., 2014). What follows from here is that the unit of analysis of any
claims-making project is the single claim, which can be a verbal or nonverbal
intervention made in the public domain by any actor (including organisations,
groups or individuals). In its most basic form, a claim translates into an inter-
vention of a subject (claimant) over an object (which can, but does not need to
be an addressee). At the same time, a claim performs an action by demanding,
criticising, blaming or protesting (Lindekilde, 2013).
The identification of a claim as a unit of analysis starts therefore with a
search for potential actors in relation to a certain ‘purpose’. The ‘purpose’ of a
claim can be defined in general terms with reference to the intention of a clai-
mant to represent someone or something (representative claims analysis (RCA);
e.g., De Wilde, 2011; Kinski and Crum, 2020). It can be assigned also to the
issue field within which claims are raised, e.g. when focusing on all claims
related to the broader topic of migration and refugees (Kluknavská et al., 2019;
Van der Brug et al., 2015). The ‘purpose’ of a claim can finally be defined in
relation to object actors at whom political demands, calls to action, proposals
or criticism are targeted, e.g., when analysing all claims that have a potential
bearing on refugees. In our TransSOL project, we opted for the second strategy
by including all public interventions which bear relation to the interests, needs
or rights of refugees. In their quality as objects of a claim, these can include
refugees as individuals or collective groups.
The findings presented in this book reflect these conceptual decisions, because
the unit of analysis is the single solidarity related claim. The latter is an inter-
vention, verbal or nonverbal, made in the public space by any actor (including
individuals who engage in acts of solidarity), which bears on the interests, needs
or rights of refugees. Claims either express opinions that strengthen/affirm/
support the interests, needs or rights of refugees, or disapprove of/reject/weaken
them. As objects of the solidarity claims, we define refugees either as indivi-
duals or as a collective/group. In other words, a solidarity claim is a statement
of support or opposition towards others (in our case: refugees) in the public
space. If it is verbal, a claim usually consists of a statement, an opinion, a demand,
a criticism, a policy suggestion, etc. addressed to the public in general or to a
specific actor. If it is nonverbal, a claim is usually tied to an activity, an event, a
behaviour, a decision or a document reported in the media.
It is important to highlight that claims-making focuses on the single claim
as a unit of analysis, and not on the article or the single statement. This strict
focus has two implications. First, an article can report several claims. The
whole article must therefore be read in a way to include all the claims repor-
ted when doing the coding. Secondly, a claim can comprise several statements
or actions. Statements or actions by different actors are considered to be part
of a single claim if they take place at the same time (on the same day), place
(the same locality), and if the actors can be assumed to act ‘in concert’ (they
can be considered as strategic allies). In sum, claims must have a unity of time
and place.
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To allow for the identification of solidarity claims in a text, our coding
instructions defined four main forms of action:
Political decisions (law, governmental guideline, implementation measure, etc.)
Verbal statements (public speech, press conference, parliamentary intervention, etc.)
Protest actions (demonstration, occupation, violent action, etc.)
Solidarity action (a direct act of providing help/assistance to others in need of
support)
More specifically, all articles were coded which report political decisions,
verbal statements, direct solidarity action or protest actions on themes that
refer explicitly or obviously to the ‘refugee crisis’.
As in comparative claims-making projects comprising several teams of coders
in different countries, it was necessary to formulate specific rules for the
identification of claims in the text selected for coding. The following guide-
lines summarise some of the TransSOL coding instructions followed by our
team of coders:
 Claims are coded only to the extent that they refer explicitly to the current
refugee crisis or contain information allowing that this is the case.
 Only solidarity claims in news articles selected for the study are coded.
 The claimant must be an actor, who is usually based in a country of the
EU and Switzerland, or a foreign actor who addresses actors in the EU
and Switzerland. This includes claims by international actors (EU,
UNHCR) that take place in the EU and Switzerland, or that address
actors in the EU and Switzerland. Claims by actors which are usually
based in a country of the EU but are made abroad, must also be inclu-
ded. For example, claims raised in Greece, but reported in the Danish
press should be coded by the Danish team. Claims must also be inclu-
ded if they are made by or addressed at a supranational actor of which
the country of coding is a member (e.g., the UN, the EU, the UNHCR),
on the condition that the claim is substantively relevant for any country
of the EU and Switzerland. Example: The claim raised by the UNHCR
that the German government should open the borders towards Syrian
refugees has to be included. The claim raised by the UNHCR that
Syrian refugees should be sent back from Turkey to Syria should not be
included.
 In case of repeated statements or announcements, each one is coded as a
separate claim. Example: An actor announces several times that it will hold
a protest against the arrivals of new migrants.
 Claims must have a unity of time and place. Two substantively identical
statements by the same actor on two different days, or on one day in two
different locales, are two separate claims. Similarly, statements by different
speakers during a parliamentary debate or a conference are considered part
of the same claim only if they are substantively and strategically compatible.
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This implies that different actors should be coded together under the same
claim if they all express a similar point of view. However, if the actors take
positions that are substantially different enough to reject the assumption that
they are acting in concert, the statements must be coded as separate claims.
Another example: If an identifiable part of a peaceful demonstration breaks
away from a march and turns violent, the assumption of acting in concert is
no longer warranted and a separate claim should be coded.
 Information found in another article or newspaper issue on a given claim
that has been coded previously should be corrected. Thus, claims that were
coded but are found in a further issue of the newspaper not to have
occurred must be withdrawn from the sample. Similarly, additional infor-
mation found in another article (even in a different issue of the newspaper)
regarding a claim previously coded, has to be used to complete the coding
of that claim.
 There is NO minimal length of a claim to be coded. ‘Open the borders’, for
example, is a claim.
Basic claims grammar
Each claim by any actor is characterised by a grammatical structure which can
be broken down into a number of elements or variables that aim to capture
specific characteristics of a claim (cf. TransSOL WP5 Codebook1). Numerous
variables of this type have been coded in our study, but the cross-national
analysis of print media presented in this book only deals with six main variable
groups, which refer to the ‘actor’ (who makes the claim), the ‘addressee’ (who
is held responsible for the claim), the ‘issue’ (what the main concern is about),
the ‘form’ (the action through which the claim is inserted in the public domain),
the ‘position’ (whether the claim is unfavourable or favourable to refugees), and
the ‘value’ (how claimants justify their interventions). The specification of these
variables enabled us to conduct systematic content analysis of newspapers in
each of the countries under study, and thus to develop a composite dataset that
allows for systematic comparisons and cross-national analyses.
Each of the six variable groups provides an invaluable basis for cross-
national claims-making analysis. Information about actors enables us to depict
the number, the type and the relative weight of claimants participating in and
impacting on public debates, while the coded forms allow us to dig into the
contentiousness of claims-making itself. For actors and forms, additional vari-
ables can be coded in order to gather data on their scope (e.g., the territorial
location or reach), their types, political orientation and the like. Beside the
identification of actors and forms of action, a core element of claims-making
analysis is to reconstruct the structure of public debates. This is usually done
with the help of two variables that belong to the grammatical structure of a
claim: object actors and addressees. The object actor is defined in most inclusive
terms, as the specific actor whose interests are affected by the claims. The
object, implicitly or explicitly, must always be present for a claim to exist. In
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the case of solidarity claims, the object actor was by definition the refugees, the
immigrants or alternative nouns referring to them. The addressee of a claim is
defined more narrowly as the main actor who is held explicitly responsible for
acting with regard to the claim – or at whom the claim is explicitly addressed
as a call to act. Experience shows that often only a minority of claims in
newspaper discourse contain an addressee. Sub-variables relating to object actor
and addressee can include ‘scope’ (referring to the territorial dimension, such as
local, regional, national, European or global), or other qualifying attributes
(such as gender or nationality). Often, claims-making projects also distinguish
between primary and secondary actors (objects and addressees) to refer to
additional actors to which a claimant can relate.
Finally, claims-making analysis is meant to reconstruct argumentative and
justificatory practices of claimants, because they take position in media debates,
and the contentiousness of public discourses is a direct reflection of these diverse
positions. The analysis of this argumentative dimension of claims-making calls
for the specification of further variables. In the first instance, we need infor-
mation about the issue, i.e., the substantive content to which a claim refers.
Lists of issues have to be developed to cover the broad range of topical debates
within a specific discursive field. In our case, the broader discursive field relates
to solidarity contestations in regard to refugees and asylum seekers, within
which a number of issues arise, for instance, those related to questions of
security and border management, of integration and assimilation, of humani-
tarian aid. Furthermore, the position of the claim needs to be established in
order to ascertain whether the claimant supports or rejects particular activities,
measures, statements or demands that are relevant for the object. In the case of
solidarity claims, the position is defined by the claimant’s argumentative rela-
tion to the object actor of the claim, i.e., the refugees. In simple terms, a posi-
tion depends on whether the claimant is supportive of the needs, demands or
rights of refugees, or mobilises against them. Coding of positions is typically
done on a scale of -1 to +1, with neutral, ambiguous, or ambivalent claims
receiving code 0.
Finally, claims-making analysis is very often interested in coding the argu-
mentative dimension of public contentions. This interest draws on a broad
scholarly literature on ‘framing’, relating to the way actors interpret, define and
construct the issues or problems they are discussing (Haunss, 2007; Johnston,
1995). The consideration of frames is crucial for an analysis of public con-
testations: Public issues and problems are identified and defined within and
through public contentions, and claimants struggle about the validity of issue or
problem definitions, not least because these interpretations and definitions deter-
mine what is considered to be a plausible cause, a legitimate demand for action
and an accepted solution. The coding of frames, however, is one of the most
demanding aspects of claims-making analysis, because it requires interpretative
skills in order to establish what the exact frame of a claim is. Several templates for
frame analysis exist. Some rely on broader categorisations by distinguishing
between diagnostic, evaluative and prognostic frames (e.g. Cinalli and Giugni,
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2016a) in order to better understand the way actors describe the essence of a
problem (for instance, the ‘European economic crisis’), its causes and potential
solutions. Others distinguish between different logics of justification with refer-
ence to interest, rights, values and identities (Cinalli and O’Flynn, 2014; Statham
and Trenz, 2013; Vetters et al., 2009). In the TransSOL project, we were inter-
ested in justifications as well, but aimed at grasping the argumentative structure
more accurately. We thus aimed to identify whether claimants grant or reject
solidarity towards refugees – and other groups or countries acting on their behalf
in the context of the refugee crisis –, and we were interested in the way they jus-
tified their statements. In particular, we distinguish between three dimensions or
variables: 1) The underlying value on the basis of which solidarity is granted or
rejected (affirmation or rejection of solidarity; directly connected to POSIT); 2)
Who is potentially blamed for a certain behaviour in relation to the ‘refugee
crisis’; and 3) Who is potentially credited for a certain behaviour in relation to the
‘refugee crisis’.
These variables help to extract crucial information from newspaper articles.
They allow us to synthesise and standardise this information in a concise and
systematic manner. To illustrate this process of synthetisation and standardi-
sation, we refer to Table 3.1, which lists two examples of solidarity claims and
the way the TransSOL codebook has used the basic grammar of claims-making
to assign predefined codes to the claims’ main dimensions.
The main variable groups presented so far are of crucial importance to help
retrieve information on the main dimensions of the claims, and thus to develop
a systematic dataset that describes the public debates under analysis. In the case
of solidarity contestations, they help to identify the constellation of participat-
ing actors, the main issues related to solidarity with refugees, the type of
actions and their degree of contentiousness, and the way solidarity is justified or
discredited. However, it is worth mentioning that it is also important to pay
attention to the context of the claims and the overall debates they are nurturing.
While previous guides for claims-making analysis have introduced and dis-
cussed the basic claims grammar and further developed or adapted it to specific
research avenues, less has been said about coding data that contextualise the
claim and, in so doing, enable a certain degree of explanatory analysis. In this
regard, we see the need to make use of meta-variables, which help to retrieve
standardised information about the context in which the claim is embedded.
Such variables concern:
 the type of newspaper (e.g., broadsheet, tabloid)
 the position of the newspaper on the political spectrum
 the date of the claim/publication date
 the locality/place of the claim
In TransSOL, we have included further meta-variables. In particular, we
have gathered data on claims in posted articles on Facebook as well as related
user comments. This data expands the range and spectrum of claimants
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and claims, which enables us to reach beyond claims-making in the mass media
and investigate other arenas of contestation. Posted articles and user comments
also allowed us to include meta-variables about the social media outlets, which
are helpful when contextualising this specific form of public claims-making.
However, our research did not exhaust the range of potential meta-variables to
Table 3.1 Examples for coding of claims-making
Newspaper Article (text part coded as claim in
italics)
Coding of variables
‘Europe has lost control of the refugee crisis, admits
Merkel’,
The Daily Telegraph, 12 Jan. 2016
ANGELA MERKEL said last night that the Con-
tinent had lost control of the refugee crisis, as she
confronts public anger over the New Year’s Eve sex
attacks in Cologne. ‘All of a sudden we are facing
the challenge that refugees are coming to Europe and
we are vulnerable, as we see, because we do not yet
have the order, the control that we would like to
have’, the chancellor told a meeting of business lea-
ders…. The findings of a report by the state govern-
ment of North Rhine-Westphalia released yesterday
are likely to add to the pressure.
‘Both witness accounts and police reports indicate
that people of an almost exclusively immigrant
background were the perpetrators of these crimes’,
Ralf Jäger, the state interior minister, told the state
parliament as he presented the report. ‘After they
were intoxicated with drugs and alcohol came vio-
lence. It culminated in the acting out of fantasies of
sexual power. That must be severely punished.’
 Claimant: Ralf Jager
 Addressee: Parliament








‘British writers and actors urge David Cameron to
rescue refugee children’,
The Guardian, 18 Feb. 2016
The actor Jude Law has assembled some of
Britain’s most prominent writers and actors to call
on David Cameron to rescue the growing numbers of
unaccompanied children living in desperate condi-
tions in Calais and Dunkirk, after visiting the
migrant camps and being horrified by what he
saw. … He was ‘horrified at the sheer number of
people living in the most extreme conditions between
Dunkirk and Calais, and the level of squalor’. Law
was so disturbed by the suffering he encountered that
he assembled 145 well known figures to join him in
an appeal to the government, asking for immediate
action to help hundreds of migrant children, travel-
ing without their parents and living in tarpaulin
shacks in France.
 Claimant: Jude Law and
other celebrities
 Addressee: David Cameron
 Issue: Inhumane conditions/
emergency (e.g. descriptive
accounts of conditions of
camps, also along refugee
routes)
 Evaluation: Positive
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be retrieved. Other possibilities, which were not implemented here, are the
inclusion of frames used by the journalist, claimants’ political positions on the
issue at stake, even the number of article clicks.
Such variables are helpful for contextualising the claims. In fact, the variables
presented above give a descriptive account of the claims’ main components:
who said what about whom, to whom and how. This descriptive information
can be analysed with a more analytic or explanatory ambition, when using the
meta-variables, because they allow us to explain descriptive incidents with
references to contexts and circumstances. In this regard, they can also be used
for hypothesis testing. Depending on the number of claims coded, it is possible
to analyse trends over time and across newspaper types or national mass media
systems, thus enabling for more nuanced comparisons. Both analyses provide
greater explanatory power to the descriptive claim’s grammar. The richness of
such meta-data can mitigate the potential risk of focusing exclusively on the
single claim as unit of analysis, thus separating it from its context. As we
mentioned earlier, claims become part of a news story through an interplay
between journalistic practices of news-making and political actors’ strategies of
agenda-setting.
These two logics help explain why political decision-makers are usually the
most frequently mentioned claimants and therefore tend to dominate debates
(e.g. Brändle et al., 2019; Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017; Kluknavská et al.,
2019). In fact, government actors have the power to make decisions relevant for
national audiences, therefore scoring high on news worthiness. They also have
considerable resources to strategically place claims in the news. However, their
public visibility also depends on the logic of journalistic news-making, the types
of news outlets and the structures of (national) mass media systems. This con-
textual information is highly relevant when trying to explain potential differ-
ences in the visibility of decision-makers in different news outlets (e.g., quality
papers versus tabloids), or when elaborating on the diverging dominance of
these actors in some countries when compared to others. Additionally, trends in
public debates can be related to contexts and circumstances, when checking
the effect of critical junctures (significant events or conflicts), longer socio-
economic, political or cultural developments, or changing news media land-
scapes on public contestations.
With regard to all these variables, we need to remember that codebooks
for claims-making analysis are rarely developed from scratch. They rather
build on best practices with variables and coding instructions developed by
previous research teams. Using earlier experiences and knowledge is essen-
tial to guarantee that one’s own codebook is a reliable and valid instrument
of data-retrieval. Good codebooks have been developed, tested and imple-
mented by groups of researchers, who very often document and reflect their
field-work. The use of these codes and coding instructions is highly recom-
mended, but it does not save time, given that these codebooks need to
be adapted to the discursive field under investigation. In most cases, the
codebooks need to be ‘reinvented’, because the main variable groups – in
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particular actors, addressees, issues, positions, frames or values – need to be
rewritten significantly in order to match the new field of inquiry. In the
TransSOL project, for instance, it was necessary to fill the ‘main actors as
claimants’ with new life. Variables with long lists of categories referring to
governmental institutions, political parties or civil society actors had to be
developed anew.
The questions to be decided in the planning phase of individual claims-
making projects relate to the topical specifics and depth of analysis. Designing
codebooks typically implies the task to adapt available variables and lists of
categories to the specific countries (e.g. adapting the names of political parties),
as well as including categories for civil society actors or experts that regularly
raise their voice in relevant debates according to the specific issue field. This
requires considerable work, very often preliminary and inductive content
analysis of news coverage, further testing and progressive refinement of coding
instructions.
Additionally, the design of codebooks typically implies choices about the
depth of analysis. Researchers need to decide, for instance, whether they are
mainly interested in broad categories of data, like the distinction between
governmental or civil society actors, or whether they wish to introduce further
nuances, for instance, in terms of political party affiliation or scope of activity
(e.g., a global, European, national, regional and local reach). As a general
rule, we can indicate that depth of analysis comes at the cost of reliability of
coding. The more elaborate the codebooks, the more time consuming the
coding process will be; at the same time, this increases the risk of diminishing
the reliability of the coding process. Researchers who wish to engage in
claims-making analyses must therefore carefully consider which depth of
analysis is feasible and necessary for their project. This is usually established
through pilot studies and reliability tests, which we will discuss in further
detail later on.
Sampling strategies
The selection of news sources in claims-analysis projects typically follows
criteria of representativeness of the selected sources for debates shaping the
national public sphere. Usually, text sources from printed or online news
outlets are given preference, but the inclusion of audio and visual material
from radio, television or the Internet is also possible. Traditionally, sampling
is done from news archives that allow for keyword searches over extended
time periods (such as LexisNexis, Factiva or Europress). The whole population
of articles for a given period of time is typically sampled through automated
text search from all newspaper sections through predefined keywords that
are applicable to all newspaper archives, and, in the case of country com-
parisons translated into the respective languages. In our case, the key words
‘refugee’ and ‘asylum’ were used to select relevant articles. More recently,
samples have also been drawn from online news sources (Galpin and Trenz,
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2018) allowing us to combine the analysis of news articles with an analysis
of user comments (see Chapter 5). The disadvantage of online sampling is,
however, that archives are often incomplete or contain only selected articles
for online publication. Moreover, search functions through keywords are
often more limited. The question of what constitutes a representative sample
needs to be established in a case specific way, but generally, such samples
include a mixture of broadsheet newspapers and tabloids with nation-wide
distribution and sometimes also regional newspapers. Tabloids tend to
report less political news, which is then a valuable expansion to capture
public debates beyond political news toward human interest framing of
socially relevant stories (Örnebring and Jönsson, 2004). In the case of the
TransSOL project, we opted for a selection of three newspapers per country
(one more left- and one more right-leaning broadsheet newspaper and a
tabloid). Switzerland has regional specificities; accordingly, for Swiss sources
we have included five newspapers (two written in German + two written in
French + one written in Italian).
Claims-making analysis is usually conducted over longer periods of time to
allow for the reconstruction of the chronology of debates. Longer time periods
also require larger samples. For the TransSOL project, we decided to restrict
our sample to the peaks of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’, spanning from 1st
August 2015 to 30th April 2016. The size of the sample further needs to be
established in relation to the number of variables and sub-values that are
investigated. The smaller the sample, the higher the risk that the data will be
below the level of statistical significance with regard to single variables con-
tained in the codebook (e.g., so-called rare phenomena – rarely coded vari-
ables). Considerations of statistical significance are of particular relevance for
comparative claims-making projects. As it is difficult to predict results, prag-
matic solutions can be found by aggregating values in the statistical analysis if
statistical significance is not reached for single variables. Other, however
costly solutions, exist in the increase of sample size through additional rounds
of coding.
Researchers who plan to engage in a claims-making project are advised to
apply some flexibility to their planning and to factor in sufficient time for
coding. If the number of articles needs to be reduced to keep the workload
manageable, claims should be selected by drawing a (systematic) random
sample of articles from the whole population of news articles retrieved for a
specific period. Such random sampling procedures can be adapted flexibly if
additional coding becomes necessary or when original coding schedules turn out
to be too ambitious. In our case, we coded around 700 claims in articles ran-
domly sampled from three newspapers in each country, published between 1st
August 2015 and 30th April 2016. We started with 100 articles to detect the
average number of claims coded per article; we then used this average to sample
the predicted number of articles needed for coding. National teams could
extend their coding up to 750 claims so as to have even numbers across the
three newspapers (~ 250 claims for each newspaper) (see Table 3.2).
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Challenges and opportunities
General considerations regarding claims analysis in a comparative,
multilingual project
The method of claims-making is unsuitable for a single researcher’s project.
Text coding should, by default, be teamwork and requires principal investiga-
tors to engage in team building and strategy development for coder training.
Claims-making could be PhD research, but young researchers can only ensure
reliability by including other researchers (e.g. students) in the coding process.
Team-building is further necessary to cope with large amounts of text required
for longitudinal studies, or to deal with the challenge of multilingualism in a
comparative project. Ideally, claims-making analysis should be conducted by
native speakers with a good background knowledge of political culture, law and
politics and, at least a general understanding of the topics under investigation.
For our analysis, eight countries’ news coverage was analysed by eight indivi-
dual country teams which consisted of two to three coders. The coding process
was supervised by a core team of four researchers who were responsible for
developing and pretesting the codebooks, for training and for giving feedback to
individual researchers before, during and after the coding. We started the
coding process with a one-week training of coders for which we all met at one
partners’ venue to facilitate face-to-face discussions.
As regards the validity and reliability of coding, it is essential to remember that
coding in claims-making projects can build on the strength of teamwork for
interpretative text analysis. In that sense, comparative claims-making analysis has
to recur to measures of ‘inter-team reliability’ which is, in a multilingual setting,
a highly artificial exercise, given that most coders do not code in their native
language. Thus, such tests, and also the coding instructions, need to resort to a
common language – usually English. The results of tests are thus dependent on
the degree of English fluency of the teams and their coders, but of course also an
intimate, near native-speaker familiarity with the cultural and linguistic specifi-
cities of the respective English-speaking country. Since instructions are in Eng-
lish, too, such tests nonetheless help not only in creating a common basis, but
also when testing how well instructions have been understood. It is to be
assumed, then, that coders will be more accurate in their native language because
of higher intuitive knowledge of the language and how it is used in the respective
social and political context.
Thus, on the one hand, it is important to establish a common understanding
of claims-making across teams, even though it is necessarily compromised by the
fact that the common language will not be the native language of most coders. It
is, on the other hand, also important to establish the reliability and validity of
coding in the respective native language. Against this backdrop, tests should ide-
ally be conducted at both levels. We therefore decided to test reliability across
teams in English, as well as decentralised within teams in their native language.
We provide a more detailed technical report of the results of our reliability tests
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on the online pages of TransSOL.2 In the following, we provide more informa-
tion on the rationale of reliability and validity testing in TransSOL.
Intercoder-reliability
Generally, questions of validity and reliability of claims-making have not been
paid sufficient attention in the literature, and only a few templates for tests are
available. As we have discussed, claims-making analysis consists of translating
textual data into numbers. Research therefore is, by default, an interpretative
process. For a comparative analysis, a shared cultural understanding among all
coders is required, but this congruence cannot be taken for granted, meaning
that a standardised codebook is not a sufficient guarantee for standardised
coding practices. At the same time, however, text interpretations by coders
should not deviate from the way regular news readers interpret the news. Data
that is generated by claims-making analysis is only valid if text messages are
interpreted by the coders in the same (or in approximately the same) way as
they would be interpreted by members of the general public. We know from the
literature that texts are not read in the same way by different audiences: The
de-coding of texts varies between individuals or with regard to different audi-
ence segments. At the same time, we can, according to cultural studies, detect a
structured variation in the interpretation of text, e.g., people with similar
degrees of education, men in a similar structural position, are likely to converge
in the interpretation of text (Hall, 1973). Claims-making analysis aims at con-
vergence of text interpretation among coders. It implicitly assumes (but de facto
is never fully able to prove) that such convergence is the best indicator for a
shared cultural understanding of text, which, in turn, can account for public
opinion formation processes.
Claims-making analysis assumes that numerical data can be treated as an
indicator of the contestation dynamics of public opinion formation, but this
assumption needs to be proven. An essential element of such a proof is the
reliability of the coding process. The standard measure in standardised quanti-
tative content analysis is Krippendorff’s Alpha, which has also been used in
claims-making analysis (e.g., Kluknavská et al., 2019). However, due to the
hybridity of the claims-making approach (i.e., the combination of qualitative
and quantitative elements), such measures seem slightly problematic. One pro-
blem is that such tests are particularly inadequate for variables with long list of
values or subcategories because of the low probability that every single sub-
category will be coded. Reliability for such ‘rare phenomena’ has generally
proven to be difficult to establish: Krippendorff’s Alpha is particularly sensitive in
such instances, thereby providing very low scores of reliability even if the number
of mistakes is extremely small (see De Swert, 2012 for a more detailed discus-
sion). In most claims-making projects, standard tests – such as Krippendorff’s
Alpha – can therefore be run meaningfully only at an aggregate level, i.e., with
regard to broader categories with higher numbers of cases. In the TransSOL
project, for instance, we can establish reliability of the category of ‘national
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political actors’, but not of subcategories that were used in coding, such as
‘government/executive/state actor’, ‘parliament/legislative’, ‘courts/judiciary’,
‘police and other security/military forces’, simply because no sample of claims
would have covered all these subcategories. In addition, the practice of claims-
making analysis implies that different values are often not categorically exclu-
sive, because the interpretation of the text would allow for different responses.
Such responses would be valid in the sense that experts could agree on the
margins of interpretation. They would also be valid in the sense of ‘decoding
practices’ by particular audience segments, even though coding would become
unreliable according to standard tests.
To avoid these pitfalls of rigid statistical tests of reliability, existing claims-
making projects mainly used percentage agreement tests to verify reliability of
coding (e.g. the EUROPUB project). For the TransSOL project, we opted for
mixed tests. On the one hand, percentage agreement was applied to test reliability
of claims-selection against the background that any claims reliability sample is
highly likely to be biased towards only relevant claims: irrelevant claims are
not coded and, accordingly, would only appear in the sample if included by at
least one coder. Hence, agreement on non-relevance would be heavily under-
estimated. Measures such as Krippendorff’s Alpha consider chance agreement
(based on the amount of values coded in the sample; i.e., in a dummy variable,
chance agreement is 50%). However, in terms of claims identification, it is
unlikely that a claim was identified by chance. Therefore, chance agreement
may be assumed to be very low. Strict measures also accounting for chance
agreement, therefore, do not seem adequate. On the other hand, we applied
Krippendorff’s Alpha test for variable coding, acknowledging that satisfactory
results can only be achieved at aggregate level and not for each single value of a
variable in the codebook. This implies that throughout this book, only aggregate
level data will be used for the analysis of solidarity claims that passed the relia-
bility test.
Nevertheless, we insist that detailed codebooks and practices of sub-category
coding remain important and should be maintained in future claims-making
projects. Even if reliability scores cannot be met for all variables, sub-category
coding practices sharpen the eye of the researcher for details in debates and thus
promote a general understanding of the complexity of the issue under discus-
sion. Sub-category coding further keeps the possibility of surprise findings open,
for instance, when specific sub-categories appear with unexpected frequencies.
To assess the validity of claims coding, we compared reliability scores of
national teams with scores from the team of instructors. This allowed for a
systematic validity check of results through the template of instructors’ team
coding. In fact, experts’ templates can be used to identify ‘valid responses’
among the variety of responses delivered by national teams and thus to adjust
the results of the test coding beyond the simple statistical variation of coders’
coding choices. However, ensuring the validity and reliability of coding
practices is not limited to standard tests, but requires continuous efforts that
stretch over the whole coding process. Small-scale reliability pre-tests can be
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useful at the stage of training the coders. We conducted such a pre-test for
screening purposes during our one-week training session, with the purpose of
identifying teams and individual coders in need of further training. The results
of such pre-tests are only relevant for internal project-coordination and do not
need to be reported. Reliability tests should only be conducted after completion
of the teams’ training and after each coder has accumulated various hours of
coding practice. In our case, material for the tests was selected by the coordi-
nation team and sent out to the national teams for individual coding. Relia-
bility results were then discussed at another face-to-face meeting among team
leaders only. The purpose was to identify possible systematic errors, which
were re-checked afterwards by the teams individually. Reliability of coding
could further be ensured through team supervision and systematic cross-checking
of coding practices and results. In our case, all teams had regular meetings for
discussion of the coding, also involving work package leaders via Skype. In that
way, continuous training was ensured. Due to the low number of claims coded in
total (n= 700–750 claims per national team), re-checking and the correction of
coding was possible without major resource losses.
Expanding claims-making: Social media as sites of contestation
A new opportunity for the expansion of claims-making analysis has opened up
with the possibility of using social media sites as an access point for political
news. Moreover, it permits us to include user comments and reactions to poli-
tical news as part of the research strategy. This allows relating the results of
claims-making research in mainstream media discourse to forms of reception
analysis of selected news readers and their engagement with political news.
The assumption supporting this methodological expansion is that political news
consumption shifts online and thus social media become increasingly relevant
for the distribution of political news (Rackaway, 2014; Siapera and Veglis,
2012). Our own research on solidarity contestation in the media pioneered a
methodological template for assessing this linkage between news-reading on
social media and forms of user engagement.
For that purpose, we combined the analysis of news coverage through legacy
media with an analysis of Facebook news readers’ comments on political news.
As a specific feature of comment sections on Facebook, users can comment freely
on published articles and are not bound to commit to journalistic standards or
political deliberation formats. Instead, comments can be understood as more
spontaneous and are often uninformed reactions to what is written ‘above’ (see
Reagle, 2015). Consequently, we understand user comments as part of informal
and uncoordinated political debates in social media. In particular, they provide
us with a window on the process of political opinion formation through con-
testation by social media users who respond to political news. The user com-
ments analysis is thus a useful supplement to the claims-making analysis
because it allows for adding a bottom-up perspective when analysing solidarity
contestation (Trenz et al., 2020).
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As with every research project, the sampling strategy depends on the research
purpose. Social media commenting is a moving target in the sense that it is still
up for debate how to conceptualise it. Moreover, we still need to better under-
stand the role it plays with regard to public opinion formation, the type of public
it constitutes (Citizens? Readers? Users?) or the impact it has on the framing of
political issues by journalists and political claims-makers. What we know is
that the share of commenters among news readers is considerably lower than
the share of online news readers, and varies across countries (Newman et al.,
2016). There seems to be some agreement that online commenters cannot be
held as representative of the whole population nor of public opinion as mea-
sured by surveys. Instead, commenters tend to be characterised by lower rates
of trust in established news media; they report higher levels of political interest
and align themselves to stronger ideological convictions (Kalogeropoulos et al.,
2017).
Given less formal space for political debate and contestation in the Facebook
commenting sections, a coherent sampling strategy is crucial. To allow for
correspondence with our claims-making analysis, we opted for sampling articles
from Facebook pages run by the same newspapers that also informed our
sample of offline news. Our sampling strategy was purposive, targeted to collect
material on instances with high degrees of contestation. Through our claims-
making analysis, we found September 2015 to be the month with the most
intense debates in all countries analysed. In order to gain a detailed look at
bottom-up solidarity contestation, we chose to focus on that month. Conse-
quently, only posts and comments with a publication date from the 1st to the
30th of September 2015 were included in our sample.
To increase the relevance of our purposive sample, we ranked posted news
articles in order of popularity according to the number of Facebook comments
they achieved. For each team, we then selected the five most commented on
Facebook posts from each newspaper (thus 15 news articles). Additionally,
Facebook’s algorithms sort comments, thus making some more visible than
others, e.g., those from friends, verified accounts, accounts with more engage-
ment (Facebook, 2020). This allowed us to collect the comments with high
degrees of engagement (e.g. likes and responses to comments), because we assume
that the latter indicates either contestation or at least support of the position of
a ‘contester’. For each of the 15 posts, the 20 top comments were coded; replies
to these comments were excluded. Our sample thus consists of an absolute
number of 300 comments per country, divided into comments on three news-
papers (expect for Switzerland) (see Table 3.3).
As mentioned earlier, comments on social media need to be interpreted and
treated differently to claims. A comment can take the form of a claim by a
news-reader, but often its grammatical structure is truncated. This has impli-
cations for the claims-making approach, because with regard to social media,
we can consider the single, entire user comment to be the unit of analysis.3
Accordingly, the analysis of users’ comments conducted during the TransSOL
project was a pilot study. Our experiences allowed us to delimit a method of
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Note: For Germany and Switzerland, the sample used for comments coding slightly differs from the
sample used for claims coding (newspapers marked with an asterisk); in Greece, the share of com-
ments coded per article was organised slightly differently due to the fact that there were not enough
comments for Ta Nea.
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social media commenting analysis that can be used by others, but requires fur-
ther development and refinement by future research. We firmly believe that this
expansion of claims-making analysis towards news commenting analysis of
social media is a highly relevant venture, because bottom-up contestation is
increasingly channelled through social media sites and because ‘alternative’
news agenda gain visibility. More than that, a systematic combination of ‘tra-
ditional’ claims-making analysis and the additional approach of news com-
menting analysis is a promising mission, given that it enables researchers to link
top-down claims-making to bottom-up contestation.
Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced the claims-making method. We discussed the
different definitions of claims as strategic acts of communication and as
broader forms of political discourse, arguing that such definitions are com-
plementary and lend themselves to an empirical investigation of public con-
testation. We have further described the role of claims-making as a method
not for understanding representative public opinions and attitudes but for
analysing the process of political opinion formation across different social
groups and political actors. Claims-making is in this sense particularly helpful
in an increasingly mediatised political landscape where mass and social media
have become the main arenas for contestation and political opinion formation
processes.
Claims-making, however, also harbours methodological challenges, as we
experienced during the implementation of our TransSOL project. Hence, we have
discussed the various tasks that applied research on claims-making involves.
These tasks include the development of codebooks and coding instructions,
the delimitation of a total population of articles and the extraction of a
sample of claims, as well as the training of coders and the application of
intercoder reliability tests suited for a multi-site and multi-language project.
We also introduced the TransSOL codebook and discussed best practices.
Finally, we introduced our adaptation of claims-making analysis to the con-
text of social media, in our case Facebook. Combined with the analysis of
claims from posted news articles, we could show how claims-making enables
researchers to link elite contestation to bottom-up contestation visible in
Facebook’s comment sections.
Against this background, it becomes clear that the claims-making method is
not the holy grail to understanding political contestation as it unfolds in med-
iatised politics. However, it offers a valuable and pragmatic entrance into a
systematic analysis thereof. Claims-making is not only transferable to different
contexts, media platforms and types of communication, but it also enables
researchers to link different actors across disciplines. It is further suitable for
single case studies, as well as comparative research questions and projects, as
long as researchers are aware of the methodological risks and challenges to be
encountered during the research process.
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Notes
1 See https://transsol.eu/outputs/data/.
2 The technical annex is provided on https://transsol.eu/outputs/data/
3 Each comment was coded only once, irrespective of whether it contained zero, one or
multiple claims. For a more detailed sampling strategy, including the rules for dis-
carding off-topic comments, see Trenz et al., 2020, pp. 155–156.
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4 Solidarity under siege
The ‘refugee crisis’ in the news media
Introduction
When the number of refugees and asylum seekers from war zones in Syria
increased in the summer of 2015, the response of EU member states varied widely
with regard to the question of transnational solidarity and the degree of hospi-
tality that should be granted to the incoming refugees. Our book provides a
snapshot of the variation of public reactions and debates and thus illustrates, first
and foremost, the national specificities of media debates on solidarity. On the
surface, such differences can be explained by reference to geo-political location,
position of the government and short-term interests of a country in confronting
the ‘refugee crisis’. Greece, together with Italy, as the first entry point to the
European Union for most refugees, insisted on fair burden sharing with the rest
of Europe. Germany was the first country to listen to these demands for solidar-
ity and, after a series of dramatic events at Europe’s external borders and on the
transit routes through the Balkans, decided to suspend the Dublin Regulation at
the end of August 2015 so as to accept asylum applications from refugees travel-
ling from Greece. In turn, this open-door policy triggered intergovernmental
conflicts within the European Union. It was supported by France, which was,
however, less affected by the immediate effects of the inflow of refugees; yet it
was heavily criticised by Denmark and Poland. It was also fundamentally ques-
tioned by other countries, such as Hungary, which are not part of our sample.
The British government took an outsider position: It strengthened its stance
against France over the responsibility of refugee camps in Calais and accepted a
minor number of war refugees from Syria as a symbolic gesture of solidarity.
Finally, Switzerland, as a non-EU country, but nonetheless a part of Schengen,
also received increasing numbers of refugees from Syria, mainly entering
through its southern borders with Italy.
These differences of country approaches towards refugee solidarity resulted in
differences in news coverage across countries, as evidenced in the first available
research (Berry et al., 2015). . We will contribute to this mapping of cross-coun-
try variation in contesting refugee solidarity in Part II of this volume with more
detailed evidence from the specific country contexts (Chapters 6–13). In this
chapter, the focus is not so much on country specificities and the development of
national debates. We rather wish to test out some explanatory variables to make
sense of the variation in news coverage within the public sphere across countries.
Variation in news coverage of migration can be a consequence of deep rooted
conflicts among EU member states, but also of systemic differences of media,
culture and society. It is well known that countries diverge in regard to the way
the news frames migration, depending on prevailing cultural patterns of stereo-
typing different groups of foreigners, like Turks in Germany and people from the
Maghreb in France (see Eberl et al., 2018 for an overview). The public sphere of
claims-making is thus selective and constructed. Yet, not only does news media
affect logics of selection and framing; it also provides the essential space for the
unfolding of the public sphere through ‘organised’ claims-making as a form of
public contestation. From this viewpoint, the arena of public claims-making that
is intrinsic in the news media overlaps to some extent with the public sphere of
political interventions by organised actors such as politicians, stakeholders or
major NGOs.
From this perspective, our analyses map a European field of solidarity con-
testation in the context of the ‘refugee crisis’, which is culturally divided. The
news media bring these divisions to the fore, because such cultural clashes
among organised actors take place within this public sphere, dividing countries,
but also segments of the public within a country. Broadly speaking, we can
distinguish between different positions in the debate, which we call ‘cultural’ as
they involve specific perceptions, evaluations and justifications based on beliefs
and values as much as on political interests and strategic choices. To the extent
to which these positions dominated public debates at a certain time in specific
countries, we can speak of ‘shared cultures of solidarity’. We can discern a
‘welcoming culture’ that unfolded during the first weeks of ‘crisis’ in Germany,
but was heavily contested in other parts of Europe, a ‘culture of denial’ of
shared European responsibility that characterised public debates in Denmark
and the UK, and a ‘culture of categorical rejection’ of international humanitar-
ian obligations and solidarity that we found frequently expressed in Poland.
These positions are however not simply national-specific and exclusive but
cross-cutting: They define the main axes of solidarity contestation domestically
and cross-nationally, opening thus a European field of solidarity contestation.
An inclusive, pro-solidarity attitude towards refugees was, for instance, tem-
porarily mobilised across the European spectrum, especially during the first
weeks of mobilisation when the ‘welcoming culture’ that found first expression in
Germany resonated in other countries. In turn, anti-immigration voices in the
news media increased across European countries as the debate unfolded over time
(Damstra et al., 2019; Eberl et al., 2018). Solidarity debates were further char-
acterised by frequent discursive shifts in the way refugees were either framed as
‘persons in need’ or as ‘threats’ (e.g. Kluknavská et al., 2019), often failing to pay
attention to refugees’ own voices and experiences (Chouliaraki and Stolic, 2017;
Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017). These shifts in media discourse and framing
can be triggered by a multitude of factors, such as external events, a change of
government, or mobilisation efforts of particular actors (e.g. Greussing and
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Boomgaarden, 2017). If public perceptions of the ‘deservingness’ of refugees
are shaped by media debates, this also means that solidarity is dependent on
the attention cycle of news media and the differences in the success of media
agenda-setting strategies of particular groups of actors over time.
In light of these differences, this chapter analyses how the ‘refugee crisis’ was
made salient and selectively amplified in the news media through claims of
organised actors in the public sphere. In particular, drawing on claims-making,
we identify the extent to which acts of solidarity towards refugees were granted
public awareness and what claims on behalf of or against hospitality towards
refugees were made, and by whom. We also examine the discursive construc-
tion of European solidarity in terms of its positions and justifications, and how
such differences are used in contestations between various allegiances (e.g. pro-
ponents and opponents of humanitarian transnational solidarity vs. traditional
national solidarities). In addition, we look into the fault lines that opened up
across Europe; in particular, we assess the extent to which national debates
followed similar patterns of division among governments, political parties and
civil society actors in the public sphere, for example, in terms of both the
positioning vis-à-vis refugees, and the way these same actors justified (or dis-
qualified) solidarity with refugees.
Mapping solidarity claims cross-nationally
The solidarity contestations under analysis in this chapter are representative of
a particular momentum of time in which solidarity was granted high salience in
the media and contributed to focus the whole of Europe’s public attention on
the fate of refugees. These contestations can be mapped and analysed empiri-
cally when looking at public claims-making in the mass media. As spelled out in
further detail in our methods chapter (Chapter 3), propositions of and opposi-
tion to different solidarity projects are taken as ‘claims’ that compete for sal-
ience in the public sphere as delimited and mediated by the media. As actors of
these ‘claims’, claimants intervene within national public spheres, but their
interventions are not limited to national borders. Solidarity contestations are
carried out across Europe since the decision of one country to open its borders
towards refugees potentially affects all the others. This broadens the scope of
solidarity contestations considerably, because the question of whether a gov-
ernment or citizenry in a given country should care for refugees is directly
linked to the question of whether national governments and populations should
support each other in their attempts to address the needs of refugees. What is at
stake in public debates about solidarity with refugees is the fact that solidarity
relationships are not containable within one single country, but need to be re-
negotiated between all Europeans across different countries.
Through the template of claims-making analysis, we can approach our gen-
eral object of research as forms and practices of solidarity contestation in the
news media. The different indicators used in claims-making analysis allow us to
raise a number of research questions, and through our aggregated data, we are
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able to provide responses that are based on cross-national and cross media
comparisons. First, we gain insights into the intensity and temporality of soli-
darity debates in a moment that is generally interpreted as crisis by looking into
the salience of debates across countries: How did national debates about refu-
gee solidarity emerge and develop over time? When and with regard to what
external events did debates peak? Secondly, we learn about the drivers of con-
flict when focusing on the involved claimants: Who are the proponents and the
opponents of refugee solidarity in national public spheres? Protagonists of soli-
darity contestations in international conflicts can often be governments or civil
society organisations across public and policy spheres, but their role can also be
challenged domestically by various oppositional actors, political parties, and
other populist or xenophobic forces. As the voice of these actors in our claims-
making analysis is mediated, i.e., selectively made salient in the news media, we
learn, thirdly, about the filtering processes of news and the possible biases of
political journalism: How are actors selectively made salient and what forms of
actions are typically reported by different news outlets (e.g. by comparing
quality newspapers and tabloids)? Fourthly, we gain information about the
main concerns that are given expression in solidarity debates. Around what
issues do solidarity debates unfold, and how are these issues debated con-
troversially in the news media? This relates to the second level of the news
selection process: In addition to rewarding particular actors with media sal-
ience, news media also selectively grant specific issues a news value over others.
The ‘refugee crisis’ as a ‘focusing event’ allows claimants in the news to focus
public attention on issues they consider to be of particular relevance. Such
selective issue attention is highly relevant as an aspect of interpretation and
understanding of the ‘refugee crisis’, because it determines the way the problem
is defined and which actions should be taken to address it. For our purpose, it
matters, above all, whether the refugee crisis is discussed primarily as an issue
of public security, or as an issue of humanitarian intervention. Fifthly, our
comparative analysis of solidarity contestation turns to the question of how the
deservingness of refugees is debated controversially in the news media. To what
extent is solidarity towards refugees granted or rejected, and how are these
different proposals towards refugee solidarity justified? We thus conclude with
an analysis of the tonality of debates, and the framing of claims over time and
across countries. In relation to this, we also present information about the
spatial dimension of debates and the degrees to which solidarity is debated
cross-nationally. We will give attention to foreign actors and events in the
media to highlight contestations that stretch beyond national borders, for
instance, in terms of coalitions and conflicts between EU member states and
governments. What are the degrees of Europeanisation/transnationalisation of
solidarity debates?
Taken together, this set of questions is of key relevance for understanding the
‘refugee crisis’ as an event that is constructed in the public sphere through the
intervention of various actors and the news reporting practices of news media.
As we argued in Chapter 3, the interplay between these two sets of actors is
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crucial to adequately understand the situation. In fact, the salience of the
‘refugee crisis’, its collective interpretations, and also its political repercussions
need to be discussed in relation to the media debates it triggered and the way
media audiences were exposed to the spectacle of mediated solidarity contesta-
tions. While the mass media play a key role in public debates, it is also neces-
sary to focus on the drivers of solidarity contestation, its majority organised
claims-makers such as politicians, humanitarian organisations and various sta-
keholders. We thus argue that the ‘refugee crisis’ was constructed not only by
the media, but through the media. The news media are considered to be the
main arena of collective interpretation of external events, which are also selec-
tively brought to the attention of the audience in the way they call for or deny
solidarity with refugees. Understanding the relationship between the public
sphere and the news media, as well as the latter’s agenda-setting and framing
processes, is of high practical relevance as it helps us to discuss the media’s role
in triggering public responses of solidarity, such as the ‘welcoming culture’ in
Germany, but also in spreading anti-immigrant sentiments, amplifying claims of
exclusion, or even xenophobia.1 The comparative analysis of claims-making in
the news media thus results in a snapshot of the state of solidarity in Europe.
Turning now to our comparative findings, we will first present an overview
of how the debate unfolded chronologically across countries and peaked at
different moments in time. We will ask whether there are country-specific
dynamics in solidarity contestations salient in the news, and will also look at
potential differences between newspaper types to investigate expected differ-
ences between tabloid and broadsheet newspapers. After that, we turn to the
organised contestants who drove these debates in the media, keen to know
which voices became dominant, with which issues, and their positions regarding
solidarity with refugees. Finally, we will take a look at how actors justify their
positions about solidarity.
Salience of solidarity debate
By looking at the overall distribution of solidarity claims over time and across
countries, peaks occur in correspondence with critical events, such as political
decisions or negotiations at EU level, but also increased salience due to huma-
nitarian crisis. Both article and claim frequency suggest that especially the
increasing number of people dying in the East Mediterranean Sea and the fail-
ure of EU migration management to handle an unfolding humanitarian crisis
created a European momentum of solidarity contestation in September 2015
(see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). This is tragically illustrated in the ways in which the
photo of the dead body of Alan Kurdi, on a Turkish beach, was rapidly circu-
lated on social media and picked up by mass media across Europe from early
September onwards. It is interesting to note that many newspapers were actu-
ally overwhelmed by the social media diffusion of this picture, as journalists’
ethical standards would commonly prohibit reproduction of images of dead
people, especially under-age children in print media (Mortensen and Trenz,
The ‘refugee crisis’ in the news media 65
2016). Independently of whether newspapers decided to reproduce the picture or
not, they nonetheless replicated the moral indignation that was expressed by the
‘distant witnesses’ of suffering.
Another instance of a European moment of solidarity contestation was the
German chancellor Angela Merkel’s call for solidarity: ‘Wir schaffen das’ (‘We
can do this’), which was widely quoted and which was part of the government’s
decision to grant accommodation to high numbers of civil war refugees from
Syria. As this decision de-facto meant a suspension of the Dublin Regulation,
which stipulates responsibility for asylum applications in countries of first-
arrival, it was debated very controversially between member states, some of
them accusing Germany of breaching European solidarity. September 2015 was
also the month of political controversy and negotiations at EU level, given that
the EU ministers voted on – and rejected – the EU Commission’s plan to
redistribute 160,000 refugees between EU member states.
The November 2015 Paris attacks or the New Year’s Eve 2015 sexual assaults
at Cologne’s train station in Germany, instead, were experienced as trauma
and, as such, possibly linked to the spread of anti-refugee sentiments across
countries and newspapers, to some extent reversing the pro-refugee solidarity
moment of September 2015. Peaks in news coverage of these events were,
however, consistently lower than the solidarity momentum of September 2015,
indicating not only a change in mood, but also of agendas in public debates
turning their attention away from specific groups of refugees to generalised
anti-immigration and anti-foreigner sentiments.
After September, salience decreased in all countries, and debates more closely
followed national dynamics focusing around events that did not gain European
momentum (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2). Some examples of heated solidarity
debates, with high peaks of attention that nonetheless remained nationally
Figure 4.1 Total number of articles over sample time period
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confined, were Denmark’s infamous ‘jewellery law’, which allowed authorities
to take valuables and cash from refugees, and the EU-Turkey agreement, which
peaked in Greek newspapers in March 2016.
These specificities show that despite the similar patterns of news coverage
(Figure 4.1) that broadly followed European events, we cannot speak of a con-
vergence of contestations across countries (Figure 4.2). After the ‘European
momentum’ of September 2015, a national re-appropriation of the transnational
‘refugee crisis’ took place. Public debates took different routes in different
countries from late autumn 2015, as they responded to domestic events and
policies and the diverging dynamics of contestation they unleashed. The two
converging peaks of September 2015 and January 2016 were thus profoundly
different. The first reflected a common supranational momentum, which was
lost in the renationalisation of the public sphere in the following months,
thereby triggering national claims-making, which increased in early 2019 due to
follow-up events or policy decisions taken by national governments.
Our findings support research in media and communication studies that mass
mediated debates react to ‘real life events’, but develop dynamics of their own
via which such events are constructed, selectively amplified and framed in spe-
cific ways in the interplay between public claims-makers and journalists
(Couldry et al., 2010; Dayan and Katz, 1992). Increased numbers of incoming
refugees do therefore not determine but rather act as a trigger of public debates.
Mass mediated public debates follow their own rules, selective logics, and fram-
ing devices, which all contribute to the construction of the so-called ‘refugee
crisis’ as a ‘media event’. In order to further validate this assumption, we can
simply contrast the diachronic trend of public debates in terms of articles and
claims with the development of the number of incoming refugees, measured in
terms of asylum applications. If public contestations mirrored objective reality,
then the higher numbers of asylum applications would also increase the like-









Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr
2015 2016
FR DE GR IT PL DK CH UK
Figure 4.2 Total number of claims over sample time period
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‘real world’ events and trends, thus triggering media contestation and news
coverage in general. By contrast, lower numbers of asylum seekers would
translate into lower levels of claims-making and media coverage in general.
Figure 4.3 shows numbers of first time asylum applicants. It confirms very
similar patterns of asylum-seeking across the eight countries, and this seems to
nourish the expectation that a similar diachronic pattern of debates should be
found in the news media. While the European momentum of solidarity con-
testation of September 2015 corresponds indeed with a rise of asylum applica-
tions in all countries, the news coverage during the following months, however,
hardly follows the same pace as asylum requests (see Figure 4.3). In particular,
the second peak of asylum requests in February 2016 with even higher absolute
numbers than in autumn 2015, did not lead to a second European momentum of
solidarity contestation. In other words, discursive dynamics in the public sphere
follow, at least partly, a logic of public-claims-making that is only loosely
coupled with (but also not decoupled from) real time events. Specifically, the
acuteness of the suddenly ‘exploding’ numbers of refugees in September 2015
and the connected ‘surprise’ effect may here be seen as prime expressions of
a media logic of news values with ‘new’, sudden, surprising events being
deemed more newsworthy than ‘old news’ (O’Neill and Harcup, 2009). The
‘refugee crisis’ of September 2015, thus can be singled out as a ‘media event’ in
all countries, and this event of shared attention has not only to do with
objective grievances, but also with the selective biases of news media and the
strategic posture and claims-making capacity of actors in the media sphere.
Protagonists of solidarity contestations in the news
The construction of media events is largely determined by the protagonists
involved in solidarity contestation. For this reason, it is essential to have a



















Figure 4.3 Number of first time asylum applicants during the ‘refugee crisis’
Source: Eurostat 2018
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be considered as the primary definers of the ‘refugee crisis’ in the mass mediated
public sphere. For reasons of comparison, we focus here on the relative salience
of three main groups of organised actors: domestic state actors (government,
political parties and courts), civil society actors (solidarity organisations,
including NGOs, trade unions, churches, but also anti-solidarity groups or
movements), and supranational actors (mainly EU institutions and the UN). A
fourth group is included in the analysis, as it represents individual citizens
whose claims are indicative of broader collective mobilisations (for instance,
with regard to acts of solidarity) but which sometimes also embrace the voices
of refugees themselves.
The question of the relative salience of particular groups of organised actors
in the public sphere relates to the question about the selective bias that news
media apply when highlighting some claimants over others. While for obvious
reasons we cannot measure ‘real-time’ and ‘non-mediated claims’ raised by
actors in the public sphere directly, we can still plausibly assume that the news
media are more inclined to report about the claims of organised actors. This
means that we can delimit the selective bias of the news media by comparing
the relative salience of particular actor groups of claimants across time, coun-
tries and different media formats.
Among the organised actors that dominated media debates on solidarity, it
comes as no surprise that state actors were the main protagonists of solidarity
contestation across all countries analysed. We can report very little variation
between countries with the highest (Italy) and the lowest (Denmark) percen-
tages, respectively (see Table 4.1). This is in line with other studies devoted to
the EU and foreign news coverage, which show that journalists mainly rely on
official state sources in framing international conflicts (Evans, 2010; Koopmans,
2010). This might be due to the fact that state authorities were also those
mainly responsible for taking action in a situation defined as an ‘emergency’.

















FR 64% 23.2% 6.4% 6.4% 0% 100% (764)
DE 63.5% 15.8% 13.5% 7.2% 0% 100% (740)
GR 63.1% 20.6% 5.6% 10.5% 0.2% 100% (753)
IT 64.5% 21.4% 6% 8% 0.1% 100% (701)
PL 58.8% 26.9% 7.9% 6% 0.4% 100% (699)
DK 57.7% 22.9% 9.8% 9.6% 0% 100% (707)
CH 62.7% 20.4% 5.4% 10.8% 0.7% 100% (796)
UK 62.3% 20.9% 5.1% 11.7% 0% 100% (788)
Total 62.1% 21.5% 7.4% 8.8% 0.2% 100% (5948)
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The low cross-national variation in the salience of different actors is confirmed
when dealing with civil society groups. With the exception of Germany, where
the government took the solidarity initiative of pushing civil society into a sec-
ondary role (only 15.8% of all claimants), the percentages in all other countries
vary between 20.4% for Switzerland and 26.9% for Poland. The salience of civil
society is notably higher during the so-called refugee crisis, when compared, for
instance, with the general coverage of immigration related news. According to
EUROPUB comparative data from seven European countries for the period of
1994–2002, domestic civil society actors account for an average of 18% of all
claims (Koopmans, 2007). This score of civil society claims-makers is con-
siderably lower, as the same study elicits, when focusing on debates about EU-
level policies, where only 5% of claimants can be attributed to civil society
actors (Koopmans, 2007). While EU debates tend thus to be state and govern-
ment driven – with only low visibility of EU-level civil society and NGOs – the
refugee solidarity debate provides an exceptional case, given the strong plurality
and relatively high visibility of civil society actors, such as trade unions, advo-
cacy groups and human rights organisations.
The overall shares of individual citizens and activists is low in comparison to
state actors and civil society, and this is true for all countries, except Germany,
where news coverage reported on an almost equal share of claimants from civil
society and individual citizens. The ‘welcoming culture’ that involved many
individual acts of solidarity, especially during the first month of debate, was
thus widely covered in the news media. The share of supranational actors (such
as the EU) is instead low in all countries. This is astonishing because the
‘refugee crisis’ was also a crisis of the European Union itself. It involved EU
institutions, EU and international NGOs at all stages, and activated important
processes of EU-level decision-making and problem-solving, such as the sus-
pension of the Dublin Regulation or the efforts to find agreement on EU
burden-sharing. This European dimension of the conflict was not made suffi-
ciently visible in the public spheres of the various countries under analysis,
which highlights how complex the relationship between politics and the (con-
struction of) a European public sphere is. Above all, it evidences that national
news media privilege a national focus of attention in their practices of news
coverage.
Issues of concern in refugee solidarity debates
To investigate variation of issues that were considered to be of major concern
for debate across countries, we rely on the following broad and aggregated
issue categories, namely, migration management, integration, the background of
refugees, consequences of the ‘refugee crisis’, and public/civic initiatives. Over-
all, data show that the debate in Europe was highly focused on migration
management, which covered approximately two thirds of all claims in all
countries (except for Germany) (see Table 4.2). Obviously, the refugee crisis
raised major concerns about security and national border controls. This is
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consistent with the high salience of state and institutional claims-makers, who
typically raise such concerns and are expected to act as crisis managers who
provide solutions (e.g., Boin et al., 2009; Heath, 2010). In turn, this means that
public concerns that are more genuinely related to social inclusion and solidar-
ity with refugees were less addressed. It is here where we observe the greatest
variance in national debates, with Danish actors in news coverage focusing
more on integration (and thus long-term effects of the inflow of refugees), the
UK’s concern lying more with the background of refugees (e.g., the situation in
Syria), thus treating the ‘refugee crisis’ more as an external event, while Ger-
many’s focus was fixed on the short- and long-term consequences of the crisis.
We can contextualise these numbers by considering the dominance of poli-
tical decision-makers in national news coverage in every country of our sample.
The absence of integration related issues in national debates (with the absence
of Denmark) could be explained by a rather constrained and narrow perspective
on refugees as ‘temporary visitors’ and ‘undesired others’ among the main
claimants. What appears as wide-spread disregard of long-term challenges
might then, however, be due to the fact that political decision-makers dominate
the pool of claimants and are, by profession, more concerned with migration
management (and generally more negative towards refugee solidarity as we will
show later) than with the aspect of integration and individual backgrounds. In
this sense, news values favour claims-makers of the political executive as the
relevant decision-makers, and therefore the most powerful protagonists of ‘crisis’.
This also leads to the increased salience of ‘security’ and ‘crisis management’ and,
at the same time, marginalises voices from civil society. This lack of focus on
individual circumstances and life stories supports a rationalisation of refugees
presented as an anonymous ‘group’; by disallowing the public to bear witness to
refugee suffering, a sense of empathy and compassion is forestalled.

















FR 64.9% 5.2% 10.9% 11.9% 7.1% 100.0% (764)
DE 49.9% 8% 12.3% 16.2% 13.6% 100.0% (740)
GR 66.1% 2.9% 11.6% 11% 8.4% 100.0% (753)
IT 65.5% 2.6% 15.4% 7.1% 9.4% 100.0% (701)
PL 62.4% 4% 10.6% 9.9% 13.1% 100% (699)
DK 66.5% 8.9% 7.6% 7.8% 9.2% 100% (707)
CH 66.1% 4.2% 8.4% 6% 15.3% 100% (796)
UK 68.1% 3.2% 15.9% 8.6% 4.2% 100.0% (788)
Total 63.7% 4.9% 11.6% 9.8% 10% 100.0% (5948)
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Solidarity divides across countries
A first look at the contested field of solidarity within national public spheres seems
to reveal a constellation of countries, newspapers and/or actors that conforms to
the cleavage between proponents and opponents of transnational solidarity. For
instance, public contestations seem to pit Germany against Greece, state actors
against civil society, left-wing against right-wing partisan actors, or citizens against
foreigners and refugees. The picture, however, is infinitely more complex.
In order to better understand these constellations of contestation in the
national debates, we first turn to the distribution of negative, neutral/ambiva-
lent and positive claims regarding refugee solidarity in each country (Table 4.3).
High levels of contestation refer to debates where most actors voice a clear
position and where positive and negative claims are equally distributed. We find
this to be the case in all countries, except for Germany, where most claimants
were reluctant to express negative positions towards refugees and rather pre-
ferred neutral positions. Generally, positive claims prevailed (40.2% on Eur-
opean average), yet this pattern is reversed in the case of the UK. At the time of
the crisis, the UK was still an EU member state, yet not part of the Schengen area
and geographically difficult to reach for refugees, meaning that it was less affected
by the ‘crisis’. Nevertheless, Britain was the country where claims-making was
most negative. As we shall see in the discussion of country findings in Part II of
this book (Chapters 6–13), the slight positive bias is mainly an effect of the soli-
darity campaigns during the first weeks of the crisis, but the claims became –
here, and in all other countries – more negative as the debate unfolded. In our
comparative overview of user commenting to news (see Chapter 5), we will see
that the predominantly positive voice of claims-makers did not resonate in read-
ers’ responses, which were overwhelmingly negative with regard to the question
of whether solidarity should be provided for refugees.
The UK’s position as the outlier in the European debate about solidarity
becomes even more evident when analysing the variance of positions across
Table 4.3 Position across countries (distribution in % and average -1 to 1)
Negative Neutral/ambivalent Positive Total Average position
(-1 to 1)
FR 31.42% 29.89% 38.70% 100% 0.072796935
DE 29.59% 31.76% 38.65% 100% 0.090540541
GR 36.29% 15.47% 48.24% 100% 0.11954993
IT 30.24% 29.39% 40.37% 100% 0.10128388
PL 34.33% 30.19% 35.48% 100% 0.011444921
DK 40.03% 19.94% 40.03% 100% 0
CH 34.04% 18.41% 47.55% 100% 0.135099338
UK 44.53% 22.80% 32.67% 100% -0.118666667
Grand Total 35.05% 24.75% 40.20% 100% 0.051488197
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countries. The overall differences between countries regarding positions were
examined by the Kruskal–Wallis test. Results indicate that samples differ sig-
nificantly (chi-squared = 48.77, df = 7, p = 0); yet looking more closely at
pairwise comparisons between individual countries reveals that this result is
driven by the claims coded for the UK sample. Positions of UK claimants differ
significantly from almost all other countries, with the exception of Poland and
Denmark, which, on average, are closest to the UK’s position (see Table 4.4).
Solidarity towards refugees does result in high levels of domestic contesta-
tion, as the shares of positional statements with supportive or hostile claims in
Table 4.3 have shown. This raises questions about the constellation of actors
responsible for the contentiousness of solidarity debates. Such an analysis of
actors’ positions, however, is faced with limits, as the sample size does not
allow for systematic testing of ideological divisions along specific subcategories
of actors, for instance, between government and opposition, or between repre-
sentatives of competing political parties. However, a comparison of the main
categories of actors is possible. At this aggregate level, we find two actor groups
that are on average supportive of solidarity with refugees: civil society and
supranational actors, among them mainly EU-related organisations, but par-
tially also representatives of the UN (Figure 4.4). State actors and political
parties tend to be negative on average, but what is more surprising is that this
posture is not prevalent everywhere. Despite their insistence on issues of crisis
management and border control, state actors position themselves mainly in
solidarity with refugees in some countries (notably Greece and France), or
remain on average neutral (e.g., in the case of Germany). The expected divide
between state and civil society is thus limited to some countries only. It is most
pronounced in Denmark and the UK, where governments took harsh lines to
exclude the arrival of refugees, whereas in the case of Greece, the position of
the left government and of civil society organisations rather complement each
other. This reaction is asymmetric to the number of asylum seekers in these
countries, again showing that actual numbers of asylum seekers as such are
only a weak predictor of news attention. This furthermore means that the
‘refugee crisis’ triggered divisions in some countries, while it temporarily united
others around the call for solidarity with refugees.
These findings corroborate that the constellation of actors imprints strongly
on solidarity contestations in the public sphere. Everywhere, we can identify
opponents and proponents of solidarity with refugees. While some non-institu-
tional actors tend to defend the needs and demands of refugees consistently
across countries and times (in particular, civil society organisations), there are
other institutional actors that have a fluctuating position, with a tendency
toward negativity. This is true particularly for state actors, whose shifting role
has decisive consequences for public contestations about solidarity.
For a better overview of these different constellations, we list the frequency
of the five most raised claims in each country, based on actor–issue–position
combinations (Table 4.5). The four most quoted issues all relate to the field of
migration management. As mentioned earlier, they deal with the question of
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Figure 4.4 Average positions (-1 negative to 1 positive) across countries and actor types
Note: The actor category ‘unknown/unspecified’ is excluded for reasons of readability,
making in total 12 (out of 5,846) claims with unspecified actors (Greece: 2 counts, avg -1;
Italy: 1 count, avg -1; Poland: 3 counts, avg 0; Switzerland 6 counts, avg 0.166666667).
‘Average positions’ does not take into account frequency of claims and should not be
understood as frequency measures for the different actor categories.
managing the inflow of refugees (e.g. by providing accommodation and reallo-
cating them across the territory) while securing borders and coordinating
migration policies at domestic, European and international levels. In relation to
these four topics, state actors’ claims are by far the most dominant and account
for the greatest share of both positive and negative claims in all countries. The
tonality of public debates is thus particularly dependent on the role of the state,
and the way state actors position themselves in solidarity contestations. Only
the fifth topic relates to typical solidarity related activities, such as volunteering
and political activism, an issue that is not put on the agenda by state actors but
by civil society.
Interesting differences appear in country comparisons of the most dominant
claims in national debates. There seems to be a divide between two groups of
countries. In Italy, Poland, Denmark, the UK and Switzerland, claims by state
actors raising the issue of migration management and rejecting solidarity with
refugees are most salient. This is not the case in the other three countries: in
France, and especially in Greece, the most frequent claims are made by state actors
about migration management who are positive toward refugees: in Germany,
neutral. The so-called ‘welcoming culture’ is thus mainly reflected in public atti-
tudes expressed in Greece as the country of first arrival of refugees and less in
Germany, with which it is commonly associated. A ‘welcoming attitude’ also
dominates debates by French political executives, while in all other countries, it is
openly rejected by the majority of claims-makers representing government.
Our findings show that the main logic for selecting a claim and covering it in
the news is its authorship (state actors) and not the negativity of its content. In
turn, this indicates an overlap between news media and the public sphere when
prominent organised actors are concerned: the news value of the prominence of
state actors beats the prominence of the negativity of content. Accordingly,
positively framed content has a good chance of making it into the public sphere
as long as it is promoted by state actors. We find country differences with
regard to the share of positive and negative attitudes expressed by state actors,
less in the frequency of claims made by state versus civil society actors. These
differences can be explained by the government’s official position in the
Table 4.5 Five most frequent claims based on actor–issue–position combinations
FR DE GR IT PL DK CH UK Total
State-MigrMa-neg 133 111 132 151 131 178 185 209 1230
State-MigrMa-neutr 104 125 54 134 118 72 74 94 775
State-MigrMa-pos 145 65 167 64 71 75 119 61 767
CS-MigrMa-pos 26 17 34 38 31 45 31 36 258
CS-PubIni-pos 17 27 20 27 41 28 53 14 227
Total 425 345 407 414 392 398 462 414 3257
Note: CS= civil society; PubIni = Public/civic initiatives; numbers are absolute numbers of claims
raised showing the respective combination of values; combinations are ranked by the total number
of claims (i.e., across all countries) per combination.
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respective countries, which was highly negative in the case of the UK, Denmark,
Italy and Poland, but more balanced or even positive in the case of Switzerland,
France, Germany and Greece. This confirms the idea of governments as prime
agenda definers in the refugee crisis, while the voice of civil society has com-
paratively little impact.
In addition to issues, actors, and their positions, we also looked into the
justifications that claimants gave for their positions (see Figure 4.5). We cate-
gorised these into interest-based, rights-based, and identity-based justifications:
Interest-based justifications were coded when the claims were concerned with
efficiency, instrumentality and pragmatic notions of the issue of immigration
(Eriksen and Fossum, 2004, p. 438). Such justifications are based on a more
instrumental conception of solidarity. An example would be that solidarity is
rejected due to institutions, strategies and procedures being overburdened with
the task of managing a heavy inflow of refugees. A rights-based justification
referred to more abstract, universal principles of justice and fairness. Such
principles can be expressed in a justification based on human rights, democracy,
civil and social rights. Actors justify or reject solidarity for refugees, for exam-
ple, with humanitarian arguments, moral responsibilities, or explanations of
what is fair and for whom. Identity-based claims justify the support or rejection
of solidarity based on a community to which certain characteristics are attrib-
uted (Eriksen and Fossum 2004, p. 441). It focuses on a bounded, exclusive
understanding of the ‘we’, while at the same time describing and demarcating
an ‘other’. Solidarity for refugees is rejected, for instance, because national
citizens’ privileges or their basic needs are perceived to be neglected. Actors give
a pro-solidarity identity-based justification when claiming that in their country,
support for the vulnerable is part of the national culture.









Interest-based justificiations Rights-based justifications Identity-based justifications No justification
Figure 4.5 Justifications in claims by country
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Overall, the debate over the ‘refugee crisis’ was mainly about values and the
morally defensible limits of humanitarian assistance (Bauböck, 2018, p. 141). With
regard to our analysis, the question then is whether and how claimants justified
their respective stances on the question of solidarity with refugees. Country dif-
ferences in this respect are less pronounced (see Figure 4.5). Claims with no justi-
fication represent by far the largest share, followed by interest-based justifications.
Connecting justifications to the respective position (see Table 4.6), claims
without justifications were more positive, while interest-based justifications
tended to be connected to a more negative stance towards refugee solidarity.
When focusing on specific actors, we find that interest-based justifications seem
to be reserved for political actors and their negative positions, rather than the
other claimant groups that are, as already stated, more positive overall and use
rights-based arguments to justify their opinions.
To sum up, solidarity contestations are patterned strongly by the constella-
tion of actors, in particular by the specific position state actors take in regard to
the needs and demands of refugees. The centrality of state actors seems to be
augmented by the mass media, given that their news reporting practices tend to
privilege politically powerful actors, thus providing them with more space and
weight. This observation raises the question of whether different types of
newspapers shape solidarity debates differently.
Contextualising the debates: Differences across newspaper types?
To approach this question of different patterns of solidarity contestation across
types of newspapers, we compare positionality of claims across newspapers. It












Negative 13.8% 1.7% 1.8% 10.8% 28.0%
Neutral/ambivalent 9.4% 1.4% 0.7% 9.0% 20.4%
Positive 6.4% 6.0% 1.0% 9.1% 22.5%
Civil society actors
Negative 2.2% 0.4% 1.5% 3.4% 7.5%
Neutral/ambivalent 1.3% 0.3% 0.3% 2.4% 4.2%
Positive 2.0% 6.8% 1.2% 7.1% 17.1%
Unknown/unspecified
Negative 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Neutral/ambivalent 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Positive 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1%
Grand Total 34.9% 16.7% 6.5% 41.9% 100.0%
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might be possible that different newspapers lean more towards a specific opi-
nion about solidarity with refugees, and that they thus might tend to grant
more space and weight to actors that profess these positions themselves. This
would lead to a more polarised public sphere, where different media outlets are
associated with diverging political opinions or solidarity claims. Our data,
however, do not support this proposition. Newspapers do not seem to polarise
domestic debates and group audiences or readerships against each other. Even
though tabloids are on average more negative (in interest-based and identity-
based justifications) and less positive in rights-based justifications in their posi-
tion towards refugees compared with broadsheets, the distribution of negative
and positive claims in relation to justifications still remains the same: interest-
based justifications and identity-based justifications are typically combined with
a negative evaluation of the deservingness of refugees, while humanitarian jus-
tifications expectedly correlate with a strongly positive correlation across all
newspapers (see Figure 4.6). In terms of news outlets, the public sphere of
domestic solidarity contestation is integrated and thus not fragmented in dif-
ferent and diametrically opposed news readerships, who adhere to different
values or are confronted with different ideological positions.
The lack of significant differences in tonality and justifications across media
outlets seems to indicate that public debates about solidarity with refugees are
highly integrated and contentious at the same time. Most probably, both aspects
are tightly interrelated. Claimants are able to make their voices heard in various
media outlets, thus participating in what we could call an integrated arena of
contestation. At the same time, the high level of integration is responsible for the
contentiousness of public debates, given that diverging positions are heard,
addressed, opposed or refuted. The constellations of actors we have been able to
unveil for each country are thus a factor that transcends various media outlets
and imposes itself on national solidarity debates. This has consequences for the
dominant position of state actors, as they can reaffirm their centrality across the
spectrum of media outlets, and thus within the public sphere at large.






Figure 4.6 Average tone of claims and solidarity justifications across broadsheet/tabloid
newspapers
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The high level of integration of the public sphere in terms of actors and media
outlets might have consequences for the closure of national debates towards the
outside. If public debates are dominated by a delimited number of actors, and if
media outlets basically converge in terms of news values and claims-making
privileges, then it might be harder for claimants from other countries and/or
supranational governance levels to make their voices heard. This might limit the
chances of promoting solidarity with refugees, particularly if this decreases the
opportunities for international organisations, more supportive of refugees, to
raise their voice within the national media. This question touches the issue of
Europeanisation, and thus the degree to which national debates are permeated by
actors and issues coming from other European member states, or EU institutions
themselves. The contentiousness of solidarity debates might thus depend on the
degree to which national arenas are closed or opened towards the outside.
Europeanisation and transnationalisation of debates
or re-nationalisation?
For these purposes, we turn now to our last research question regarding the
scope of claimants. This general proposition can be validated when looking at
the territorial scope of actors involved in national solidarity contestations,
asking whether actors located at the local, national or European levels profess
different solidarity positions. To answer this question, we pooled the informa-
tion about the actors’ scopes across countries. Figure 4.7 shows quite clearly
that actors are, on average, the most negative when they have a national
scope, whereas claimants with a scope beyond or below the national context
are substantially more positive over time. This seems to match the divisive
nature of electoral politics at the national level, which has led to the
upsurge of extreme right-wing parties in many European countries. By con-
trast, sub-national and EU politics follow quite different dynamics, as they
are often inspired by the common search for bipartisan solutions to specific
issues (the subnational level), or by the formation of consensus among dif-
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Figure 4.7 Average position of actors by scope across all countries over time
80 The ‘refugee crisis’ in the news media
structural contraposition of national and European scopes. There is a divi-
sion between national governments looking for electoral support on the one
hand, and the EU on the other, as the latter favours European solutions that
are based on universal human rights. The EU finds itself in opposition to
national governments, which refuse to comply with EU resettlement schemes.
However, this contraposition has to be qualified in longitudinal terms. The
average position of actors at all scope-levels seems to follow similar diachronic
trends, and this particularly affects the average position of international or EU-
related actors, as they tend to become less supportive. This suggests that events
like the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the sexual assaults in Cologne
over New Year in 2016 influenced the discourse about solidarity with refugees
towards the negative at all levels of political debate, even though transnational
actors tend to stick to a more supportive attitudes towards refugees, even in
more difficult times.
Looking into the average positioning of organised actors at different scopes
by country reveals some remarkable differences. Figure 4.8 shows that Germany
and Greece, for example, are the two countries in the sample where national
actors have, on average, more positive claims about refugees, whereas in all
other countries, national scope equals negative tonality. Germany stands out as
having the smallest gap in positioning between the domestic and the European
level, not surprisingly so, given its leadership in Europe and the relatively minor
role the supranational cleavage plays in its electoral politics. A small gap can
also be observed in Greece, standing out in particular when looking at the
position of actors with a larger than national scope. Greece is the country in the
sample with the most negative claims put forward by trans-, supra- or interna-
tional actors. Possibly, this is due to the usual way the media portray European
actors for their problem-bringing, rather than problem-solving capacity since
the beginning of the debt crisis in 2008. Overall, solidarity claims in Greece
seem to follow the opposite dynamic in terms of positions and scopes, when
compared to most of the other countries in our sample.
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Figure 4.8 Average positioning of claimants by country/scope
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Conclusions
In this chapter, we have shown that public debate and contestation in the news
media over the ‘refugee crisis’ emerged as a dynamic process of cultural exchange
between European governments, oppositional parties, transnational civil society
and segments of the public. The way solidarity is contested in the EU cannot be
explained by looking at nationally confined debates only, nor can we reduce it
to international conflicts in the form of cultural clashes between states. Instead,
we can speak of a European field of solidarity contestation where attention was
focused on the same events, common lines of arguments were developed, and
positions were shared by different segments of the public.
By looking at media contestation over the refugee crisis, this chapter has
uncovered the ambivalence of European solidarity between the needs to provide
humanitarian assistance and the protection of national welfare and democracy.
While one may disagree with the idea that the ‘refugee crisis’ was Europe’s Sep-
tember 11 (Krastev, 2017b), it is nonetheless clear that the ‘refugee crisis’ has not
only been about refugees, but has also been, and still is, about Europe itself. Our
findings thus support the idea of a new dynamics of transnational solidarity
contestations that is driven by a new ideational divide that replaces traditional
ideological cleavages and that juxtaposes so-called communitarians with cosmo-
politans (de Wilde et al., 2019; de Wilde and Zürn, 2013; Kriesi et al., 2012).
This dynamic exchange started with a genuine European momentum of soli-
darity, which dwindled quickly through the re-appropriation of the ‘refugee crisis’
by national actors, who were mainly driven by concerns and positions of national
politics. We showed that solidarity contestation depends on particular moments.
Such a moment for European solidarity was triggered by the dramatic events that
unfolded throughout the summer of 2015. Yet, such a European momentum of
what was emphatically referred to as ‘welcoming culture’ was neither embraced
equally in all countries, nor did it last. National specificities re-emerged over the
following months across public spheres based on a culture of denial and rejection
of refugee solidarity and the closure of national and European borders. At the
same time, our findings have suggested that the ‘refugee crisis’ has not yet become
a genuinely European field of contentious politics. In fact, we observed the pre-
sence of heterogeneous forms of action, whereby protest does not dominate the
large variety of country-specific repertoires.
Looking into the average positioning of public claims-makers, we showed
that the public sphere is not the arena that can be held solely responsible for
promoting anti-solidarity and anti-refugee attitudes, justifications, and positions.
The overall position of claims was often favourable rather than unfavourable
vis-à-vis refugees, while some emphasis was regularly put on humanitarian
issues and not just on security concerns. In addition, civil society was parti-
cularly active, and most often with a positive stance. In particular, we showed
consistently positive attitudes among civil society actors across countries. By
contrast, we found that variation is stronger when looking at intra-national
differences between organised actors: state and political actors stand out for
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their stronger involvement in negative claims, whereas civil society groups and
collective actors engage more extensively in pro-refugee claims. However,
state actors diverged considerably between countries in regard to their average
position towards solidarity with refugees, thus having an important impact on
the overall tonality of public debates within their country.
Claimants with a trans-, inter-, or supranational scope were overwhelmingly
positive regarding solidarity with refugees, in contrast to national scope clai-
mants. Our data reveal a considerable gap between the more cosmopolitan
standing of the EU, on the one hand, against the national revival across member
states, on the other. However, the gap tends to be diminishing, given the less sup-
portive role of international and European institutions within national debates.
Furthermore, we have identified relevant patterns of justifications, which clai-
mants appeal to when justifying their claims. In particular, rights-based justi-
fications are often used when claiming solidarity with refugees, while the
opposite is true for interest- and identity-based justifications. This finding cor-
roborates the opposition between supranationalism and renationalisation pro-
cesses: National governments often refused to comply with EU resettlement
schemes so as to defend their interests and identities, while EU actors favoured
a solution based on universal human rights.
Ultimately, our findings show that there was potential in news media to
mobilise solidarity beyond the borders of national publics. However, the pro-
mise of more solidarity with the refugees was especially linked to the European
momentum of September 2015, after which solidarity simultaneously declined
and re-nationalised. This momentum of solidarity is not an unusual experi-
ence, given that European integration has always been promoted as an
expansive solidarity project. The EU is widely seen, for instance, as a huma-
nitarian power that guarantees the free flows of labour, capital and people,
propagates inclusive notions of citizenship or a European social model (Trenz,
2016). Yet, European solidarity can also turn into a more exclusive and pro-
tective project, where national interests become focal points of orientation. In
this new constellation, European cooperation would be limited to the coordi-
nation of the fight against irregular immigration and of external border con-
trols, with the sole objective of protecting national welfare regimes.
Note
1 We will deal with such public responses selectively in our analysis of social media
user comments to political news in Chapter 5.
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5 Bottom-up solidarity contestation
through social media
How Facebook users respond to
political news
Introduction
Our analysis of public claims-making in the previous chapter was built on the
premise that news media constitute a representative arena for generalised public
opinion formation processes. The way solidarity is contested in the news media
would thus also reflect country differences of attitudes towards refugees. Con-
testants in the news would speak for particular segments of the public and the
salience of either positive or negative attitudes in the news could even indicate
trends in the development of public opinion turning more open or more hostile
towards refugees. From existing studies, we know that media negativity in the
coverage of immigration-related issues is also paired with negative attitudes
expressed in public opinion (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009).
The claims-making method is insufficient to understand this empirical link
between media negativity and public opinion. However, by expanding claims-
making to social media and the analysis of user reactions, we are able to grasp the
opinions and claims of media consumers and thus understand better how this
group of people receive and contest solidarity regarding refugees. By doing so, our
analysis reaches beyond the discourse of organised actors as claims-making in
news media, thereby shedding light on people who feel the need to engage in public
discourse. In our study, we therefore make – to our knowledge – the first sys-
tematic attempt to include selected responses of single individuals to media claims
of organised actors into the analysis of public debates. This goes significantly
beyond existing analyses which have studied political contestation in the media
arena in isolation from the responses of individual readers themselves. We build
here on new opportunities offered by the spread of political news through social
media, where selected user responses exist as an attachment to shared online news
articles. One caveat is that these responses are highly selective and therefore not
representative of the opinions of the general public. This observation is true inso-
far as only a minority of news readers make use of these commenting opportunities
and that a self-selection bias of ‘angry citizens’ who raise their voice online might
apply (Chen, 2017; Gonçalves, 2018). However, it also needs to be taken into
consideration that these selective online debates increase their potential impact by
creating broader visibility: comments are published on news sites that reach out to
rather broad audiences and thus they are also read by others. Their effects on
public opinion formation remains, of course, difficult to assess, but given the
fact that an increasing number of people, especially young adults, mainly read
political news online and through social media, such possible effects should not
be disregarded.
In light of the news media’s influence on opinion formation processes it thus
seems overdue to take this arena of political contestation more seriously. For
this purpose, we now turn to Facebook commenting in reaction to news, which
has been shown to facilitate expressions of xenophobia and racism, especially
with regard to debates on foreigners and immigration (Chaudhry and Gruzd,
2020; Graham, 2019). Such expressions might be even more prevalent in the
context of the ‘refugee crisis’, which has presented a springboard for right-wing
populist parties to reinforce xenophobic sentiment and nationalistic tendencies,
openly criticising the trustworthiness of established news media themselves.
We will focus our analysis of user-driven bottom-up contestation on the case
of the ‘refugee crisis’, and here in particular on public debates during the month
of September 2015. That month was marked by a series of dramatic events that
brought the ‘refugee crisis’ to the attention of a wide European audience, espe-
cially when images of Alan Kurdi, the boy from Syria who drowned on a beach
in Turkey, were widely shared through social media, triggering a wave of soli-
darity mobilisation (Thomas et al., 2018). The visual images of distant human
suffering allowed for the emergence of what has been called ‘impromptu publics
of moral spectatorship’ (Mortensen and Trenz, 2016).
Given the complementary nature of this chapter to the claims-making analysis
of mainstream media coverage (Chapter 4), we selected Facebook user comments
that were posted in response to news articles on mainstream newspapers’ Face-
book pages. This suited our aim to collect data on the more hidden side of the
public sphere: While our claims-making analysis allowed us to map the official
voices and public interventions of organised actors, the online commenting ana-
lysis in this chapter collects the informal ways individual news readers of social
media seize the chance to express their views and emotions and translate them
into political speech from the bottom up. In this way, the following analysis adds
to an understanding of solidarity contestation from below, considering users’
Facebook comments as arenas for direct involvement in political discourse.
Online news commenting: Theoretical considerations
New and social media are increasingly used by readers to engage and debate the
boundaries of what they perceive to be their political community and the desir-
ability of solidarity among each other. The group of social media commenters
might still constitute a niche, yet it is growing and becoming more active on
mainstream newspaper sites on social media, thus arousing the attention of large
audiences. What online commenters think about the deservingness of refugees,
and how these commenters express themselves in response to political repre-
sentatives is therefore of relevance to understanding how solidarity is negotiated
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within the public sphere. The existing literature does not provide clear indications
about the effects of social media commenting on civic attitudes and democracy,
because scholars are divided in their assessments. On the one hand, they emphasise
the destabilisation effects of social media. In particular, social media and news
commenting sites are often held responsible for the spread of hate speech and
uncivic culture towards fellow citizens (Gerhards and Schafer, 2010; Michailidou
et al., 2014; Rasmussen, 2014). On the other hand, media scholars have highlighted
new opportunities, because the social media stimulate agenda-setting, more
inclusive deliberations, identity building, and therefore also solidarity. Political
debates are more civic, global, inclusive and accessible, empower disadvantaged
groups and pluralise the public sphere in various ways (Dahlgren, 2013;
Rauchfleisch and Kovic, 2016). This optimistic assessment stands in contrast to
the former one, as this position assumes that social media stimulate an uncivic
online sphere that is a potential threat to established solidarity relationships.
The analysis of user comments will not only provide new insights into public
contestations, but also into the mobilisation of citizens’ solidarity. Bottom-up
mobilisation of solidarity is commonly analysed in terms of individual practices
and attitudes (Gerhards et al., 2019; Lahusen and Grasso, 2018) and/or initiatives
by civil society activists and grassroots movements providing support to vul-
nerable groups of the population (Kousis et al., 2018; Kousis et al., 2020). An
investigation of bottom-up solidarity contestations in the social media allows
new light to be shed on an important arena where citizens form their opinions
and commit to social and political norms or values. Such an inquiry is inter-
ested in the ways in which reader-users express their opinions and emotions
on Facebook. These expressions are of particular relevance, because they are
placed in a public medium that is more visible than established news sites.1
The analysis of users’ comments thus enables us to better understand how
solidarity is contested within the public sphere in reaction to broadsheet and
yellow press news on their respective Facebook pages.
The following analyses of Facebook comments will be driven by two over-
arching questions. On the one hand, we are interested in understanding whether
users’ comments can be treated as contributions to a meaningful debate between
proponents and opponents of solidarity. The analysis will help to assess whether
online commenting is a manifestation of a civic or uncivic public sphere. On the
other hand, our investigation will attempt to map and analyse solidarity con-
testations by showing the extent to which solidarity emerges in reaction to news
articles and the claims reported therein, and by indicating how strong opposition
to solidarity with refugees is among readers of such news.
Individual users might decide to add a comment when confronted with the
news coverage about the ‘refugee crisis’. By doing so, they enter into some sort
of collective, interpretative work through social media. They produce text in
the form of comments, and these texts relate to the news content in very specific
ways: They interpret the evidence presented in the newspaper articles, they
support or reject claims raised by politicians and other organised actors in the
news media, they ascribe political responsibility and they reflect on political
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consequences. User debates on social media are therefore not cut off from main-
stream political debates as covered by the news media, neither do they develop in
self-chosen isolation within closed communities. The meaning structures of user
debates on open Facebook pages remain embedded and are influenced by the
frames of interpretation used by actors in the mainstream media (Galpin and
Trenz, 2019). User debates are to be considered, first and foremost, as a valu-
able contribution that adds to the plurality of public opinion formation in the
democratic public sphere. In addition to journalists, intellectuals and political
actors, who are dominant claimants in the news media, users can also exploit
public channels in order to contribute to public discourse. To do this inter-
pretative work, individual users cannot only relate back to claims-making of
organised actors reported in the news media and support or reject their argu-
ments. They can also relate to each other, engage in an exchange of arguments
and come up with their own justifications as to why solidarity towards refugees
is accepted or rejected.
The manners in which such an exchange of viewpoints is organised varies,
however, in important ways. In line with our theoretical argument developed
in Chapter 2, we wish to distinguish conceptually between two alternative
scenarios: An online civic sphere of solidarity contestation and an online uncivic
sphere of solidarity contestation. According to the first scenario, news readers’
commenting practices on social media are part of an online civic sphere that
enriches the traditional top-down ways of political communication by facilitat-
ing horizontal exchanges among citizens, making the media voice more plural
and participatory, and thus building a more inclusive sphere for the formation
of public opinion (Dahlgren, 2013). In this way, Facebook news sites offer
platforms for people who feel the need to engage in the bigger debates, to
respond to the claims in the posts curated by the newspapers, and subsequently
to participate in democratic discourse.
This hypothetical scenario of an online civic sphere could be validated if
commenting practices meet the following three criteria. First, we would expect
online users to be responsive to news contents and to claims raised in the news
media. Secondly, we would expect them to relate directly to refugees as
‘objects’ of solidarity (as coded) and to critically judge whether or not solidarity
should be granted to them. And thirdly, we would expect users to seek political
influence, i.e., to translate an informal and individual opinion into formal and
collective political action. Taking voice through individual commenting should
be paired with demands for collective action: ‘we shall’, ‘let’s do’. Such calls for
actions could try to oppose or subvert solidarity with refugees, but they could
also aim to expand bonds of solidarity towards refugees, either by reference to
emotions such as pity, or by references to universal principles supporting a
notion of transnational solidarity. In all these cases, individual users would
motivate and encourage each other to swing to collective commitment and to
support a cause for or against solidarity with refugees. As such, they would
become secondary definers of the ‘refugee crisis’, because they would not simply
accept or reject claims raised by organised actors in the media, but also bear
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witness, engage in their own collective practice of interpretation of the situation
and take sides on the question of refugee solidarity.
At the same time, online participatory news formats and, in particular, user
commenting on social media and online news sites have become the object of a
harsh normative critique (Gerbaudo, 2014; Krämer, 2017). According to our
second scenario – the uncivic sphere – online publics are defined as non-
responsive and marginal, as they lack public visibility. The online media would
engage selected citizens, but these debates would remain detached from political
deliberations and formal decision-making contexts, and they would have mini-
mal impact on public opinion and/or political outcomes (Givskov and Trenz,
2014). Considering the general relationship between news content and com-
menting on Facebook, the online publics would be fragmented into different
opinion bubbles, closed communities where users mainly exchange opinions
among the like-minded (Sunstein, 2009). Online fragmentation would further
affect users’ capacities to talk beyond their individual stand, to express
informed opinions and to defend values of social justice and solidarity. Closed
within their bubbles, online users would position themselves in increasingly
polarised ways. Such a polarised constellation of online discourse would be
paired with increasing distrust and enmity between the opposing camps, who
would engage primarily in an exclusive and non-solidary rhetoric against their
political opponent or against migrants as undeserving outsiders. There would,
in other words, be a general tendency among online users to adopt what, in line
with Benjamin Moffitt (Moffitt, 2016), can be called a populist style that chal-
lenges the performance of democratic (representative) politics and displays or
amplifies primarily the positions taken by populist parties in the electoral con-
test. The online uncivic sphere would unfold through a populist style of user
debates that is exclusive and anti-solidary either against the political opponent
or against people in need. In terms of solidarity contestation, we argue that this
scenario can be validated by ascertaining the extent to which online publics
voice their discontent with established representative politics, restrict rather
than expand solidarity relationships and target political enemies or refugees in
an exclusive way, i.e. as undeserving of solidarity.
Engagement in social media debates: The civicness of citizens’
commentary on Facebook news sites
Before diving into the analysis of how solidarity contestation among news
readers unfolded, we show in which ways users engaged in the news debates
during the month of September 2015 (see Chapter 3 for the sampling strat-
egy). The analysis of user comments is restricted to this one month because
our overview of claims-making evidenced that public interventions peaked at
this moment of time in all countries under investigation (see Figure 4.2 in
Chapter 4). Other studies have shown that sympathy with refugees peaked
for a relatively short period and only in some countries (Thomas et al.,
2018). Additionally, news and social media did not become a unified space
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of solidarity mobilisation, because this space continued to be fragmented
along national lines (Triandafyllidou, 2018).
Our own analysis does not allow us to portray developments across time and
national fragmentations in the intensity of bottom-up contestations. However,
our data provide evidence that news readers in all countries under study were
heavily engaged in commenting on news articles on the refugee crisis. Even
though solidarity remained contested within and between countries, the cov-
erage of the Syrian war and of the human histories of war refugees created a
European momentum of public sensitivity. This focused attention on the
‘refugee crisis’ and was clearly visible not only in the contentious dynamics of
public claims-making in the news media (see Chapter 4), but also corre-
spondingly in the practice of user engagement on social media during Sep-
tember 2015. It is therefore all the more important to establish a linkage
between public claims-making of organised actors in the news and readers’
responsiveness at the individual level in the social media.
In this part we will provide more substance to these general observations.
First, we need to clarify how commenters engaged with the posted articles,
that is, whether they engaged directly with the respective claims or topic of
the news articles, or whether they expressed their opinions independently of
the post. After that, we focus on those comments that are directly related to
refugees as potential recipients of solidarity. We will look into the tone of
commenters as they expressed opinions and emotions regarding solidarity
with refugees, and we identify the justifications they use to back their views.
In order to understand user comments, we first need to know their stance
regarding solidarity toward refugees in the claims of the articles posted on
Facebook, in other words, the posts to which commenters reacted. We are
interested in the responsiveness of user comments on Facebook; we need to
have knowledge about how solidarity was contested in the articles posted on
Facebook. Figure 5.1 suggests a positive trend in the news in the sense that
most claims were supportive of solidarity with refugees during the month of
September in this sub-sample. This applies independently of the positioning of
the respective government in these countries. In Denmark and Poland, whose
governments were officially rejecting European solidarity with refugees, the
average tone in the news posted on Facebook was even more positive than in
countries like Greece and Germany, where the governments welcomed refu-
gees from Syria.
By giving information on the tone in the sampled Facebook articles, as well
as the sampled Facebook comments, we can show that both texts were inter-
related in terms of content and message. Our data does not substantiate the
assumption that social media users are part of an uncivic public sphere that is
detached from public deliberations and secludes itself in egocentric bubbles of
like-minded people. On the contrary, as we will show, we found that com-
menting is generally responsive to news coverage and often motivated by a
proactive engagement in public debate. We distinguish three forms of motiva-
tion: 1) to make a general contribution to the debate raised by the article, 2) to
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respond to a claim by an organised actor, and, 3) to make an independent
contribution to the debate outside the thematic context of the article. The
second form is obviously the most inter-discursive, but also the first and the
third can be considered to be – from a deliberative point of view – valid con-
tributions to a political debate.
The responsiveness of commenters on Facebook and the degree to which they
enter into an exchange of opinion was very high: 74.4% of all commenters
responded to news content on the refugee crisis and only 25.6% of the users
posted unrelated independent statements. Most of them, however, were still
within the thematic context of the refugee crisis. Among those comments rela-
ted directly to news content, the majority (39.2%) responded to the general
issue raised in the main article, but every third comment (35.2%) also respon-
ded to a claim raised by an organised claimant in the main article (Trenz et al.,
2020, p. 158). Regarding national specificities, interesting differences can be
shown (see Figure 5.2). Italy, Germany and Greece appear as the countries with
the highest level of bottom-up contestation during the refugee debate, i.e. those
countries where claims in the news, most of them raised by elites and political
representatives, are most challenged on social media. Low levels of bottom-up
politicisation, as in the case of Poland or the UK, point instead to a congruence
of opinion expressed by political elites in those countries (most of them repre-
senting the national government) and online news readers. There is, in other
words, less motivation for online users to be emotionally engaged in the debate
as, overall, they feel represented by the claims raised in the news media.
The engagement of Facebook users with news articles becomes even more
palpable when looking at the way commenters react to the posted articles.
Table 5.1 sheds light on the response patterns to journalistic outputs. We find
that the great majority of commenters (80.1%) took sides in the sense of either
affirming or opposing claims or issues in the posted news article, 19.9%









Figure 5.1 Average tone of claims regarding solidarity with refugees in articles posted on
Facebook
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remained neutral or ambivalent. Among those, 47% were in opposition to the
general issues or claims in the main article, and only 33.1% expressed support.
User commenting was, in this sense, found to be more critical than affirmative.
To understand what is at stake in commenters’ contestation regarding soli-
darity towards refugees, we looked at the issues (or concerns) raised in debates.
The numbers in Table 5.1 indicate that there is a tight linkage between jour-
nalism debates and online commenting: Commenters tend to have similar topics
in mind, because the distribution of issues among their comments largely mir-
rors the distribution of issues addressed by organised actors in news articles
(see Figure 5.3). Basically, users stick to the topics raised by journalists and the
organised actors quoted in their articles.
This general finding has to be broken down according to countries in order
to assess the extent to which commenters focused on the same issues. We would
expect that attention should be distributed unequally with different issues
brought into focus by commenters in different countries, because national news-
making is focused on country-specific topics and national audiences (Pfetsch,
Table 5.1 The type of comment by position of commenter towards the issue/claim in the








Response to general issue in
main article
29.6%(463) 10.1%(158) 14.3%(224) 54.0%(845)
Response to claim raised in
main article
17.4%(272) 9.8%(154) 18.8%(294) 46.0%(720)
Total 47.0%(960) 19.9%(428) 33.1%(626) 100%(1565)









Response to general issue in main article
Response to claim raised in main article
Independent statement, opinion
Figure 5.2 Overview of user engagement across countries and reactions (types of com-
ments in frequencies)
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2007). However, as shown in Table 5.2, we did not find a clear pattern in the
cross-country distribution of issue attention. Rather, we can see a partial con-
gruence of agendas, because social media users tend to raise similar issues of
concerns in all countries under investigation, when articles reporting on refu-
gees are at stake. Commenters in all countries focused on the ‘refugee crisis’ as
a management problem that required the state to regain control and adopt
adequate policies. Additionally, they voice concerns regarding the general con-
sequences of the crisis and the problems created by refugees. Non-state civic
activities also figured prominently, especially in Denmark and Switzerland. The
background situation and the fate of refugees were also discussed to some









Migration management Integration Background/situation of refugees
Consequences of refugee crisis Issues re public/civic initiatives
Figure 5.3 Overview of issues discussed in articles posted on Facebook

























France 49.3% 3.0% 7.3% 21% 17.7% 1.7% 100%
Germany 16.3% 0.3% 17.3% 40.7% 22% 3.3% 100%
Greece 54% 0% 18% 10.3% 17.7% 0% 100%
Italy 33.3% 1% 21.3% 5% 21.3% 18% 100%
Poland 25.3% 9% 15% 30.7% 18% 2% 100%
Denmark 44.3% 0.3% 13.7% 7.7% 31% 3% 100%
Switzerland 29.3% 4.3% 20% 14.3% 31% 1% 100%
UK 49.3% 0.7% 30.7% 8.7% 10.7% 0% 100%
Total 37.7% 2.3% 17.9% 17.3% 21.2% 3.6% 100%
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degree, especially around the case of the drowned Syrian boy, Alan Kurdi. In
other words, in the heat of the ‘refugee crisis’ of September 2015, Europeans
largely talked about the same issues of concern, in spite of divisions between
national media and public spheres.
Overall, these findings point to a solid linkage between claims-making inputs
about refugee solidarity and online user responsiveness. They thus confirm the
first scenario of an online civic culture. For the great majority of news readers,
online commenting is an opportunity to actively intervene and take sides in a
controversial political debate. This is why issue agendas of online commenting
and mainstream news coverage largely overlap. We find little evidence for frag-
mented user debates among individual citizens that are decoupled from main-
stream public debates of organised actors in the news media. These findings lend
some support to other research on social media commenting (Hille and Bakker,
2014). Instead of understanding comment sections on mainstream news Facebook
pages as an outlet for blatant political outrage and disillusionment that ignore
discourse in the public sphere, it is important to distinguish between different
contexts and platforms where commenting takes place, linking mainstream or
niche news outlets with different segments of audiences.
Engagement with refugee solidarity: Reactions to the witnessing of
human suffering
In this section, we turn from a general discussion of the civicness of online
debates at the individual level and their linkage to claims-making of organised
actors to the more specific question of how refugee solidarity is contested in
Facebook news commenting forums during the ‘refugee crisis’.
Turning now to our sample of Facebook comments in response to the above
articles, it is important to establish how many of these comments engaged in
solidarity debates with refugees. Facebook news readers are of course free to
comment on any related or unrelated issues they consider to be of relevance.
Commenters who express a position about solidarity can do this either by
maintaining high levels of interdiscursivity, i.e. a reaction to posted content in
the news, or a response to a solidarity claim, or out of context of the posted
article, but related to the broader context of the refugee crisis. In the same vein,
commenters who do not express themselves on the issue of refugee solidarity
can also still engage with the posted material in meaningful ways and engage in
political debates, yet without relating to refugees as objects of solidarity (for
instance, they may contest the position of a political representative on an issue
unrelated to the case of refugees).
To establish how important the issue of solidarity with refugees was for
them, we distinguish between comments where commenters refer to the issue of
refugee solidarity (object=yes: all comments where refugees as objects of soli-
darity were recognisable), and comments on any other, not further specified
issue (object=no). These represent 83.9% of all comments found on Facebook
news sites with the object filter on ‘Yes’ (see Table 5.3). Table 5.3 shows
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further that the Facebook commenting function was used for an intense and
focused debate on the issue of refugee solidarity. Commenters used the Face-
book news sites in order to voice their views in regard to issues pertaining to
refugees directly, and only a minority shifted the focus of debate to other
unrelated issues (such as the legitimacy of domestic actors during the ‘refugee
crisis’). In other words, online news readers all over Europe used the opportu-
nity for bottom-up mobilisation at the individual level to express their opinion
in support of or in opposition to the question of whether refugees should be
welcomed during the crisis peak, September 2015.
Our comment analysis builds on the notion of a politics of pity. In particular,
we wish to investigate the way emotions, such as fear or pity, are given political
expression. We do not analyse emotions directly, but the way emotions translate
into a public statement of side-taking solidarity. Consequently, we are focused on
moral debates in which citizens are engaged in discussing whether solidarity should
be granted or not (Mortensen and Trenz, 2016). Through our combination of
claims-making and reader commenting analysis, we argue that fear or pity as
emotional expressions in media discourse are used as an element of political
claims-making to distinguish positions in the solidarity debate, ascribe responsi-
bility and call politicians to act. The question thus is what contributes to the sal-
ience of pity or fear at any particular moment of the debate, and who defines and
interprets pity and fear and translates them into calls for or rejections of solidarity.
Taking sides in the solidarity question
By looking at commenters’ tonality regarding refugees, we can measure degrees
of polarisation of the solidarity debates. We speak of a polarisation of solidarity
contestation when user comments at the individual level clash with statements by
organised actors in the media and/or express diametrically opposed opinions, or
when their opinions were, on average, more extreme on the tonality scale.
Table 5.3 Subsampling comments with position regarding refugee
solidarity (Object = Yes)
Object: No Object: Yes Total
France 8.7% 91.3% 100%
Germany 33.0% 67.0% 100%
Greece 8.0% 92.0% 100%
Italy 20.3% 79.7% 100%
Poland 20.3% 79.7% 100%
Denmark 22.7% 77.3% 100%
Switzerland 2.3% 97.7% 100%
UK 13.3% 86.7% 100%
Total 16.1% 83.9% 100%
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We first analyse how far users are supportive or critical of refugees. Generally,
and across all countries, we can see that even though the largest share of user
comments (47.7%) rejected solidarity with refugees, there was a substantial min-
ority of supportive users (31.1%), while 21.3% remained neutral or ambivalent
(see Table 5.4). These numbers suggest plurality of opinion and disagreement
among the commenters in the solidarity question. At the same time, they disprove
that media users are a homogenous group sharing anger and/or rejection. Never-
theless, users who reject solidarity are the dominant group, a finding that contrasts
with the position of claims-makers in the news articles, because the latter are
dominantly positive towards refugees (47%). As a matter of fact, the share of
negative and positive comments among individual Facebook users is reversed when
looking at claims-making of organised actors in the news articles (news claims:
30.7% negative, 22.3% neutral, 47% positive; comments: 47.7% negative,
21.3% neutral, 31.1% positive). Even though Facebook commenting on the
pages of mainstream newspapers is often not associated with the spread of hate
speech and xenophobia (due to moderation practices), the opportunities for
bottom-up mobilisation are nevertheless used to take sides against solidarity
with refugees, and, in addition, to raise a voice to criticise the discourse in the
public sphere.
Figure 5.4 reports similar findings by comparing the average tonality across
countries. Except for Poland, degrees of negativity in user commenting are
relatively low, or even balanced. In two countries (Greece and Italy), the aver-
age tone in Facebook commenting regarding the question of refugee solidarity is
even positive. This might be the result of a politics of pity from below (i.e., the
expression of care for the suffering and needs of refugees) that is nurtured by
the immediate experience of hardships of the incoming refugees in countries
with external borders, and the intense mobilisation of civic solidarity at the
grass-roots level (see Kousis et al., 2020). Northern European countries might





Anti Neutral Pro Anti Neutral Pro
France 28.5% 24.5% 47% 53.3% 26.3% 20.4%
Germany 22.6% 28.2% 49.2% 55.2% 21.4% 23.4%
Greece 41.5% 17% 41.5% 24.6% 42% 33.3%
Italy 31.9% 22.3% 45.8% 27.6% 23% 49.4%
Poland 27.2% 29% 43.8% 75.3% 15.9% 8.8%
Denmark 39.3% 14.5 46.2% 47.4% 12.9% 39.7%
Switzerland 24% 14.4% 61.6% 48.8% 16.4% 34.8%
UK 40.7% 24.6% 34.7% 52.3% 10% 37.7%
Total 30.7% 22.3% 47% 47.7% 21.3% 31.1%
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be less exposed to these immediate needs. Moreover, and in spite of the ‘welcom-
ing culture’ that turned into a popular movement in countries like Germany and
France (see again Kousis et al., 2020), the selective group of Facebook com-
menters were more critical of this wave of support in their countries. Poland,
with the lowest number of asylum applications (9,490 from August 2015 to
April 2016 according to Eurostat, 2018), was the most negative country. All this
seems to confirm our interpretation that the refugee crisis is a ‘mediated event’
that is not fully explained by facts and numbers.
It is noteworthy that negative and supportive commenters raised different
issue agendas (Tables 5.5 and 5.6). In line with a politics of fear, the most
salient issue (i.e., migration management) was more recurrently referred to by
negative commenters (Table 5.5: 42.0%),3 followed by issues relating to the
consequences of an increased migration influx to their countries (29.5%). As
Table 5.6 shows, positive commenters highlighted instead the refugees’ personal
backgrounds and situations (38.0%, compared to 11.6% in negative comments
in Table 5.5), positions that are more in line with a politics of pity. Positive
comments were also associated with civic initiatives (30.2%). Hence, whenever
the background situation or fate of the refugees was referred to (politics of
pity), the likelihood of a positive positioning towards refugees increased. If
instead an emphasis was put on moments of crisis (politics of fear), this was
mostly done in the context of a negative statement towards the refugees. If
government and state policies were mentioned, this was mainly associated with
negative attitudes towards refugees, while civic activities were related to posi-
tive statements.
Our findings thus show in sum that Facebook commenting on newspaper
sites became a site of user engagement and of moral commitment with ques-
tions of refugee solidarity. In this moment of heightened attention, a politics of
fear was countervailed by a politics of pity that placed its focus on the need to
provide humanitarian assistance to the needy in an emergency situation. User
commenting fora were not found to be, as is often assumed, the place for a radi-
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Figure 5.4 Average stance towards refugees in comments
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These radical opinions may have been downgraded by other users and thus would
not have been included in our sample as popular comments; additionally, they may
have been filtered out by the moderators of the Facebook pages, in case they
breached netiquette. But concentrating here on the most commented on posts
and the most popular comments – ranked highest on Facebook and moderated
by the newspapers’ web administrators – refugee solidarity was debated in a
mostly balanced way, with supportive users still outweighing commenters rejecting
refugee solidarity. However, this anti-solidarity voice did not dominate the debate
and did also not systematically turn disrespectful towards the opinions of others,
or towards refugees as our objects of solidarity.

























France 61.6% 1.4% 2.7% 22.6% 11.6% 0.0% 100%
Germany 20.7% 0.0% 4.5% 64.9% 9.9% 0.0% 100%
Greece 57.4% 0.0% 4.4% 25.0% 13.2% 0.0% 100%
Italy 43.9% 1.5% 9.1% 13.6% 21.2% 10.6% 100%
Poland 19.4% 11.7% 16.7% 43.3% 7.8% 1.1% 100%
Denmark 42.7% 0.9% 25.5% 17.3% 13.6% 0.0% 100%
Switzerland 35.7% 5.6% 12.6% 22.4% 23.8% 0.0% 100%
UK 65.4% 0.7% 12.5% 16.9% 4.4% 0.0% 100%
Total 42.0% 3.5% 11.6% 29.5% 12.5% 0.9% 100%
























+France 41.1% 3.6% 8.9% 19.6% 26.8% 0.0% 100%
Germany 6.4% 2.1% 53.2% 8.5% 29.8% 0.0% 100%
Greece 16.3% 0.0% 52.2% 5.4% 26.1% 0.0% 100%
Italy 17.8% 0.8% 47.5% 4.2% 29.7% 0.0% 100%
Poland 23.8% 4.8% 23.8% 9.5% 38.1% 0.0% 100%
Denmark 37.0% 0.0% 12.0% 1.1% 48.9% 1.1% 100%
Switzerland 26.5% 2.0% 27.5% 6.9% 35.3% 2.0% 100%
UK 25.5% 1.0% 61.2% 0.0% 12.2% 0.0% 100%
Total 24.4% 1.3% 38.0% 5.6% 30.2% 0.5% 100%
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Justifications
Our initial assumption has been that a politics of pity and a politics of fear
require individual users to translate their first emotional reactions into public
speech. This translation requires justification, because users have to provide
good reasons for why they opted to express support or rejection of refugee
solidarity in their online comments. The only caveat to keep in mind here is
that online commenting forums are not structured in a way that facilitates an
exchange of arguments among users. Commenters rarely enter a dialogue with
each other (Barnes, 2018; Galpin and Trenz, 2019). Providing justifications by
expressing one’s opinions is therefore in no way self-evident, as opinions are
often expressed in an abbreviated way by making use of more emotional lan-
guage and marginalising rational argumentation. Especially with regard to the
events associated with the ‘refugee crisis’, debates around solidarity were rather
driven by emotions and not by a rational exchange of arguments (Chouliaraki
and Stolic, 2017).
Despite these restrictions, we found that a slight majority of commenters
(‘pro’, ‘neutral’, and ‘anti’ together: 57.2%) justified their stances regarding
solidarity towards refugees (Figure 5.5). This indicates that news commenting is
a form of discursive contestation and engagement, and not plain opinion-stat-
ing. By making solidarity statements, user-commenters took sides, meaning that
they had to decide whether to treat refugees as worthy objects of solidarity.
Anti-solidarity commenters notably engaged to a higher degree in justificatory
practices (33.0%) than pro-solidarity commenters did (15.4%) (see Figure 5.5).
This is a surprising but revealing finding: While the rejection of solidarity is
largely backed by arguments, solidarity with people in need is often sponta-
neous and is not justified.
Commenters relied on a wide spectrum of arguments to justify their choices
when backing or rejecting solidarity with refugees.4 Among the comments oppos-
ing solidarity with refugees and providing justifications, the most frequent argu-
ment used was that national citizens should be regarded first (welfare chauvinism,
16.1%) (see Figure 5.6). This was followed by references to the inappropriateness
















Figure 5.5 Justification versus no justification in comments with tonality toward refugees
(in %)
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9.7% as a justification for negative stances. Among the pro-solidarity justifications,
we can list human rights and broader humanitarian aspects as the most diffused
arguments (25.2% of positive comments as compared to only 1.6% of negative
comments).
Figure 5.7 indicates that tabloid readers use the same patterns of interpreta-
tion that structure the debate about the refugee crisis across newspapers and
countries, even though they tend to make more use of exclusionary and less
supportive frames. Debates in both types of newspapers are plural, defending
both pro- and anti-solidarity positions. The range of arguments used in user-
driven debates is broad, but they overlap between newspaper formats. There is,
in other words, no evidence in these data for separate online communities on
Facebook. This means that, by and large, national news audiences are still
addressed by the same agenda of news. They are involved in shared debates
about the same issues of concern which, according to political theorists, is a key
condition for a well-functioning democracy (Habermas, 1996, Ch. 8.3).
In sum, findings allow us to paint a nuanced picture of bottom-up solidarity
contestation within social media news commenting forums. First of all, our
data show that user debates allow for the expression of plural opinions and
arguments. It is true that the number of Facebook commenters rejecting refugee
solidarity outnumbers the share of supporters in almost all countries (except in
Italy and Greece). Additionally, one out of five users abstains from taking sides
in this debate. However, a sizable group of online commenters speaks out in



















Figure 5.6 Justifications of solidarity of negative and positive comments compared
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taking sides on the question of refugee solidarity via user comments creates a
justification requirement, even though proponents and opponents are engaged in
argumentative exchanges to different degrees. In fact, solidarity seems to be a
widely accepted norm, and this seems to be evident to most Facebook users,
irrespective of whether they are supportive or critical of refugees. Solidarity is a
socially desirable norm, and this means that showing solidarity towards people
in need is a reasonable and expected response within the Facebook community
of news readers. As such, it does not need to be further justified and might be
backed only by the expression of emotions (e.g., ‘I feel so sorry for the poor
children’). The choice to reject solidarity towards those people in need seems to
put the commenter on social media under pressure to engage in an explicit jus-
tification (Chouliaraki, 2013). The quite substantial presence of commenters
with positive views about refugees and their attitude as ‘do-gooders’ (a pejora-
tive term often used by the group of negative commenters) further urges the
opponents of solidarity to back their opinions with arguments, i.e. explain why
they are against refugees.
Conclusion: A European sphere of online solidarity contestation
One key question addressed by analysts and commentators of political commu-
nication within the social media is whether more participatory forms of online
news consumption and commenting can meaningfully contribute to democratic
politics, and whether social media may help to engage users in political debates
and facilitate a more pluralistic process of public opinion formation (Dahlgren,













Figure 5.7 Average position in broadsheets and tabloids in relation to justifications
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2013). This question is also highly relevant for our study of public debates about
the ‘refugee crisis’. During our analyses, we thus asked whether ‘taking sides’ and
‘witnessing human suffering’ through the social media translates into more open
forms of user engagement and participation. These findings would help to vali-
date the emergence of an online civic sphere that contributes to public debates
about refugee solidarity through a pluralistic exchange of arguments.
The analysis of social media commenters, however, must proceed with care. In
fact, even if news reading through social media has become a widespread practice,
we need to remember that people who make a more active use of online media
channels by engaging in participatory forms of journalism are not to be regarded
as representative of the whole population (Bruns, 2010). From existing studies, we
know that users who regularly engage in political debates on social media are
younger and better educated. As such, they may be more likely to be politically
active (e.g., Mellon and Prosser, 2017; Vissers and Stolle, 2014) and more critical of
how solidarity politics are practiced in the EU (Brändle and Eisele, 2019). To do
justice to this debate about the status of social media commenting, we decided to
put a particular focus on how Facebook online news sites are confined to parti-
cular online communities of like-minded news readers.
Our findings do not support the assumption that Facebook news sites facilitate
the formation of a separate arena of segregated user groups. Our comparative
analysis of bottom-up solidarity contestations at the height of the so called ‘refugee
crisis’ shows how citizen-users on Facebook took the opportunity all over Europe
to make their voice heard on an issue of shared concern. These voices were raised
in the commenting sections of mainstream newspapers’ public Facebook sites.
They were informed and motivated by witnesses of a humanitarian disaster and
human suffering of refugees coming to Europe. But they were also fuelled by
diffuse feelings of fear in light of a seemingly uncontrolled influx of refugees.
We found elements of a politics of fear (Wodak, 2015) and a politics of pity
(Boltanski, 1999) – two concepts that express how emotions were translated into
public speech by Facebook commenters in order to express a political opinion
and take sides in regard to the question of whether solidarity with refugees
should be granted or not.
The Facebook comment sections of mainstream newspaper sites offered citi-
zens an opportunity for focused debates about the ‘refugee crisis’ through the
exchange of a plurality of positions and arguments. Our analysis highlights,
however, that social media commenting is not an entirely autonomous space of
debate, because commenters remain tied back to the context of debate provided
by organised claimants in the political news posted on Facebook. Social media
commenting did in this sense not unfold within a bubble, but rather contributed
to the broader public sphere within which solidarity is debated at national and
European levels.
Bottom-up solidarity contestations at the individual level are thus found to be
closely related to the broader public and political discourses in the various
countries under analysis. The newspaper sites on Facebook, which we selected
for analysis, are not just niches found in some hidden angle of the Internet.
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They reach out to mass audiences that are in part even larger than the reader-
ship of offline newspapers. In this sense, they expand the reach of news cover-
age and claims-making of organised actors, and provide additional arenas of
user-driven discussion and contestation. The analysis of solidarity contestations
via user comments further shows that social media provide spaces for an
exchange of opinions that does not conform to the picture of an undifferentiated,
angry user community, as is often assumed (Fletcher and Nielsen, 2017). Looking
at public Facebook sites of mainstream newspapers, we found a strong link
between organised contestation in online news and individual contestation in
online commenting. This points to an integrated public sphere of solidarity
contestation, where primary definers (organised claims-makers such as politi-
cians, stakeholders or main NGOs) in the news media set the agenda and the
main frames for social media users, which in turn become active on their own
as secondary definers of the debate. In social media responses to political
debates, a plurality of issues, concerns and justifications are expressed, con-
tributing to the bottom-up formation of public opinion.
Looking more closely at the dynamics of user-driven solidarity contestations,
we find that these contestations are most often verbally fought out. This means
that social media are not used for targeted political mobilisation in the sense of
direct calls for protests or acts of solidarity. We learned that user-driven con-
testations largely follow the public agendas set by the posted articles and the
claims made by organised actors therein. This is obvious when looking at the
issues Facebook commenters addressed in their own posts, given that they fol-
lowed the ranking of most or less important topics, ranging from migration
management and security concerns, to issues of social integration, welfare ben-
efits, civil society initiatives, living conditions and personal stories of refugees.
News articles and user comments diverge more strongly when looking at the
tonality of the claims and statements made. Opinions expressed by commenters
were overall more negative than the views voiced by claims-makers in the news
media. In the two border countries (Italy and Greece), a positive view prevailed
over hostility among social media users. The comment sections of news sites on
Facebook were, however, not used for the expression of political extremism, of
xenophobia or of hate towards foreigners. Again, we are aware that it is likely
that news sites moderate their Facebook pages. Moreover, they will take pre-
ventive measures by selecting less controversial news content posted on Face-
book. The lack of radical opinions, however, does not exclude contentions and
conflicts. On the contrary, we find in our data that the online voice of users is
particularly critical of claims stated in the posted articles. Commenters in all
countries systematically referred to claims-making of organised actors in the
news media, and if they did, they tended to be critical towards them, not
affirmative. In this sense, we see that citizens use the social media to interact
critically with the mass media, and to engage in contentions with public
claims-makers, many of them considered their political representatives.
Solidarity contestations among media users, however, were not marked by
strong polarisations, even though commenters tend to disagree when solidarity
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with refugees is at stake. They did not take fundamentally opposed views.
Additionally, our analyses showed that Facebook users tended to acknowledge
similar moral exigencies, to which they had to react while making public claims.
In fact, taking sides on the question of refugee solidarity generated a require-
ment to justify one’s position in public debates. This justification requirement
was spelled out differently, depending on whether commenters rallied for or
against solidarity with refugees. While pro-solidarity commenters often relied
on an unconditional form of justification, such as the higher morality of human
rights, anti-solidarity commenters most commonly defended a notion of condi-
tional solidarity. This required them to spell out the conditions under which
solidarity should apply or be withdrawn. The anti-solidarity voice in all countries
generated, therefore, a higher amount of justifications than those comments that
called for solidarity with refugees. Denying solidarity thus requires more argu-
mentative work, while granting solidarity was communicated as an implicitly
reasonable and desirable attitude.
These findings, however, need to be taken with care, given that our analysis
is centred on a very specific time, September 2015, which was marked by a
situation of humanitarian emergency and controversies about the decisions of
the German government to open its borders to refugees. Our purposive sample
might thus mirror a very specific part of opinions from hostile to more sup-
portive attitudes towards refugees (Ditlmann et al., 2016). This specific context
surrounding our sample, however, does not seem to have had a strong impact
on political opinions expressed by users on Facebook news sites. In fact, the so
called ‘welcoming culture’ made itself heard, particularly in the news media’s
coverage and the claims-making of organised actors. As a consequence, the
opinions expressed by these actors peaked in every country in its support for
refugees during the month of September. Individual social media users, how-
ever, did not necessarily join in on this unconditional support. Facebook news
sites, during this critical period, remained an arena of political contestations,
where solidarity was contested more controversially than in the news. This became
especially visible in Germany, where commenters remained more distanced and
critical of the decision to open the borders to refugees and of the so-called ‘wel-
coming culture’ by civil society organisations. They thus displayed an attitude of
critical scepticism (Brändle and Eisele, 2019), indicating that the solidarity
momentum of September 2015 would remain short-lived and exceptional.
Our findings paint a much more complex picture of solidarity contestation
than expected. User-driven debates are partly dissociated from claims-making in
the news media, as they seem to provide a vehicle for the expression of scepti-
cism or criticism of established politics and media-driven debates. At the same
time, however, online user debates largely follow the patterns of the broader
discussions within the mass-mediated public sphere. We are not dealing with a
segmented arena driven by its own logic and detached from the political main-
stream. Social media users contribute to public debates and complement public
deliberation dominated by organised actors. In this sense, they also contribute
to a more balanced picture of solidarity contestations, because they show that
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solidarity with refugees was a much more fragile phenomenon than views on
the news coverage of the mass media might have conveyed. In this sense, our
data corroborate the main argument of this volume about the fragility of soli-
darity contestation across Europe. The investigation of the social media has
powerfully confirmed this assumption, because even at this exceptional moment
of heightened attention for the humanitarian needs of refugees, prevailing in
September 2015, citizens displayed quite different attitudes across arenas and
countries and on the whole remained critical with regard to claims-making in
the mainstream media. The solidarity momentum woke feelings of compassion
with refugees, thus making a politics of pity into a widely diffused approach.
However, the quick shifts of opinion in the subsequent months evidenced the
difficulties translating the momentum into an enduring and collective support of
solidarity (Vollmer and Karakayali, 2017). Social media therefore remain fragile
and contested arenas of solidarity.
Notes
1 We noted during data collection that many newspapers closed their own website com-
menting functions below the news articles, shifting toward user engagement on their
Facebook pages where a separate unit was likely responsible for content monitoring.
2 Independent statements are subtracted from the total number of comments because
they do not relate to the article as such, or the claims raised in the article.
3 Similar for neutral or ambivalent commenters.
4 As country differences in the use of justifications were neither significant nor did they
show the expected correlations (e.g. the emphasis on religion in Poland), we only
compare the argumentative patterns of pro- with anti-refugee commenters.
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Part II

6 Solidarity contestation in Switzerland –
fragmented news, fragmented solidarity?
Refugee solidarity in the Swiss context1
Switzerland as the only non-EU country in the sample is an attractive country
for migrants, mirrored in a share of permanent non-Swiss residents of around
25% and a share of over 30% belonging to ethnic minorities, or having an
immigrant background (Bonfadelli, 2017). Switzerland is characterised by poli-
tical, cultural and linguistic diversity: Manifested also in the strong federalism
implemented in the unique Swiss political system, Swiss cantons have their own
more or less far-reaching political systems. Moreover, there are three major
linguistic regions (German, French, Italian) in the country. Overall, this leads to
a high degree of internal heterogeneity and fragmentation in political, linguistic
and cultural respects (Kriesi and Trechsel, 2008; see Fernández 2018a for an
assessment of fragmentation in terms of solidarity practices in particular). More
importantly, however, Switzerland represents the country with the strongest
features of direct democratic participation in our sample. Political, cultural and
linguistic diversity together with a strong, direct influence of citizens in political
decision-making indicates a particularly high degree of contestation given the
overall fragmentation of the country.
Regarding Switzerland’s relationship with the EU, ‘almost everything …
points towards Switzerland being part of the European Union’ (Sarrasin et al.,
2018, p. 203). Indeed, the strong economic ties with the EU are secured through
a range of bilateral agreements. Being situated among EU member states, Swit-
zerland also entered the Schengen area, abolishing border controls and guaran-
teeing rights of free movement to EU citizens and citizens of member states of
the European Economic Area (EEA) (Hanke et al., 2019). However, Switzerland
never formally became a member of the European Union, due to the majority of
Swiss citizens’ opposition to membership. The referendum of EU-membership
in 1992 officially marked the end of accession plans and mirrored the afore-
mentioned regional fragmentation, with the French Swiss being overwhelmingly
pro-European versus the German and Italian Swiss rejecting membership
(Trechsel, 2007). Reservations towards formal membership are nurtured by
Euroscepticism (Wagschal, 2007), which has grown since 1992 and is often
related to European immigration policies. Euroscepticism is mainly endorsed by
the radical right, most prominently the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische
Volkspartei – SVP), which is today the strongest party in the Swiss Federal
Assembly (Sarrasin et al., 2018, p. 206).
The prominence of the far right in Switzerland has also increased public sal-
ience of the issue of migration: ‘The rise of the SVP … can be at least partly
attributed to the party’s ability to persuade voters to agree with them on mat-
ters associated with immigration’ (Fitzgerald and Jorde, 2018, p. 199). In line
with the literature, this comes with preferences for less social spending in terms
of welfare policies (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser, 2004), a disposition most likely
influenced by the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the radical right which underlines
that immigrants might profit most from it (e.g., Bonfadelli, 2017). During the
‘migration crisis’ of 2015/2016, the number of asylum applications went up
from 23,500 in 2014 to 39,400 in 2015 according to Eurostat, but decreased
again the year after to 27,100 applicants (Eurostat, 2018). From a comparative
perspective, Switzerland thus managed to keep the number of incoming refugees
relatively low. Nevertheless, incoming refugees fuelled the quite hostile anti-
immigration climate. Migration became the most controversial topic in public
discourse and a source of polarisation, also nurturing the grand success of the
SVP in the general elections in October 2015 (e.g., Bochsler et al., 2015).
Overall, there seems to be a fundamental ambivalence embedded in the Swiss
case, since Switzerland ‘is emphasising internal ethnic and linguistic hetero-
geneity and tolerance on the one hand, but has enforced one of the most
restrictive immigration and naturalisation regimes in Europe on the other hand’
(Bonfadelli, 2017, p. 300). These restrictive policies are, on the one side, often
directly informed by popular initiatives or referenda, as citizens are involved in
legislative decision-making via direct democratic tools. On the other side, atti-
tudes towards refugee solidarity are, according to our own TransSOL survey
(Grasso, 2017), on average more positive than the average of our sample
countries (i.e., Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, the UK):
more than half of the population (52.2%) agreed with a moral responsibility
of Switzerland to accept refugees (14.5% ‘strongly agree’, 37.7% ‘agree’)
against 22.6% answering ‘neither’, 14.4% ‘disagree’ and 11.1% ‘strongly dis-
agree’. Furthermore, 16.4% agreed to admitting higher numbers of Syrian war
refugees in 2017 (TransSOL survey average 12.4%), while 12.1% opposed
their admittance (against 19.5% TransSOL survey average). All of these issues
taken together make Switzerland an interesting case study for how solidarity
contestation during the ‘migration crisis’ unfolded across different publics.
The Swiss public sphere
In line with the fragmentation of the political system in Switzerland, the
media system in the country is also divided along linguistic borders and
regions. This is mirrored by the dominance of regional newspapers and TV
channels, and the lack of a news outlet at the federal level, which would allow
citizens from the whole country to follow public debates. Given this fragmented
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nature of the Swiss media landscape, Kriesi (1992) concluded that a Swiss public
sphere does not exist, even though established coordination mechanisms between
regional media organisations meet the requirements of a functional democracy
(see also Mono, 2009).
It is not surprising, therefore, that the regional media principally address
regional and linguistically divided audiences with different issue agendas. The
lack of a federal newspaper fosters the weight of subnational media, which are
tied back to each linguistic-area and strengthen their role as pseudo-national
media. In addition, the external impact of Swiss German-, French-, and Italian-
language newspapers in the Swiss media needs to be taken into consideration,
as well. Neighbouring countries’ media have influenced Swiss newspapers, and
Swiss readers are well-informed about political and cultural events from the
adjacent country of linguistic reference, and might also follow solidarity dis-
courses towards refugees in their media (see Studer et al., 2014, pp. 7–10).
To account for the specifics of the Swiss case, the analysis here was based on
five newspapers that represent the three major linguistic regions of the country.
No tabloid press was coded; instead, we decided to increase regional repre-
sentation by coding a Swiss-Italian newspaper. For each newspaper, we coded a
minimum of 150 claims. For the Swiss-German region, we used the Neue
Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ) and Tages Anzeiger; Le Matin and Le Temps for the
French-speaking region; and La Regione for the Swiss-Italian region. Since the
Italian newspaper was not available on Facebook, we had to substitute it with
the German-language tabloid, Blick, for the social media commenting analysis.
Given the high involvement of Swiss citizens in politics via direct democratic
procedures (e.g., popular initiatives and referenda), the media play a crucial role
as a source of information and an arena of public opinion formation processes.
Accordingly, over 65% of Swiss journalists believe that it is extremely or very
important to share information in their coverage to enable people to make up
their minds about political issues. This value is higher in comparison with their
German or Austrian colleagues (69%; in contrast to Austria: 63%; Germany:
56%; see Hanitzsch and Lauerer, 2019, p. 147). Regarding the function of the
media in society in general, the ‘refugee crisis’ has generally fuelled a heated
discussion in Switzerland about the responsibility of journalists: Should jour-
nalists provide moral guidance and opinion while risking to patronise their
audience? Or should they remain a neutral and distant observer, conveying
reality in an unpartisan and objective way, but risk being mere bystanders
where universal human rights and freedoms are being disregarded (Hanitzsch
and Lauerer, 2019, p. 136; more generally also Hanitzsch and Vos, 2018)?
Research on how migration is debated in the Swiss media before the refugee
crisis found that foreigners and migrants usually had very low media visibility:
‘When it comes to immigrant minorities, neither media regulation nor media
performance reflect Switzerland’s tradition as a multicultural and multilingual
country’ (Signer et al., 2011, p. 419). Low salience in the media did not pre-
vent journalists from using recurring frames when reporting about immigrants
from different parts of the world: Turkish or North-African immigrants, for
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example, were usually connected to Islam, religious fundamentalism and gender
inequality. And more generally, immigration bore rather a negative than a posi-
tive connotation, while immigrants themselves were usually talked about and
only rarely granted an active role (Trebbe and Schönhagen, 2011). This reflects,
to some degree, the strong anti-immigrant rhetoric of the right-wing-populist
Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which has gained strength over the last 20 years.
Patterns of political claims-making: Fragmentation into regional
public spheres?
Against the more general background just discussed, we would expect that, also
in terms of solidarity contestation, Switzerland’s public sphere is fragmented.
Yet it seems that the Swiss debate does not conform to these expectations, but
follows very similar patterns, when comparing different regional newspapers
within Switzerland and the Swiss case with the other countries in the sample:
The debates about refugees in the media of all linguistic regions, like in the
other TransSOL countries as well, were dominated by domestic/national state
actors and political parties (overall 60% of claims). They raised most of the
claims and were also most often directly addressed in claims.
In terms of pro- and anti-solidarity positioning, the share of positive claims
was higher than those conveying an anti-solidarity stance. However, unfavour-
able demands could count on the support of core political actors: political parties
were the most negative with respect to solidarity with refugees (52%), directly
followed by state actors (42.4%). Civil society organisations and supranational
actors like the EU or the UN, in contrast, were overall supportive of solidarity
with refugees. Even though they were less visible in terms of claims frequency,
they counterbalanced the strong negative bias of parties and state actors as
responsible decision-makers to a certain extent. Differences between news-
papers or languages are less pronounced for this central variable. With regard
to newspapers, only Le Matin sticks out, being the most positive (52.7%) in
comparison to the other four newspapers. But also when clustering results
by the language of the newspaper, the patterns are very similar, suggesting
that there are no systematic differences between linguistic spheres in terms of
position.
Swiss media contestation also follows the main European pattern with
regard to issues. Public claims makers focus their debate mainly around the
issue of migration management (over 60% of all claims), thus searching for
political solutions to the assumed challenges and practical problems associated
with the accommodation of the increased number of incoming refugees. The
debate thus centred on state policy reactions and not, for instance, on refugees’
life stories and living conditions. A much lower share of claims dealt with
public activities and civic initiatives not involving political institutions (around
15%). This low visibility of such activities and initiatives is noteworthy in light
of the high degree of political participation that traditionally characterises
Swiss politics, but also in light of the strong role played by Swiss civil society
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associations and volunteers, which form an essential supporting infrastructure
assisting a relatively weak welfare state (see Helmig et al., 2017).
The patterns of justification used to support or reject solidarity with refugees
in the Swiss debate follow the main patterns of the other EU countries in our
sample, as well. Justifications communicated in claims were most often rooted
in interest-based considerations, putting emphasis on rational cost and benefit
calculations (over 60%). A much smaller share (around 25%) was based on
rights-related arguments maintaining, for example, that solidarity with refugees
derives from the universality of human rights. Claims referring to identity-
related arguments, in contrast, were rather rare (just over 10%). State actors,
political parties and supranational actors tended to justify their mostly negative
claims by interests, whereas civil society actors, in contrast, tended to focus
their more positive claims on rights-related justifications. Almost half of the
claims covered in Swiss newspapers, however, were not connected to arguments
at all, but were mere opinions about refugees that did not explicate a rationale
or frame. When looking into different linguistic areas, patterns of justifications
connected with positions were very similar, with one exception – claims refer-
ring to identity-related justifications: Claims using identity-based justifications
were on average more negative in German language newspapers (-0.05) than in
French (0.4) or Italian (0.6) language newspapers. This is mainly due to the fact
that more extreme right-wing actors were covered by German language news
for this category of claims. Regarding the argument of a fragmentation of soli-
darity contestation in the Swiss public sphere, however, these differences do
provide only very weak support given the very small share of identity-based
claims.
A month of contestation on Facebook: Commenters’ responses to the
solidarity debate
The analysis of Facebook comments allows us to check whether news readers
responded differently in the linguistic communities. As explained above, the
Italian newspaper was not available on Facebook, which is why we focus only
on French- and German-speaking Facebook commenters. These two groups of
commenters were leaning towards a neutral or anti-solidarity stance, with the
French-speaking Le Matin’s commenters sticking out with 90% negative com-
ments (in contrast to German speakers, ranging between 31–38% and Le Temps
with 42%). Again, we do not find any systematic evidence that would support
the hypothesis that Swiss social media commenters differed across language areas
and/or newspapers.
Forty-three per cent of all Swiss comments failed to indicate any justification
for their position. If they did, they were mostly related to a negative position.
Only the humanitarian crisis frame (84% of comments) and human rights frame
(69% of comments) were overwhelmingly connected to a pro-solidarity stance.
However, we need to consider that comments with no justification conveyed more
positive positions towards refugees. While newspapers seem to differ slightly in
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their coverage of specific frames, the numbers of comments coded were sometimes
very small and thus do not allow any more generalised conclusions. Commenters
also seemed to mostly follow the tone of the article discussing refugee solidarity.
Thus, Swiss solidarity commenting does not backlash claims-making by organised
actors in the media, and this observation is specific for the Swiss case, given that
the backlash pattern was observed for the other countries in the TransSOL sample.
Discussion
Switzerland has been characterised as a democracy that functions without an
overarching public sphere (Kriesi, 1992). In fact, the country is marked by political,
cultural and linguistic diversity, as this applies also to the media landscape, which
caters to the different target audiences respectively. However, these differentiations
do not seem to impede cross-regional policy debates and deliberations that com-
plement, control or fuel institutionalised politics. Our own data corroborate this
general proposition, because linguistic differences are much less pronounced than
expected when taking a closer look at solidarity contestations within the public
sphere. This might be explained by cleavages along liberal-multicultural and
nationalist-communitarian lines that characterise all three language communities,
and structure public debates about migration and border control in a similar way.
Switzerland is therefore not fundamentally different from the other countries in
our sample. Everywhere, we detected a strong solidarity divide between institu-
tional/political and non-institutional or civil society actors: the former defending
security interests and debating questions of ‘crisis management’, the latter empha-
sising the personal needs of refugees, questions of care and the defence of rights.
In the case of user commenting on Facebook, the divisions between linguistic
communities were more pronounced than among claims-makers in the news,
but do not evidence a strong fragmentation of the debate. Overall, the debate
about refugee solidarity in Switzerland does not exhibit strong traits of frag-
mentation, and even seems to suggest homogeneity when it comes to questions
of migration. Contestation seems to follow similar patterns across the different
linguistic communities within the country. Additionally, similarities are also
pronounced when comparing Switzerland with the other countries included in
our sample. Switzerland might stick out as the only country in the TransSOL
sample that is not a formal member of the EU. However, it is not very different
from other countries in terms of how immigration is debated and how the
country positions itself with regard to the contested notion of European soli-
darity. Here, as everywhere, political actors and citizen-commenters tend to
express a rather sceptical view with regard to solidarity with refugees.
Note
1 We would like to thank Eva Fernández Guzman Grassi for valuable research con-
tributions. A detailed discussion of the findings of the Swiss case can be found in
Fernández (2018b).
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7 Solidarity contestation in
Germany – ‘Can we really do it?’
Refugee solidarity in the German context1
With its decision to open borders for incoming war refugees from Syria in late
August 2015, within days Germany became the epicentre of the so-called refu-
gee crisis of 2015 and 2016. The new open border policies had far-reaching
effects for Germany and for the whole of Europe. Domestically, the country had
to handle a staggering 477,000 asylum applications in 2015 and 745,000 in 2016.
According to Eurostat, this amounts to more than one third of the total number
of asylum applications within the EU in 2015, and more than half of all EU
applications in 2016. At the EU level, the decision by the German government
was fiercely opposed by some member states and only half-heartedly embraced
by others. By unilaterally suspending the Dublin regulation, Germany was
pushing for an EU-wide distribution of refugees, yet the EU remained deeply
divided on the question of burden-sharing.
Solidarity was thus contested: both on the German and on the European
Union front. Domestically, Angela Merkel spearheaded public debates about an
open policy towards refugees by reassuring public authorities and citizens in
their ability to rise to the current challenge by arguing: ‘We can do it’. Addi-
tionally, the oft-cited ‘Willkommenskultur’ (‘Welcoming Culture’), with people
welcoming refugees at the train stations of Munich and elsewhere, prominently
illustrates the positive German response towards refugees (e.g., Hamann and
Karakayali, 2017). The early enthusiasm, however, provoked a substantial
counter-mobilisation that was nurtured by public worries about Germany’s
absorptive capacities, but also by several events in the ensuing months. First of
all, the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 played on security narratives of
refugees as potential security and terror threats. The feeling of immediate
emergency was best summarised by the comment of the Bavarian finance min-
ister, Markus Söder, who in the aftermath stated: ‘Paris changes everything’
(Holmes and Castañeda, 2016, p. 18). Another event that aroused similar con-
cerns was New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 in Cologne, which impacted even more on
public opinion than the Paris attacks, as it became ‘a touchstone in debates
about refugees in Germany’ (Weber, 2016a, p. 80; also Weber, 2016b).
Immigration is an important topic, given that Germany has increasingly
turned into an immigration-friendly country over the last decades, with a 25.5%
share of the population having a migratory background (Bundeszentrale für
politische Bildung, 2019). Public policies partially mirror this immigration-
friendly orientation: Political and public debates have shifted towards the issue
of integration of immigrants into the labour market, while the right of residence
and the immigration of spouses and family reunion have become more restric-
tive over the years, thus contributing to stagnating numbers of immigrants
(Müller-Hofstede and Butterwegge, 2007). This ambivalence is also true when
looking at public opinion, as conveyed by opinion polls. Germans are divided
over the question of how Germany should have handled the refugee crisis.
According to our TransSOL survey (Grasso, 2017), a slight majority of Ger-
mans claimed in retrospect that the country should have accepted lower num-
bers of Syrian refugees (37%), or should not have let anybody in (12.8%). On
the other hand, 9.3% would have accepted higher numbers, and 35.7% think
that the number should be kept about the same. The German population, thus,
remains internally somewhat divided on the question of refugee solidarity.
A second line of confrontation was fought at the EU level. Germany, tradi-
tionally one of the political heavyweights in the EU, tried to act as a leader in
response to the crisis, emphasising that the EU’s failure in light of the refugee
situation would destroy its intimate relationship with universal civil rights
(Harding et al., 2015). However, the welcoming approach did not remain
undisputed. Merkel and her government were ‘not able to get the rest of Europe
to follow … [their] lead’ (Matthijs, 2016, p. 150). Merkel grew to be an
increasingly contested public figure among European neighbours, nurturing very
mixed and polarised reactions. Those ranged from the celebration of Germany
as a bulwark of human rights, to reproaches that Merkel’s open borders policy
was responsible for fuelling further refugee surges. These criticisms often rela-
ted Germany’s response to the country’s fascist history and its desire to clear its
conscience (e.g., Conrad and Aðalsteinsdóttir, 2017). Merkel’s policies, it was
argued, set incentives for economic refugees to come and, in doing so, played
into the hands of populist right-wing parties, capitalising on an overwhelmed
administration struggling to accommodate the huge arrivals of people in need.
With increasing worries about Germany’s absorptive capacities, Merkel’s critics
in Europe and Germany started characterising her decision not to close the
border as ‘naïve and foolish’ (Matthijs, 2016, p. 149). Merkel’s position also
grew more and more contested within her own party (Holmes and Castañeda,
2016, p. 14).
The German public sphere
Despite the fragmentation of media systems and the decline of traditional media
in general (e.g., Mancini, 2012), newspapers still play an important role in
Germany. This is mirrored in the comparatively high circulation numbers, and
also in the broad range of newspapers from which readers can choose (Thomaß
and Horz, n.d.). There are a few national newspapers and many regional ones,
the latter documenting the strong political tradition of federalism in Germany
(Kleinsteuber, 2004). The country’s media market is not only the largest in
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Europe, but also the most dynamic and stable. Against the backdrop of the
massive instrumentalisation of the press for propagandist purposes under the
Nazi regime, political parallelism is low in the sense that newspapers are not
linked to specific parties. Yet, opinion-leading quality newspapers can still be
clustered along the political cleavages embedded in the party system (e.g.,
Eilders, 2000, pp. 184–185).
The selection of newspapers for the claims-making analysis was guided by
the TransSOL sampling strategy. We included three newspapers that have
country-wide circulation and contribute to covering the political spectrum. We
thus selected Bild Zeitung as the biggest (politically right wing) tabloid, the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (centre-right broadsheet) and the Süd-
deutsche Zeitung (SZ) (centre-left broadsheet). Overall, our coders coded a
total number of 740 claims in 264 articles (see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3), giving us
an average number of 2.8 claims per article. For the analysis of articles and
comments on newspapers’ Facebook accounts, we used Spiegel instead of Bild,
meaning that we used a slightly different sample for the analysis of bottom-up
contestations. This was due to the fact that a preliminary search for our key
terms (refugee and asylum) returned no results for articles posted on the Bild
Zeitung’s Facebook page.
Previous research on the media representation of migration before the crisis
found that migrants and refugees were not very visible in the public sphere.
They were often framed as passive objects or pure numbers, and not as subjects
or agents with their own voice in the media. News coverage was consistently
biased towards the alleged negative traits of migrants, who were often por-
trayed as criminals or a threat and a burden to the German welfare system.
This negativity bias was particularly accentuated in the tabloid newspaper Bild
Zeitung (Weber-Menges, 2008). Furthermore, asylum seekers were the most
prominent group of migrants in the news and also the most negatively framed
(see Eberl et al., 2018 for an overview). Regarding the migration crisis, existing
studies show that external events have influenced the German discourse on
immigration, which explained the strong degree of volatility in public debates
(e.g., Triandafyllidou, 2018; Vollmer and Karakayali, 2017; Wallaschek, 2017).
Immigration is thus a news topic that is prone to contestation. The latter
seems to be fuelled by broader socio-cultural questions of nationhood that tend
to arouse considerable concern. This is evidenced by recurrent debates about
whether or not Germany is an ‘immigration country’ (‘Einwanderungsland’)
and whether multiculturalism is an enrichment or risk for German culture,
particularly when discussions are related to the Muslim population. Specific
events have made the latent nationalist fundament more manifest. An example
is the intense debate following the massive number of sexual abuse and har-
assment cases during New Year’s Eve in Cologne, dominated by perpetrators
with a migratory background. This event induced a massive public contestation
regarding the country’s capacities to host refugees from non-Christian coun-
tries. Conrad and Aðalsteinsdóttir (2017), for example, analysed the framing of
refugees in three German broadsheet newspapers. The media seized the
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opportunity to frame the refugees as a burden or risk over the course of the
second half of 2015 until March 2016.
The German debate about refugee solidarity in the print media
For Germany, our analysis sketches the picture of a welcoming climate that
was interrupted by external shocks, thus creating room for anti-refugee
concerns to be voiced. Our analyses corroborate that the events of New
Year’s Eve in Cologne 2015/16 are a clear turning point, because the average
tone of the claims regarding solidarity with refugees became more negative,
especially among claimants with national scope (see Figure 4.7 in Chapter
4). Other research confirms this tendency of an increasing negativity of news
coverage towards refugees, too (e.g., Conrad and Aðalsteinsdóttir, 2017;
Weber, 2016a, 2016b).
As is the case with claims in other countries in our sample, public contesta-
tions are dominated by state actors in Germany as well. Additionally, debates
tend to focus primarily on migration management. Civil society organisations,
especially during the first weeks of September, did not act in opposition, but
rather played an auxiliary role supporting the federal government and local
administrations in order to accommodate the incoming refugees. Our data
deviate slightly from this, because the tone of claims by political actors in the
news media was on average balanced. This also means that oppositional and
governmental, critical state actors had their say in the news. This partly con-
tradicts other research findings, which accused the German media of a one-
sided coverage that leaned towards an elitist, pro-immigrant voice and was not
representative of the German political landscape, thus contributing to deepening
the ideological rift between liberals and nationalists (Haller, 2019). Our own
study did not spot this bias, even though our data stems from a random sample
of claims made in the news during the heat of the refugee crisis. On the con-
trary, our analyses show that different voices in the media had a say: The
political spectrum was rather evenly represented in the news coverage of the
newspapers under study, to the point where different positions balanced each
other out. A majority of positive claims in support of refugee solidarity is only
expressed by representatives of civil society and not by state actors. Never-
theless, when merging claims by political actors, civil society and other groups,
the general tone of public claims in the German media was clearly supportive of
refugee solidarity without fully reflecting, however, a German ‘welcoming cul-
ture’. Instead, the data unveil a pattern of news journalism that is more or less
similar to what we find for the other countries (see Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4).
In line with the dominant focus of media claims-making on crisis manage-
ment, interest-based arguments were most commonly used to justify claims.
This suggests that public claims-makers behaved in a rather rational-pragmatic
way and were not reacting emotionally, as suggested by other studies (Haller,
2019). Also in Germany, we find that more positive claims tend to come with-
out a justification, while claims expressing negative attitudes towards refugees
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are more regularly justified. One reason for this lower level of justificatory
argumentation in pro-solidarity claims is that many positive claims were linked to
direct acts of solidarity such as, for instance, examples of citizens or celebrities
helping refugees. In such cases, solidarity actions were a spontaneous reaction to
the witnessing of the suffering of people in need, as we have argued in Chapter 2.
Such claims can do without justifications because they build on the underlying
assumption of a strong consensus on the validity of humanitarian values. A similar
logic may be at play in the case of justifications related to a rights-based frame. In
fact, actors with positive stances towards refugee solidarity most often referred to
universal principles, such as the defence of human rights, to argue in favour of the
unconditional right of war refugees to seek asylum. Less supportive claims make
use of different frames and justifications. In this regard, we can highlight the
interest frame which is used by claimants concerned about the economic capacities
of Germany (see also Chapter 4). They remain more ambivalent and neutral
regarding the issue of refugee solidarity. Overall, positions in German claims
appeared quite balanced with a slight tendency towards negativity. Our evidence
thus contradicts the findings of other studies that speak about a biased and dom-
inantly positive news coverage during the refugee crisis (Haller, 2019).
The German debate about refugee solidarity in social media
commentary
Before the backdrop of claims-making analysis, we now turn to German news
readers on Facebook and the way they responded to media claims-making
during the refugee crisis. In general, we were able to identify complementary
findings. On the one hand, we detected considerable synchronicity between
public claims in the news media and readers’ responses in terms of topics cov-
ered and main frames of interpretation used. On the other hand, we spotted
slight differences in terms of audiences when comparing different newspapers
and their readers’ readiness to support refugee solidarity.
The issues raised in comments were largely identical to those discussed in the
news. News readers on Facebook as well were mostly concerned with the political
management of migration and short- and long-term consequences of the refugee
crisis, such as economic costs. Facebook news readers, however, also picked up on
so-called alternative agendas and discussed, for instance, the role of civil society,
the involvement of ordinary Germans in solidarity action or the background of
refugees. They thus positioned themselves in relation to the ‘welcoming culture’,
either by embracing aspects of volunteering or by critically discussing the refugees’
deservingness of solidarity, for instance, through the distinction of ‘real’ and bogus
refugees. These overlapping issue agendas between newspaper claims-making and
commenting are partly explained by the fact that comments were most often
expressed in direct response to issues and claims raised in articles. Media claims-
makers are thus clearly distinguishable as ‘primary definers’ of the debate, as they
set the agenda for the debate on social media. The public sphere constituted by
Facebook is, in this sense, rather secondary and not ‘alternative’ to the news
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media. Thus, Facebook commenters often mirror public claims-making directly,
confirming the interactive feature of the online debate.
Significant differences can be found, however, with regard to the overall tone
of the debate. Facebook users are not only more critical with regard to the con-
tent of the article; they are also much more negative in regard to refugee soli-
darity than media claims-makers. Important differences in the tone of the debate
are also found between different audience segments across the three newspapers
under study. While keeping in mind the limitations of our rather small sample,
we find that SZ commenters express the most positive stance towards refugees
(0.43, in contrast to FAZ: -0.75; Spiegel: -0.23), whereas the FAZ commenters,
while commenting the least, are the most negative (see Eisele and Perfler, 2018,
p. 82). Additionally, the distance in positions between the FAZ newspaper claims
and comments’ responses is also the greatest among the three newspapers (dif-
ference in mean position: 1.19; in contrast to SZ: 0.5; Spiegel: 0.57). In this
respect, Spiegel readers are more in line with the more balanced claims reported
in Spiegel.
The findings suggest a nuanced relationship between public claims-makers as
covered in the news media and Facebook users’ comments. While users in their
comments largely follow the issue agendas defined by the news articles they have
read, they tend to use the opportunity to disagree with the public claimants’
positions. In fact, while the top-down communication by organised actors cov-
ered in newspapers conjures up the image of the overall positive, welcoming
approach of German politics and society, we see that social media users engage in
bottom-up communication that takes a more negative stance. This result can be
related to more general discussions about the assumed hostility within online
discussions, which are perceived to be ‘undermining the deliberative potential of
online interaction’ (Ksiazek et al., 2015, p. 850). While it needs to be acknowl-
edged that user commenting on Facebook is not an appropriate format for the
unfolding of argumentative debates (in fact, 25% of all comments did not provide
any justification), we need to highlight that Facebook users are nevertheless
committed partly to engaging in argumentative reasoning. In fact, there is a
recurrent pattern among Facebook users to provide dominantly moralising argu-
ments in order to justify their claims. They do, for instance, refer to the appro-
priateness of the behaviour of migrants (as individuals or as groups) and provide
religious or spiritual reasons when expressing their opinions in opposition to
claims raised in the news. In this sense, we can speak of a negative trend among
Facebook commenters that is not restricted to Germany, but is to be found also
in the main patterns of user responsiveness in all other countries, except maybe
for Italy and Greece (see Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5).
Discussion and conclusion
Public debates about solidarity with refugees as covered by German newspapers
exhibit a clear pattern: they are dominated by contestations among the political
elite; they focus primarily on the management of refugees and the possible
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problems and consequences of the large numbers of arriving immigrants. The
dominance of state actors and the focus on crisis management fostered a per-
ception of refugees as a ‘problem that awaits solutions’. However, the discourse
among the dominant political elites that was covered in newspapers was not
biased in the sense of either embracing solidarity or rejecting it. Debates devel-
oped in cycles, depending on external events, and thus shifted from an over-
whelmingly positive stance in the months of September to a decidedly negative
one in response to the Cologne events on New Year’s Eve 2015. Some weeks
later, however, some balance is restored when discourse indicates that neither
pity with refugees in need, nor fears about criminal refugees had a lasting
impact on opinions expressed in public claims-making.
Our analysis thus sketches a rather balanced picture of the German political
discourse on solidarity with refugees during the crisis. This is true in regard to
participating actors. While political actors had a strong say, other actors could
make their more positive opinions heard, as well. Angela Merkel is the most
prominent figure in the debate, yet the government did not monopolise claims-
making and other political leaders from the opposition and from the regional
level were regularly given voice in the news. Thus, we find supportive evidence
for the expectation that power and influence are important for explaining the
media’s interest in political leaderships. Moreover, conflict plays a significant
role as well when it comes to what journalists regard as worthy of being cov-
ered in the news. This observation, however, conforms to the fact that claims-
making analysis is a tool to map contestation, and thus a way to analyse
dynamics of conflict – thus inherently linked to the media logic of news-
worthiness (e.g., O’Neill and Harcup, 2009).
While the welcoming culture is strongly echoed in an overall positive tone of
claims reported in news articles during September 2015, the discussion unfold-
ing on Facebook’s comments draws a more negative picture. Relating this to the
findings that issues are mirrored in comments and comments often relate to
claims in articles directly, it seems that commenters interactively engaged with
political claims communicated top-down in the news media. However, Face-
book comments are driven by some sort of backlash, even though these state-
ments cannot be reduced to mere opposition. Commenters also formulated
claims of their own, including justifications for their positions.
Our findings paint, on a more general level, a partial picture of solidarity
contestations in Germany. We need to remember that previous analyses of
Facebook data have shown that Facebook users are not representative of the
whole population. For a study like ours, engaging in ‘sampling only politically
vocal social media users, is likely to have even fewer representative samples’
(Mellon and Prosser, 2017, p. 6) is particularly relevant when evaluating our
findings. We need to stress that the case study of September 2015 is but a
glimpse into the public discussions about solidarity with refugees, as they are
unfolding offline and online, and should therefore not ‘tarnish’ the radiant
image of volunteers welcoming refugees at Munich’s main station that month.
Still, it provides important insights into the perceptions of commenters and
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their otherwise probably unheard views on solidarity and migration. In addi-
tion, it deepens our understanding of the forces that influence public opinions
about one of the most challenging and salient issues of our times – not only for
the European Union, but for today’s democratic societies at large.
Note
1 We would like to thank Jana Bernhard and Filip Perfler for valuable research con-
tributions. A detailed discussion of the findings of the German case can be found in
Eisele and Perfler (2018).
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8 Solidarity contestation in Denmark
A national escape from transnational crisis1
Refugee solidarity in context
At the peak of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in autumn 2015, Denmark was
among the most inhospitable countries in the European Union. The welcoming
culture that was sparked in neighbouring Sweden and Germany in the initial
weeks of August and September 2015, mobilising substantial parts of the
population in solidarity actions towards Syrian refugees in particular, did not
extend to Denmark. Rather, the Danish government insisted on the strict
application of the Dublin Regulation, rejecting the asylum applications of
refugees who entered via its southern borders with Germany (Olsen, 2015).
This unreceptive approach conforms with the orientation of the Danish asylum
system, which openly privileges immigration policies which aim at deterrence of
possible migrants, such as cutting social benefits for refugees by 50% and
introducing further restrictions on family reunification (Gammeltoft-Hansen,
2017). By early September 2015, the Danish government had even placed
advertisements in Lebanese newspapers, warning refugees that they would
encounter these harsh measures, including detention and deportation, if they
decided to come to Denmark (Gormsen, 2015). At the same time, the Danish
government, for some time, allowed refugees to transit to Sweden providing
only minimal assistance during their journey through Denmark, and considering
their stay only temporary. Nevertheless, Denmark experienced a considerable
increase in asylum applications in 2015, accepting a total of 21,000 refugees,
which ranks it number 10 among the EU countries with the highest intake of
refugees per capita of the population (though seven times less than neighbour-
ing Sweden and two to three times less than Germany; Connor, 2016).
In contrast to its neighbouring country, Sweden, immigration debates in Den-
mark have been always fought in a highly controversial way, categorically rejecting
multiculturalism as a model for Danish society and expressing a clear preference
for a restrictive control of incoming migrants and refugees (Green-Pedersen and
Krogstrup, 2008; Hedetoft, 2010).The Danish government’s harsh approach to the
European crisis fuelled an intense debate within the country, as well as critical
voices across the EU demanding more solidarity. And domestic debates insisted
that the Danish government had to conform to its responsibilities. In fact, the
Danish population was not found to be particularly hostile in terms of solidarity
towards refugees, when compared to other European countries. On the contrary,
the harsh policies by the Danish government resulted in 18.1% of the population
believing that Denmark should admit higher numbers of refugees from Syria.2 A
substantial number of citizens also expressed embarrassment over their govern-
ment’s lack of solidarity towards refugees. During September and October 2015,
tens of thousands of people took part in pro-refugee rallies in all the major cities of
Denmark, and civil society all over the country organised private action in support
of incoming refugees (Sand, 2015).
Public opinion on the issue of solidarity with refugees is characterised by an
increasing polarisation of Danish society on questions regarding immigration,
multiculturalism and international human rights obligations (Trenz and Grasso,
2018). Solidarity becomes increasingly contested between two opposite ends
alongside a right-communitarian and left-cosmopolitan scale (Brändle et al.,
2019; de Wilde et al., 2019). The right–communitarian pole is formed by the
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) that defends an exclusive notion
of nationalistic solidarity based on strong ethnic ties. At that time, DF was
Denmark’s second largest party, having gained 21.1% of the votes in the 2015
general elections and (together with the Liberal Alliance party and Det Kon-
servative Folkeparti) subsequently provided parliamentary support for the right-
liberal minority government formed by the Venstre party. The mobilisation
power of the DF was particularly influential during the ‘refugee crisis’, as it was
able to reach the whole population and influence public debates successfully.
The left–cosmopolitan pole was represented by the Red–Green Alliance
(Enhedslisten), garnering 7.8% of the vote in the 2015 elections, and sees itself
in proximity to many civil society initiatives, who rallied in support of the
refugee cause and the moral obligations of inclusive, humanitarian solidarity.
The largest opposition party, the Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet, SD)
were not explicitly opposed to the government’s restrictive policies towards
refugees and did not propose a more inclusive solidarity agenda.
The Danish public sphere and solidarity
Governmental EU positions are hardly challenged in the media, and journalists
typically present a unified vision of Danish interests (De Vreese, 2003; Trenz et al.,
2009). Over time from 1970 to 2016, Danish newspapers have increasingly become
harsher in their reporting on immigration, portraying immigration as a threat,
unlike in Sweden where victim-frames were more frequent and in Norway where
coverage is less harsh than in Denmark (Hovden and Mjelde, 2019).
Denmark’s media landscape is characterised by a wide distribution of news-
papers which reach a broad readership and thus play an influential role in
public debates. The three nationally distributed newspapers, namely Jyllands-
Posten, Politiken and Berlingske, uphold standards of quality journalism and
guarantee wide-ranging coverage of political events both nationally and inter-
nationally. We included Jyllands-Posten and Politiken in our sample, because
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these two Danish newspapers have the widest circulation (Slots- og Kulturstyr-
elsen, 2017, p. 5). Jyllands-Posten is considered to be more government friendly,
representing conservative readership (Hjarvard, 2007), while Politiken is con-
sidered to be more critical of government, representing a liberal-left leaning
readership. The two national tabloids, Ekstrabladet and BT, play a minor,
though not insignificant role. We included BT in our sample, because it has the
larger readership of the two tabloids and was expected to be supportive of the
governmental restrictive policies towards refugees.
Patterns of political claims-making: The denial of transnational
solidarity
By looking at the chronology of the debate in the Danish media, the peaks shown in
the articles and claims frequency (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter 4) correspond to
a few decisive political decisions and developments regarding the influx of asylum-
seekers to Denmark and its neighbouring countries, Germany and Sweden. Gen-
erally, the hard-line approach to refugees was upheld by the government during the
entire time period. In early September, the Danish Integration Ministry published
announcements in Lebanese newspapers warning potential migrants against coming
to Denmark. In the same month, the southern borders to Germany caught the pub-
lic’s eye as refugees and asylum-seekers made their way on foot along highways
towards Denmark, most of them aiming to reach Sweden (Gormsen, 2015). With the
Swedish government deciding to introduce border controls in November 2015,
Denmark was no longer a ‘transit country’ for refugees. Responding to its neigh-
bouring country, in the first week of January 2016, the Danish government imple-
mented border controls itself. Later that month, the government announced its
highly provocative ‘jewellery law’, which allowed for the seizure of assets from
refugees upon arrival in Denmark. These harsh measures caused an international
outcry, but were also discussed as controversial within Denmark. Our data reveal
that newspapers report the same events and aspects in an almost parallel way. This
indicates a relatively unified public sphere with clearly delimited debates. The pat-
terns of claims-making regarding solidarity towards refugees point to an overall
emphasis on migration management and political control. The increasing numbers
of refugees are discussed as a problem of the national government that requires
domestic measures of security and border control, and not externally coordinated
actions at the European level embedded in a humanitarian framework. This general
observation can be broken down into four main findings.
First, the Danish debate is centred around domestic state actors. We can
therefore speak of a focus in Danish newspapers on debating refugee-related
issues mainly from a state-centred, top-down perspective. Emphasis is put on
control instead of solidarity. Public support of solidarity is mainly mobilised by
civil society organisations, and most often these claims stand in opposition to
statements by state actors (Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4). Among the political party
actors (Brändle et al., 2018), the Danish People’s Party (the DF), strictly
opposed to refugee solidarity, was responsible for the representation of most
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claims. The main opposition party, and Denmark’s largest political party, the
Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet, SD) ranks second among the claimants,
though not in major opposition to the government’s negative stance: Venstre,
the governing party on the centre-right, is the third most frequent claimant in
the media. The centrality of these three parties is noteworthy, because it shows
their ability to dominate the public debate. Indeed, other parties who defended
a solidarity agenda with refugees, such as Enhedslisten, were hardly ever given
voice in the debate. It was the DF, in particular, which gained visibility in the
media via provocative statements that expressed hostile attitudes toward refu-
gees (Brändle et al., 2018).
The dominance of these actors suggests that public debates about the ‘refugee
crisis’ were mainly domestic and excluded foreign or European voices to a large
extent. This points to a low level of Europeanisation of the refugee debate in
the Danish media. The latter put less emphasis, for instance, on the discussion
of the causes and effects of flight, the wider European repercussions of the
crisis, and the European-international context of cooperation within which
possible solutions to the ‘crisis’ were debated. Almost two thirds of the main
claimants have a national scope (63.9%). Regional (18.2%), and in particular,
supranational actors (16.3%) are clearly underrepresented (Brändle et al., 2018),
and crucially national actors on average took negative stances toward refugees
(see Figure 4.8 in Chapter 4).
Secondly, and in line with the high visibility of domestic state actors, issues
relating to refugee solidarity were given generally low salience in the Danish
media. Debates centred dominantly on policies of ‘Migration Management’,
that is, on issues touching upon asylum policies, border controls and other ways
to control, secure or administer the influx of refugees and asylum-seekers. At
66.5%, such security and control issues take most space in the debate, leaving
minimal room for claims raising alternative agendas in support of refugee soli-
darity. In fact, only every 11th statement raises a solidarity issue regarding the
integration of refugees (8.9%), and only every 13th claim thematises refugees’
experiences of flight or their personal stories (7.6%) (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4).
This pattern suggests an overemphasis on the domestic perspective of the ‘refugee
crisis’, privileging questions of security, control and border management, and
downplaying humanitarian issues, which are externalised and relegated to the
European Union. Of all the issues raised in the debate, 71.3% are of a purely
national or subnational scope, i.e., do not look beyond the borders of Denmark.
Less than one third of the claims touch on the European and transnational ramifi-
cations of the refugee crisis.
Thirdly, the refugee solidarity debate in Denmark is driven by a focus on
political decisions. This points to a top-down perspective that addresses the
‘refugee crisis’ through the lenses of state actors, and not through civil society
or opposition parties. Solidarity contestation is confined to the official arena of
state and party politics, and there is little attention paid to solidarity action or
protest. The mass-mediated debates thus privilege an official account of how
decisions are taken within the political institutions, but leave out protest events
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and direct solidarity actions such as providing resources to refugees directly. In
this way, visibility is granted to top-down decision-making, while relegating
contestation to the outside: Opposition is expressed by civil society and grass-
roots organisations or NGOs, and not by political parties, but this means that
these voices receive considerably less attention in the news reporting. Ulti-
mately, confrontation takes place between state and civil society, not along
ideological lines between political parties.
Fourthly, the overall distribution of pro- and anti-solidarity claims towards
refugees reflects a sharp polarisation of the debate dividing the claimants in two
equally large groups: Positionality towards solidarity with refugees is divided
into shares of 40.0% negative, 40.0% positive and 19.4% neutral claims, with
no significant difference in the position of reported claims between the news-
papers (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). Therefore, contestation is high since 80%
of the claimants take an explicit stance on refugee solidarity. Generally, state
and political actors hold the main share in negative positions towards refugee
solidarity (see Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4). This stands in contrast with positions
taken by civil society and other actors, who are more supportive of refugees.
Most frequent were claims by state and political actors who adopted a negative
tone toward refugees, focusing on rational solutions and a ‘management’
approach to ‘crisis’, dominated by state actors (see, e.g., Table 4.5 in Chapter
4). Additionally, political actors used mostly interest-based justifications (see
Brändle et al., 2018). We found rights-based justifications in around a quarter
of the claims, but hardly used by political actors and rather used by civil society
actors, suggesting more humanitarian forms of solidarity among these clai-
mants. Identity-based justifications were rare, meaning that claimants did not
often refer to aspects of identity or ethnicity when justifying their stances
regarding solidarity. These patterns are similar to the ones found in the other
countries (see Table 4.6 in Chapter 4).
A month of contestation on Facebook: Commenters’ responses to the
solidarity debate
An important dimension to understand Danish solidarity contestation regarding
the ‘refugee crisis’ is whether commenters in social media supported or opposed
the positions expressed by the main claimants in the news media, because this
allows us to identify the way they positioned themselves with regard to soli-
darity with refugees. Our data show that commenters on the Facebook sites of
Danish news media strongly engaged with the issues and demands expressed in
the posted newspaper articles. This engagement was mainly critical, because the
majority of the commenters ‘talked back’ to claimants in the media by opposing
their views. Despite the fact that articles posted by Danish newspapers on
Facebook were on average more positive towards refugees, Facebook users’
voices were raised mainly to reject solidarity towards refugees: 47.7% of com-
ments spoke out against refugees directly, in contrast to 39.7% that were sup-
portive of solidarity toward refugees, while 12.9% remained neutral or
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ambivalent (see Table 5.4 in Chapter 5). In instances where justifications were
used, commenters mostly justified their stances with references to human rights. In
these cases, commenters were mostly positive regarding solidarity. In negative
comments, we found more commenters justifying their rejection of solidarity by
referring to refugees’ (supposedly ‘bad’) behaviour, as well as to the demand that
national citizens’ needs are more important than the needs of ‘outgroups’ (justifi-
cation ‘welfare chauvinism’) (Brändle et al., 2018).
These findings show that Facebook users engage in commenting on articles in
order to express criticism or opposition to the claims reported in the posts.
They thus deviate from the picture painted by the previous research in two
ways. On the one hand, Facebook users are involved in criticising and arguing
with regard to the claims reported in the posted news, which means that Face-
book comments are much more than a generalised and vague expression of
political discontent and frustration. The level of interdiscursivity is not as low
as others have argued (Hille and Bakker, 2013). On the other hand, social
media sites are not an arena where commenters form ‘counter-publics’ and
evolve around shared notions of immigration as a threat, as research has sug-
gested (Toepfl and Piwoni, 2015). Even though there is a dominant negativity in
Danish user comments, these commenting forums can hardly be described as a
counter-public, because we also found pro-refugee engagement and counter
mobilisation by users against the anti-solidarity claims of the majority.
Discussion: A national escape from crisis
The ‘refugee crisis’ debate of 2015 reflects the increasing polarisation of Danish
society along the lines of inclusive humanitarian solidarity orientations towards
others and exclusive national-communitarian solidarity. Civil society repre-
sentatives appear in the media not simply as care-takers or charity actors, but
as actors in opposition to the government. The refugee crisis leads in this sense
to a politicisation of the civil society sector. This confirms the bipolar patterns
of refugee solidarity in Denmark, which we also found in our survey of civil
society solidarity action (Duru et al., 2021): While on the one hand, the refugee
crisis has mobilised many Danish people in support of refugee solidarity
through charity action and political protest, there is, on the other hand, a
widespread attitude of welfare chauvinism among Danish citizens paired with
anti-immigrant attitudes.
The Danish civil society and its lively support of refugees, however, is not a
plot for news stories in the media. Danish citizens’ engagement in voluntary
work is only marginally dealt with as part of the news coverage of the ‘refugee
crisis’. Additionally, Danish news media tend to cover the international and
European ‘refugee crisis’ from a rather narrow national perspective. They give
ample floor to the position of the government and its supporting parties, which
join in on the attempts to define ‘refugee crisis’ as something that does not
affect Denmark and is thus to be treated as something external. Against this
majority of claims, there is only a minority of oppositional voices that rally for
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refugee solidarity but cannot gain high media salience. In this sense, there is a
polarisation of debates about the ‘refugee crisis’, but this contestation does not
reside in dissent between governmental and oppositional parties The analysis
rather suggests that the division is between a dominant group of political actors
rejecting solidarity and a small segment of civil society actors in support of
solidarity. The Danish media thus leave little space for actors seeking con-
frontation that challenge the positions taken by the government.
The Danish debate is thus characterised by what can be called a ‘national
escape from crisis’, because it distances itself from the causes of increased
migration and insists on keeping developments under control in a situation of
national emergency. A more fundamental debate about the foundations of soli-
darity in Europe does not take place. Only a minority of voices raises incon-
venient questions in the media, when they ask why Denmark shows so little
solidarity in Europe and why its policies of deterrence should be in line with the
Danish self-understanding of universal welfare and human rights.
The country is divided on refugee solidarity, but this division is underplayed
by the media. Instead, there is a remarkable salience of Danish political actors
discussing the ‘refugee crisis’ in terms of political management of borders and
asylum policies. This is a matter of concern, not only because pro-solidarity
voices are misrepresented in media claims-making, but also because the cen-
trality of anti-solidarity measures in news coverage might distract the readers
from the actual humanitarian crisis which still forces millions of people to flee
to safer areas.
In light of these results, we have found that the Danish media rather uncri-
tically reflect the official position of Denmark in Europe, promoted by the gov-
ernment, and thus carry rejection of solidarity, undisputed, into public debates.
The rather negative news coverage of solidarity and immigration in the news in
general makes it difficult for bottom-up initiatives to promote their engagement
for people in need against more powerful top-down voices of rejection.
Notes
1 We would like to thank Freja Sørine Adler Berg and Anna Sofie Rosenberg for valu-
able research contributions. A detailed discussion of the findings of the Danish case
can be found in Brändle et al., 2018.
2 The Danish population is, according to our own TransSOL survey, the most favour-
able with regard to the question of taking in refugees from Syria. The average level of
support among the eight countries included in the survey is 12.3%. The survey was
fielded at the end of 2016 (Grasso, 2017; Lahusen and Grasso 2018).
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9 Solidarity contestation in France
Bottom-up polarisation and segmentation
Refugee solidarity in context1
Solidarity is a major pillar of the French constitutional framework, built into
the brick of ‘brotherhood’ (fraternité) and contained in the same Revolutionary
tricolour and national anthem. In the migration and refugee field, however,
political developments throughout the 2000s and 2010s have signalled an overall
process of declining solidarity, combined together with an increasingly restric-
tive stance of the French state. The traditional generosity of the French system,
both in terms of the short-term welcoming of refugees and the long-term inte-
gration of migrants into full citizens has been replaced by a series of restrictive
twists. Accordingly, new ‘reforms’ have prevented migrants and refugees from
accessing the country by making it more difficult for them to attain citizenship
(Cinalli, 2017), while at the same time nurturing anti-migrant discourses which
push the idea that migrants and refugees are a burden on society (immigration
subie). Perhaps the strongest symbol of the migration crisis has been the ‘Calais
Jungle’, a camp near the northern city of Calais. Many migrants living in this
camp have pursued the objective of crossing the Channel and entering Great
Britain. The camp gained global attention during the refugee crisis, particularly
with respect to mass evictions which French authorities have been carrying out
since October 2016 (Baumard, 2016), peaking with the final clearing of the
‘Jungle’.
Indeed, restrictive measures have underscored the negative agenda of succes-
sive governments, left or right, which have deterred new arrivals, introduced
tougher border controls at the time of the ‘Arab Spring’ and the Syrian war,
denied solidarity to the large number of Tunisians and Syrians reaching France,
and implemented coercive measures against those who provide solidarity aid to
migrants and refugees. All these dynamics have taken place within a highly
sensitive context, owing to a series of terrorist attacks such as the Charlie
Hebdo shooting on 7 January 2015 and the Paris massacre in November 2015.
Since then, the public sphere has been shaped into a deeply emotional debate,
impinging on the discussion of the refugee crisis. Thus, at the time of the refu-
gee crisis, France was ravaged by draconian measures of public emergency; it
was burdened by the economic and political legacy of the economic crisis and
wars in Iraq, Syria and Libya; and it underwent intense party competition
combined with a growing popular support for the extreme right.
The shifting policy-agendas have had considerable repercussions on debates
and activities of solidarity at the time of the refugee crisis, because they have
introduced ambivalences and contradictions. In fact, French authorities have
also intervened in the field with a favourable position vis-à-vis refugees. Thus,
they have transferred to NGOs and social firms the burden of sustaining
migrants and refugees through granting specific funding, since NGOs and social
enterprises can implement programmes that are broader in scope and deeper in
outreach. Accordingly, favourable interventions have targeted the dis-
advantaged neighbourhoods with the highest percentages of migrants and
people of migrant background (Escafré-Dublet et al., 2014). A number of civil
society organisations have taken the responsibility for actions that are invalu-
able to mediate between the state willingness (‘in principle’) to welcome on the
one hand and, on the other, the promise of migrants and refugees’ integration
into the French Republic. Some civil society organisations, for example, have
connected migrants with firms to create job opportunities, maintained data-
bases of potential candidates for employers, offered refugees training courses,
set up group workshops, individual coaching, media training with professional
communication and human resources. Simply put, there has also been renewed
evidence of increasing pro-beneficiary mobilisation on behalf of refugees and
migrants (Cinalli, 2004 and 2007; Giugni and Passy, 2001).
The French public sphere and solidarity
We can now provide a picture of how the French public debate over the refugee
crisis has developed between August 2015 and April 2016. Our focus on the
refugee crisis enables us to deal with a highly resonant topic in the public
sphere which has stood out as a central focus for the state, policy-makers and
civil society. Accordingly, our aim is to analyse the main dynamics such as the
role that French citizens have had in the definition of the issue, the specific grids
by which refugees have been framed (for example, as victims or otherwise as a
threat), the degree to which organised publics have engaged with solidarity
actions on behalf of refugees, as well as the main level shaping the public sphere
(national, transnational, subnational). Our analysis follows an operationalisa-
tion of the public sphere that draws on ‘claim-making’ (Cinalli and Giugni,
2013a, 2016a; Koopmans and Statham, 1999), shedding light on specific national
dynamics within the context of broader European comparative analysis, offered
in Chapter 4.
The French media landscape is characterised by a wide distribution of
newspapers with a high readership and influence in the public sphere. In parti-
cular, our analysis draws on Le Figaro and Le Monde (having the widest cir-
culation and standards of high-quality and wide-ranging coverage), as well as
Le Parisien (standing out for its more tabloid style that reports sensationalist
news). The number of readers for all three newspapers represented almost
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1 million in 2015 (Alliance pour les Chiffres de la Presse et des Médias, 2017).
The newspapers chosen ensured the equal representation of opposed opinions
and socio-political cleavages in France so as to fit our focus on solidarity con-
testation in a country where issues of migration and diversity are highly con-
tentious (Cinalli, 2017). Le Figaro is a conservative right-wing media; Le Monde
represents left-wing citizens and Le Parisien the centre. Overall, our analysis
gathered information on 764 claims, identified through the examination of 301
articles (with an average of ca. 2.5 claims per article).
At the same time, the analysis focuses on user commenting to add another
crucial layer of contestation in the migration and refugee field. In so doing, the
analysis allows for stretching our study of the public sphere in a way to include
the voice of individual French readers who intervene to express their position
and (dis)satisfaction vis-à-vis claims of the main organised publics in the media.
In this case, our data refer to 300 Facebook comments in response to 13 news-
paper articles related to the refugee crisis over the period of September 2015.
Data were extracted from Facebook using the online application Netvizz. This
tool allowed us to collect all comments responding to media articles for Le
Figaro, Le Monde and Le Parisien in September 2015, with numbers of likes,
shares and replies. This first step involved the selection of posts (links to
newspaper articles) that related to the research object. The final sample inclu-
ded a total of five posts for Le Figaro, five posts for Le Monde and three for Le
Parisien, with 20 user comments coded for each. Since certain comments fell
short of the sampling criteria, a total of 97 comments were coded for posts
published by Le Figaro, 100 for Le Monde, and 103 for Le Parisien.
Patterns of political claims-making
Our findings show that the highest peak in terms of public coverage of the
refugee crisis refers to the strong public impact of the support of the French
President, François Hollande, in favour of establishing a refugees’ quota system.
Claims’ distribution shows that this peak occurred in September 2015 (see
Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4), at the same time when the President announced that
France would welcome 24,000 refugees. The prominence of these events is in
line with the general pattern within our data, according to which state actors
lead more than half of the whole claims-making. Behind numerical figures, we
find that German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, is a prominent actor in the
French public debate, even more so than the French President. This corresponds
to the decision of the German President to accept the largest number of refugees
in Europe in spite of tough internal and external opposition. More broadly, we
find a strong presence of German actors, signalling a certain Germanisation of
the refugee crisis debate. Beyond this specificity, French debates are structured
along a clear distinction between state actors, whose scope is mostly national
and sub-national, and categories like ‘group-specific organisations’, ‘civil society
and human rights organisations’ as well as ‘professional organisations groups’
which are characterised by both an international and a sub-national scope.
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Looking behind the general figures, it is important to say that claims by state
actors include guidelines for the welcoming of refugees (which the national gov-
ernment give to subnational governments), official visits by the Prime Minister in
Greece to help the Greek government, as well as declarations maintaining an open
dialogue with controversial state leaders such as Viktor Orbán and Recep Erdo-
ğan. The prominence of state actors is followed by that of political parties, which
include mainly representatives of the Socialist Party, the Republicans and the
National Front. Emphasis must be put on the relatively low visibility of civil
society in general, as well as ‘advocacy and policy-oriented groups’. The diverging
presence of state, political and civic actors has consequences for public debates,
because these actors advocate for different types of narratives that nurture con-
tentiousness in the overall field. State actors, especially under the Socialists’ rheto-
ric, lead a neutral discourse about the refugee crisis and the role of France as a
country of transit for refugees. Against this position, the extreme right stands out
for its tough position, calling for an end to any systematic plan for welcoming,
while the Republicans take a middle position by calling for tougher controls at the
French borders, together with major plans for international aid.
As regards the position vis-à-vis refugees in particular, it is important to note
that a substantial share of ca. 40% of claims by state actors are openly sup-
portive of refugees (with the remaining claims being distributed evenly between
a neutral and an anti-refugees stance, respectively), whereas nearly half of
claims by political parties are in explicit opposition to refugees.2 This is evi-
dence of increasing contentiousness, a result of competition between main
political stakeholders in the party system, beyond the more soothing attitude of
main institutions and especially civil society. It is instructive to look at the jus-
tifications public claimants employ when supporting or opposing solidarity with
refugees. In this regard, we see affinities between justifications in support of
solidarity and positions towards objects (see Table 4.6 in Chapter 4). Approxi-
mately two thirds of the rights-based justifications supporting general or uni-
versal principles are linked to favourable claims towards refugees, whereas over
40% of identity-based justifications rejected solidarity towards refugees. As
regards interests-based/utilitarian justifications, they are in a balanced situation
between anti-refugee and pro-refugee positions.
Some final findings consist of the extensive variation of claims-making across
different newspapers. Table 9.1 shows that Le Monde is the newspaper that
most often avoids reporting a solidarity justification, while Le Parisien almost
always does so. This finding is somewhat counter-intuitive since one would
expect more complete information over claims in higher quality newspapers
than in the tabloid-style press. Yet it is in line with the major effort that a
tabloid-style newspaper such as Le Parisien has made in France to show that the
refugee crisis touched the core of interests, rights, and identities of citizens.
Another interesting variation can be found in terms of more identity-based
newspapers on the one hand, in line with the conservative vision of Le Figaro,
and more rights-based newspapers on the other, in line with the progressive
vision of Le Monde.
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A month of contestation on Facebook: Commenters’ responses to the
solidarity debate
To fully understand whether solidarity is collectively supported or contested in
the debates, it is important to include bottom-up mobilisation beyond mass
mediated discussions.3 Our findings show that refugees were the subject of
debate for 91.3% of Facebook comments.
Facebook users’ reactions revealed the predominance of negative positions
towards refugees. With a mean of -.328, the study shows that French commen-
ters did not express solidarity with the newcomers. Often, French Facebook
users were opposed to welcoming refugees, granting refugee status and asking
for border closure. In second position are placed those who expressed neutral
attitudes: they questioned politicians, values of French citizens, and/or the way
the media presented events (i.e. media manipulation). Only a minor proportion
of the French Facebook users expressed solidarity with the refugees in their
comments. In this case, they often defended refugees, reminding readers of the
human perspective, supporting open asylum policies and stressing that refugees’
lives were in danger in their home country.
A majority of the comments justified their stances regarding solidarity, while 22%
did not. When commenters provided a justification against solidarity, they referred
firstly to ‘welfare chauvinism’ (16%), suggesting putting the needs of French citizens
above refugees’ needs. This was followed by individuals who questioned the social
or economic capacity of France to host refugees (10.3%). By contrast, pro-refugee
justifications built around philanthropic reasons, i.e. human rights, represented only
10% of Facebook users. Human rights have certainly emerged as a main justification
among pro-refugee commenters: being human, or humanity has thus been used to
express solidarity towards the refugees, or to call explicitly for their protection.
Findings show that an overall majority of 3/5 users related to the con-
servative newspaper do not express solidarity towards refugees. By contrast,
readers of the progressive newspaper express a more equal distribution between











106 33.44 57 17.98 154 48.58 317 41.49
Rights-based
justifications
22 22.22 21 21.21 56 56.57 99 12.95
Identity-based
justifications
24 36.36 13 19.70 29 43.94 66 8.63
No
justification
98 34.75 173 61.35 11 3.90 282 36.93
Total 250 32.72 264 34.55 250 32.72 764 100
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those who show negative, neutral and positive positions vis-à-vis refugees.
Users of Le Parisien show equally a proportional distribution between positive,
neutral and negative positions, yet they display similar levels of opposition as
Le Figaro This suggests that commenters seek out the newspaper that speaks to
their personal opinion, thus users’ positions vary when comparing the three
newspapers. In this sense, solidarity contestations seem to be strongly seg-
mented along different camps sharing similar ideological orientations, while
congregating under the roof of ideologically akin newspapers. In this sense,
French newspapers tend to contribute to the polarisation and segmentation of
public debates about solidarity.
Discussion
Our data indicate that the refugee crisis has been a highly relevant topic for
discussion in the public sphere, raising extensive debates among the state, pol-
icymakers of different kinds, as well as organised publics and individual citi-
zens. The most crucial point, however, is the ways in which positive, neutral
and negative stances vis-à-vis refugees are distributed across claimant types. In
particular, the tonality of the debate is on average slightly supportive of soli-
darity with refugees; however, we also see a strong contentiousness of public
claims-making, given that only about one third of all public interventions raise
neutral or ambivalent views, and thus around two thirds of claims endorse or
reject solidarity with refugees (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). Political actors show
on average an anti-refugee stance, while civil society organisations join the
voice of those supporting refugees; as regards state actors, they maintain a
moderately positive stance, which seems to be influenced by the position of the
German government and the binational relations between both countries.
The solidarity contentions are also related to the arguments and justifications
used by public claimants when endorsing or refusing solidarity with refugees. In
fact, our findings have confirmed that there is a tight relationship between certain
types of justifications on the one hand, and the positioning vis-à-vis refugees on the
other. In particular, the defence of refugees comes together with a strong emphasis
on a humanitarian perspective, supporting open asylum policies and stressing that
refugees must be protected in the name of fundamental human rights. In contrast,
the opposition against solidarity with refugees is most often defended through
identity-based justifications. Solidarity contentions are increasing because the
public sphere is fragmented between newspapers according to the specific political
orientations which they convey. In fact, claims-making varies across different
newspapers to such an extent that their audiences remain divided according to
traditional ideological cleavages between the left and the right of the French poli-
tical spectrum.
Similar patterns can be observed in the comment sections on Facebook,
where commenters seem to stick to the newspapers according to political pre-
ferences. This leads to differences between comment sections of the three
newspapers. It is in this sense difficult to speak of shared solidarity contestation
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when looking at bottom-up mobilisation in the French case. Instead of arguing
with each other, news readers tend to search for like-minded arenas and com-
menters that support their views, thus contributing to a more polarised and
segmented bottom-up debate. It thus seems that the political leanings of the
traditional media have left their mark on social media debates, as well.
Notes
1 We would like to thank Rosa María Lechuga Morales, Carlo de Nuzzo and Maria
Jímena Sanhueza for valuable research contributions. A detailed discussion of findings
of the French case can be found in Cinalli et al. (2018).
2 For detailed numbers and a discussion on the position of French claimants, see Cinalli
et al. (2018).
3 For detailed numbers and a discussion on commenters’ responses to the solidarity
debate, see Cinalli et al. (2018).
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10 Solidarity contestation in Greece
Standing on the verge of emergency1
Refugee solidarity in context
Since 2009, solidarity in Greece has been seriously put under pressure by a
context of multiple crises with considerable political, social and humanitarian
repercussions (Mexi, 2018). Besides the economic and financial crisis, migratory
pressures have increased and since 2015, Greek authorities have struggled to
accommodate the high number of people arriving at its borders, especially on
the islands of Lesbos and Samos. Given its geographical location, Greece
became the main entry gate for refugees and migrants into the European Union.
According to statistics provided by the UNHCR, 856,000 arrivals were recorded
in Greece in 2015, most of whom were refugees escaping from the war in Syria
(Velentza, 2018). Against this backdrop, the number of first-time asylum appli-
cations, according to Eurostat, was somewhat delayed and much lower, with
13,210 applicants recorded in 2015 and 51,105 in 2016. For a great number of
incoming refugees, Greece was merely a transit country on their journey
towards other destinations in the EU.
The SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left)–ANEL (Independent Greeks)
coalition government called at that time for external support, and asked Fron-
tex and the EU for help to control its borders and provide humanitarian assis-
tance for people who were expected to transit through Greece. As a beneficiary
of European solidarity itself, the Greek government made clear that its efforts
to engage in refugee solidarity could only be minimal and would be reliant on
international assistance (Paschou and Loukakis, 2018, p. 95). Unlike the former
governments, who implemented a harsh control policy towards immigration
and erected a fence at the Greek–Turkish border, the SYRIZA–ANEL govern-
ment was less restrictive. It allowed refugees to enter the country, but did not
comply with its obligations as stipulated by the Dublin Regulation to register
asylum seekers in their first country of arrival (Velentza, 2018). While the dys-
functionality of the Dublin Regulation became evident for all (see Zaun, 2018),
Greek immigration and asylum policies were characterised by incoherence and
conflicting domestic demands. Hostile, anti-immigrant claims were raised,
above all by extreme right-wing parties, who had become increasingly popular
during the decade of ‘crisis’, putting social solidarity and cohesion under stress
(Mexi, 2018, p. 350). In the weeks and months of major influx of refugees
(August 2015 until early 2016), the government’s ‘open border policy’ mainly
facilitated the transit of refugees from the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea to
the Macedonian border, from where they headed towards northern destina-
tions. At the same time, the Greek government emphasised the interlinkage
between the financial and humanitarian crisis, and called for solidarity from
the EU and from member states. It made use of what was called the ‘refugee
crisis’ as a bargaining chip to handle the Greek debt crisis with more flex-
ibility (Evangelinidis, 2018).
By insisting on Greece being a ‘transit country’, the Greek government
attempted to externalise the problem. Yet the country also had to face a
humanitarian disaster domestically, as human lives had to be rescued and first
aid assistance had to be provided to the incoming refugees, who arrived on the
shores of the Aegean islands often in desperate condition. The televised pictures
of the overcrowded refugee camps incited a broad mobilisation of solidarity in
the whole of Europe, and were also the background for the accusation of the
UNHCR that the Greek government was neglecting its humanitarian duties
(Mexi, 2018, p. 348). Refugee reception took place under poor conditions (and
continues to do so; see Bell, 2020). A lack of functional state structures forced
Greece to rely primarily on the informal sector of civil society volunteering that
had already emerged in Greece during the Great Recession in response to eco-
nomic hardships (Kalogeraki, 2018). Informal and often politicised civil society
support networks were reactivated in 2015 to provide spontaneous assistance to
refugees in situations of emergency and to raise awareness about the danger of
right-wing extremism and xenophobia, such as those linked to the rise of the
group Golden Dawn. Such informal and local citizens’ initiatives tried to take a
substitutive function in the absence or inefficiency of state help and more for-
malised support action (Kanellopoulos et al., 2020; Kousis et al., 2020). However,
their capacities to shelter their beneficiaries from precariousness were limited, and
it soon became clear that in the face of a problem of such magnitude, volunteer-
ing could not substitute state action and the absence of organised civil society.
International aid brought partial relief in the form of transnational solidarity
coalitions between NGOs, International Organisations such as UNHCR and
IOM (International Organisation of Migration) and volunteering citizens from all
over Europe, which collaborated with local support groups on the Greek islands
and at the border with the Republic of Macedonia to provide first assistance.
Grass-roots level solidarity that is spontaneously organised by local citizens in
response to urgent need in their immediate environment was thus interlinked
with broader networks of transnational solidarity (Kousis et al., 2018).
Public attitudes of solidarity towards refugees in Greece were not significantly
different compared to the rest of Europe. According to our own TransSOL survey
on solidarity attitudes and behaviour (Grasso, 2017; Lahusen and Grasso, 2018),
the moral obligation to provide help to war refugees from Syria was generally
accepted by the majority of the Greek population. Despite the experiences of eco-
nomic deprivation, 31% of Greeks agreed with the intake of the high number of
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refugees or would even have supported higher numbers. A substantial majority of
the Greek population (51%) demanded, however, that this number should be
lowered and 12.9% categorically rejected the intake of Syrian refugees. There was
thus quite a clear opinion that Greece took in more refugees than it could possibly
handle, and that it should be assisted by Europe, but this attitude did not com-
promise a general support of the principle of refugee solidarity.2
The Greek public sphere and solidarity
The Greek public sphere is traditionally shaped by the strong role of party
discourse amplified by journalists who are more party affiliated than indepen-
dent reporters. The independence of journalism suffers from political patronage
and entanglement with politics (Doudaki and Boubouka, 2019). Typically
viewed as a polarised pluralistic media system, strongly established in Southern
Europe (Hallin and Mancini, 2004), the Greek public sphere is distinguished by
ideological cleavages that shape polarisation in public attitudes. Journalists
typically propagate a Greek identity based on a strong ethno-cultural notion of
nationhood and are committed to defending national interests towards ‘an
outside’, but they are also torn by the fractured solidarity at the inside along the
lines of social class and party affiliation (Iosifidis and Boucas, 2015). As a con-
sequence, Greek media and journalism are among the most distrusted in
Europe.3 During the economic crisis, the established structures of this media
system collapsed, when public broadcasting was partly suspended, several of
the country’s largest media organisations went bankrupt, and newspaper cov-
erage dramatically shrank (Michailidou and Trenz, 2015; Siapera et al., 2015).
Greece’s media landscape is characterised by a low distribution of news-
papers, a considerable decrease in the number of news readers since 2008 and
the closure of several flagship newspapers, with a parallel rise in digital news-
papers and news portals. The three newspapers selected for our content analy-
sis, the centre-right, Kathimerini, 4 the liberal centre, Ta Nea, 5 and the tabloid/
right-wing newspaper, Proto Thema, 6 are among the most popular outlets and
occupy an influential place in political debate.
As in other countries of our sample, public and media attention at the peak of
the so-called refugee crisis was high. It was even enhanced by journalists travelling
in from countries worldwide to provide live coverage of dramatic and unfolding
events in what they considered to be ‘the epicentre of crisis’. A quantitative content
analysis of Greek news coverage by Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti (2016) revealed
that for the early months of 2016 there was a dominant focus on the ‘inhumane’
living conditions in the refugee camps. This observation is confirmed by our own
study of claims-making, because Greek newspapers tended to individualise the
crisis, giving refugees voice or portraying their individual stories. On average, their
coverage of the refugees was favourable, but they were critical of the government
and the EU.
This humanitarian agenda seems to be a reflection of political developments
in Greece preceding the ‘refugee crisis’. In earlier times, migrants were badly
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integrated into Greek society (Triandafyllidou, 2009) and, driven by the right-
wing forces, public opinion grew increasingly negative with repeated incidents
of racist attacks, especially against migrants from Muslim countries, who were
seen as a threat to the ethnic-national homogeneity of the Greek nation
(Kadianaki and Andreouli, 2017). While previous governments opposed liberal
immigration policies and engaged in securitisation measures (Evangelinidis,
2016), a major shift came with the Tsipras government, which took office in
2015 and engaged in a radical-left discourse on immigration that linked the
issue to capitalist globalisation, impoverishment and wars (Nestoras, 2015), and
put Greeks and migrants on par as ‘victims of crisis’. Even though this left-leaning
internationalism had little direct impact on public debates, media attention never-
theless shifted towards a more favourable position towards refugees. Existing
research of Greek press coverage during that short period in early 2016 highlights
that journalism clearly focused on the living conditions in the refugee camps and
on procedural/administrative issues related to migration, e.g., transfer and regis-
tration, as the most frequently reported topics (Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti, 2016).
Furthermore, evidence from comparative research suggests that Greece, alongside
other frontline countries during the ‘refugee crisis’, scored significantly higher in
humanitarian action as opposed to military securitisation in its media narratives
and gives more voice to refugees compared to other western European countries
(Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017, p. 10).
Patterns of political claims-making: The externalisation of crisis
Our own claims-making analysis confirms this picture of Greece as a transit
country in a situation of emergency. In line with the rest of Europe, debates
about refugee solidarity in Greece peaked in September 2015 with the mass
arrival of refugees, but in contrast to how the debate unfolded in other coun-
tries, the issue continued to be high on the agenda and the intensity of debates
even increased in early 2016 (Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter 4). The second peak
of highest media attention is located in mid-March 2016 and corresponds with
the EU–Turkey deal signed on 19 March 2016, after which numbers of incom-
ing refugees were considerably reduced. This lasting salience of the refugee issue
over an extended period of time is related to the decision of the European
governments in late 2015 and early 2016 to close their borders to transiting
refugees. Other countries were more successful than Greece at taking the ‘refu-
gee issue’ off the agenda, by taking drastic measures with significant negative
side-effects for Greece. Refugees were stranded here, and many of them reached
deadlock at the border with the Republic of North Macedonia, where the
situation escalated in March 2016 (Paschou and Loukakis, 2018). Public atten-
tion for the so-called refugee crisis and controversial discussions were very
unequally distributed across the European public sphere. The resistance of
European partners to assist Greece in an emergency situation in early 2016
triggered heavy debates and many protests in Greece, but considerably less so in
the rest of Europe.
138 Solidarity contestation in Greece
The intensity of public debates is not the only aspect that distinguishes the
Greek situation from the one in the other countries under study. Everywhere
else, the refugee crisis was portrayed mainly as a problem to be dealt with by
national governments, called to take adequate measures at the domestic level in
terms of security measures and border controls. The Greek debate is special
because domestic actors pleaded for external help and coordinated action
within a European framework dedicated to humanitarian aid. Political claims
regarding solidarity towards refugees exhibit two main features that are
strongly interrelated: low levels of domestic political contestation on the one
hand, and an external dimension that is manifested in the plea for international
support and cooperation in the management of the refugee inflow, on the other,
that placed particular emphasis on lobbying for European solidarity. The
agenda was set by the emergency situation and the necessity to respond to the
basic needs of the incoming refugees. That such assistance had to be provided
was uncontroversial and did not need to be further contested in the media. The
debate was documented and informative; it could evoke emotions, but it was
not strongly opinionated. This also explains why claims-making in Greece was
less focused on security issues, which the government had few resources to
provide anyway. The emphasis was rather on humanitarian concerns and a
solidarity response from abroad.
Three salient patterns underline these results. First, as in other countries in
our sample, the dominance of state actors is overwhelming in the Greek debate.
This can be explained by the external dimension of the crisis, which led to the
formulation of a nationally unified position. In a situation defined as ‘emer-
gency’ and ‘crisis’, state actors can occupy both security and humanitarian
agendas, and thus ensure a monopoly of the debate. Such a convergence of
agendas can be considered to be atypical compared to traditional patterns of
political culture in Greece: Instead of polarisation, the Greek debate led, at least
temporarily, to a unification of the voice of media claimants, mainly repre-
sented by state and governmental coalition who entered a short-term coalition
with NGOs and civil society groups. State and political party actors in Greece
were expressing themselves on average more positively towards the issue of the
refugee solidarity (+0.05), distancing themselves quite considerably from the
average, mostly negative attitudes that were expressed by groups of state and
political party actors in other countries (-0.12 as the average of the eight coun-
tries analysed) (Figure 4.4 in Chapter 4). The main line of confrontation was
between Greece and the rest of Europe (Germany and the EU). This line of
disagreement is, however, not only a confrontation, but also a relationship of
mutual dependencies, as pleas for solidarity between Europe and Greece were
combined with the accusation that Europe was responsible for the crisis.
Secondly, the Greek government’s strategies to externalise or Europeanise the
‘refugee crisis’ became most evident in the high salience of supranational
claims-makers and the predominance of addressees with a transnational scope.
The latter reflects pleas by Greek actors for international support and coop-
eration during the crisis period. Such pleas were addressed at the EU level,
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especially during the first peak of claims-making in September 2015, and
regarding individual countries, most notably in Germany with 15.6% of all the
claims that contain addressees.7 Externalisation thus does not mean a denial of
responsibility, as was discussed in the case of Denmark, but ‘Europeanisation’
in the sense of involving other EU countries in burden sharing. The Greek
government also used the UN Plenary, the Bratislava EU Summit and an
emergency summit of the Southern European state leaders, all of which took
place in September 2015, to call for transnational support (Kaitatzi-Whitlock
and Kenterelidou, 2017, p. 134).
Thirdly, as regards the tone of the debate towards refugees, the patterns of
claims-making confirm that confrontation was not around the issue of refugee
solidarity as such, but about European solidarity. The average tonality in
claims-making is positive (0.12); in fact, Greek claims-makers are most sup-
portive of refugee solidarity compared to the average in all eight countries
analysed (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4). This confirms our observation that refu-
gee solidarity did not become a contested issue of party contestation. In con-
trast to other European countries during this period, the Greek government
expressed explicitly favourable positions towards refugee solidarity, and this
partially amplified the views of civil society. The fact that state actors were on
the same page as advocacy organisations reflects the predominance of a soli-
darity discourse, which united different fractions of society rather than dividing
them. Negative claims were typically raised by New Democracy, the main
opposition party advocating primarily for securitisation. However, these posi-
tions were marginalised during this period of emergency, or they were confined
to the fringes of the political spectrum, where political parties of the extreme
right gained some visibility, accusing the government of neglecting its obliga-
tions to control external borders. What our data show, however, is an increase
in anti-refugee and xenophobic stances over time, reflected often in the
increasingly negative reactions of local actors and municipalities who were most
exposed to the influx of refugees (Paschou and Loukakis, 2018).
A month of contestation on Facebook: Commenters’ responses to the
solidarity debate
Commenters on the Facebook sites of the three Greek newspapers engage in
broader political debates in the context of the ‘refugee crisis’, but do not
necessarily express an opinion on the issue of refugee solidarity. As in other
countries, the majority of Greek commentators ‘talked back’ in a way to con-
test opinions expressed by political actors in the main article or to express their
own opinions in the context of the debate, but not directly related to debate
inputs by political actors (see Figure 5.2 in Chapter 5). The remaining com-
ments are not ‘out of context’, but often contributed general information or
factual statements to the debate. If we use these comments as a mirror of public
opinion of politically engaged social media users in Greece, what draws the eye
is the vagueness of Facebook commenting. In the majority of the cases, opinions
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of users often remain ambiguous and are not targeted, with 52% of comments
being neutral with regard to the needs and demands of refugees (Paschou and
Loukakis, 2018). Among the comments that allowed us to identify a clear
positioning of users towards the issue of refugee solidarity, positive comments
outnumbered negative ones in all three newspapers analysed, which further
backs our observation that the need to provide assistance to incoming refugees, at
least during these initial weeks of the ‘refugee crisis’, was not contested among
engaged news readers. Additionally, political claimants in the news remained the
primary definers of debate in terms of content, because they set the issues that also
became a matter of concern within the commenting forums, which centred mainly
on the management of the inflow of refugees. This issue convergence in claims and
comments confirms the absence of clashes between political representatives and
news readers. Most notably, social media news readers did not mobilise an alter-
native agenda – for instance in support of security and restriction – from the
bottom-up. The emphasis was rather on local contexts and the practicalities of
providing initial support to incoming refugees.
Discussion: Multiple crises unfolding
As in other countries in our study, the issue of refugee solidarity in the Greek
media was primarily defined by political representatives and did not offer an
opportunity for bottom-up mobilisation by civil society. Unlike other countries,
however, the Greek debate about the reception of Syrian war refugees was not
strongly contested domestically. This finding is somewhat surprising when con-
sidering the tradition of Greek political culture and the propensity of mass media
to sustain rather polarised debates. Despite the fact that Greece was the most vul-
nerable country in Europe and experienced the highest influx of refugees during the
period of analysis, this emergency situation did not trigger substantial degrees of
public and political mobilisation. The strategy by the Greek government was to
highlight the responsibility of the European Union for a ‘crisis’ that was not strictly
defined as a Greek problem. These attempts were successful in setting the media
agenda. In light of the multiple crises that affected Greece, the government was
thus able to formulate a unified national position against the rest of Europe. The
attempt of the main opposition party to mobilise public support by emphasising
securitisation and border control were less effective during this period of European
emergency. In addition, attempts by the extreme right to instrumentalise the refu-
gee crisis in order to radicalise public opinion were marginalised by legacy media
and more interactive websites like Facebook.
It is noteworthy, however, that the economic crisis contributed to the dis-
mantling of the legacy media analysed in this chapter, thus contributing to a
more hybrid media system in which many Greeks turned to alternative and
online news. As Siapera argues, important discursive shifts took place on social
media because civic groups in solidarity with refugees were circulating alter-
native counter-discourses online (Siapera, 2019). The mainstream conservative
views that were expressed in the legacy media might therefore no longer be
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considered as representative for the discursive field of solidarity in the Greek
public sphere.
With this caveat in mind, we found that refugee solidarity in the Greek news
was primarily discussed as a case of first aid and humanitarian assistance, and not
in terms of a durable solution that encompasses the whole of Europe. As Greece
understood itself as a first arrival and transit country, and not as a place of final
destination, solidarity became auxiliary and transitory. Greek government actors
and other political forces used the ‘refugee crisis’mainly as a momentum to call for
solidarity with Greece. The Greek media adopted this frame when stressing that
the country was an indispensable beneficiary of solidarity action from Europe, but
not a provider of solidarity that shares the burden with the rest of Europe. While
initial support towards refugees remained uncontroversial, contestation in the
media was mainly about the external dimension of solidarity and about burden
sharing with the rest of Europe. It needs to be added, however, that a small-scale
‘welcoming culture’ was established by bottom-up initiatives from local civil
society, often in coalition with transnational actors. Their solidarity engagement
remained, however, fragmented, episodic and hardly made it into the news.
Our findings thus point to a solidaric Greece, oscillating between calls for
solidarity action with the EU, and standing in opposition to the rest of Europe.
This discursive constellation was, however, confined to a political moment
identified as an ‘emergency’ by all actors involved. Important discursive shifts
towards a re-securitisation of the refugee debate took place in later years and
ultimately contributed to the change of government in 2019 (Dinas et al., 2019).
Notes
1 We would like to thank Maria Paschou and Angelos Loukakis for valuable research
contributions. A detailed discussion of the findings of the Greek case can be found in
Paschou and Loukakis (2018).
2 Support to take in higher or equal number of refugees from Syria was lower in Greece
than the EU average and at a comparable level to Italy, according to our own 2018
TransSOL survey (Grasso, 2017).
3 According to Standard Eurobarometer 88, Autumn 2017, Media Use in the EU, only
22% of the Greek population tend to trust television and 22% trust written news
compared to an EU average of 51% and 47% respectively (https://ec.europa.eu/comm
frontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/ResultDoc/download/DocumentKy/82786).
4 Kathimerini is the oldest centre-right newspaper with the first issue published in 1919,
and the highest in circulation (on average, 14,000 on a daily basis and 61,225 for the
Sunday edition in 2016); source: Argos press distribution agency: http://www.argoscom.
gr/eng/index.php
5 Ta Nea has the highest circulation of centre-left newspapers in Greece (13,500 on
average for the daily edition in 2016); it started its operation in 1939; source: Argos
press distribution agency: http://www.argoscom.gr/eng/index.php
6 Proto Thema is a tabloid newspaper, published every Sunday (printed edition), which is
also the newspaper with the highest circulation in Greece (on average 76,500 issues in
2016); source: Argos press distribution agency: http://www.argoscom.gr/eng/index.php
7 For detailed numbers and a discussion on the role of addressees, see Paschou and
Loukakis (2018).
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11 Solidarity contestation in Italy
A dual debate between regulatory and
confrontational discussions
Refugee solidarity in context1
Following on from the TransSOL project (Maggini, 2018), we know that the
total number of sea arrivals in 2014 reached 170,000, almost a third of whom
were rescued by the operations ‘Mare Nostrum’ and/or ‘Frontex’. Almost half
claimed to be escaping from Syria and Eritrea. A new record was registered in
2016, when the total number of sea arrivals reached 181,000: an 18% increase
compared with 2015 (154,000). Individuals arriving by sea between January and
November 2016 mainly originated from Nigeria (21%), Eritrea (12%), Guinea,
Côte d’Ivoire and Gambia (both at 7%). Several thousand people perished at
sea. In 2016, the number of people who lost their lives was 5,022. Finally, 2016
data also highlight Italy’s record for the number of landings in the Mediterra-
nean: approximately half of ca. 360,000 migrants arriving by sea into Europe
landed on the Italian coast, 48% of the landings occurred in Greece, while the
remaining numbers landed in Spain.
As regards the requests for asylum, they were in limited numbers until 2013,
at least in comparison with other European countries: this is in line with diffi-
cult conditions for application and the prevailing approach in Italy to act since
it was predominantly a ‘transit’ country. Yet, between January and October
2016, over 98,400 persons lodged asylum applications in Italy compared to
83,970 applications in the whole of 2015. As a result, Italian decision-makers
adopted crisis-driven measures not always consistent with the principle of soli-
darity. Solidarity both as a source of legislation and as a constitutional para-
digm, has thus been a core point of political equilibrium during the crisis,
standing out either as a main stronghold to defend or target for change from
different political perspectives.
Given that the Italian courts, and especially the Constitutional Court, have
emerged as a second, very relevant actor for the protection and respect of soli-
darity as a source of legislation, the Italian government reformed the procedure
in 2017, restricting the scope for appeals. The crisis-driven legislation and
policies have thus generated high levels of contentiousness, with an increasing
number of restrictive measures that in turn have been challenged in the courts
invoking the respect of solidarity, fundamental human rights, and equality. The
Home Affairs Minister, however, has operated in a way to make overall
restriction the prevailing force, targeting in particular the concession of ‘huma-
nitarian’ permits, that is to say, the more flexible form of legal protection for
refugees in Italy. Accordingly, the Italian government has abolished almost
completely this type of permit by enforcing a new highly restrictive ‘security
decree’ in 2018 by Law 113 (Bonizzoni, 2020).
This restrictive policy has run parallel to increased xenophobic sentiments.
Initially, extensive discourse on migration in the public sphere was char-
acterised by an increasing politicisation of migration (Colombo, 2017), which
has become a central issue of the political agenda in line with many other Eur-
opean countries (Krzyz.anowski and Wodak, 2009). In the longer term, actors
with anti-migrant stances such as the right-wing populist Northern League,
have prevailed owing to the restrictive change in terms of policies and public
discourse, thereby reframing the politics of migration under new populist terms
(Richardson and Colombo, 2013).
The Italian public sphere and solidarity
We can now provide a more systematic assessment of how the Italian public
debate over the refugee crisis developed between August 2015 and April 2016.
As for other national cases in this book, the refugee crisis allows for dealing
with a highly resonant topic in the public sphere which has garnered huge
attention by the state, policy-makers and civil society alike. Also in this case,
our aim is to analyse the main dynamics that shape the public debate (Koop-
mans and Statham, 1999; Cinalli and Giugni, 2013a), placing the specific
national dynamics of the Italian case within the broader European comparative
analysis context offered in Chapter 4.
The Italian media landscape is characterised by the presence of newspapers
with sizeable readership and influence in the public sphere. In particular, our
analysis draws on Il Corriere della Sera and Repubblica, the two main Italian
newspapers with the highest circulation (ca. 308,000 and 275,000 copies
respectively in 2015); to the analysis of these two main newspapers we have
added Il Giornale (ca. 68,000 copies in 2015) and Libero (ca. 52,000 copies in
2015). Following the selection of other newspapers for the study of other
national cases in this book, our choice has followed the need to ensure as
representative and unbiased a sample as possible, including both quality news-
papers and more tabloid-orientated newspapers across the left–right political
spectrum. Thus, Il Corriere della Sera traditionally represents the moderate
Italian bourgeoisie, while La Repubblica has a progressive, centre-left orienta-
tion. Il Giornale is a conservative newspaper, which has been crucial in com-
pleting our collection of data for claims-making. Finally, Libero is a right-wing
newspaper with a tabloid format that fits our analysis of Facebook comments
so as to detect the contribution by individual readers to the overall discourse.
The articles from these newspapers have been retrieved using Factiva archive
and the following keywords: rifugiati (refugees) or profughi (refugees) or
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richiedenti asilo (asylum seekers). As regards our analysis of claims-making, the
starting number of selected articles was 1,896 for Corriere della Sera, 1,124 for
La Repubblica and 1,103 for Il Giornale. Afterwards, we randomly selected 351
articles from each of these three newspapers, before settling on 241 articles for
coding. This final step has resulted in an overall figure of 701 claims (235 for
Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica and 231 for Il Giornale) (see Table 3.2 in
Chapter 3). As already mentioned, Libero has been crucial for extending the
analysis of Facebook comments in such a way to include a newspaper with an
explicit tabloid style.
Patterns of political claims-making
The ‘European refugee crisis’ has particularly affected Italy because this country
is positioned at the centre of several migration routes in the Mediterranean Sea
and, hence, is one of the key entry points to the EU. The increased inflow of
refugees from Syria and other regions affected by war, and the hesitancies of the
EU institutions and EU member states in establishing a coordinated system of
admission and integration, put solidarity under enormous pressure, increasing
press attention on the refugee situation with daily media coverage. In the period
under analysis in this book the issues of migration and asylum have thus gained
high visibility within the Italian mass media, which in turn have voiced a
broader concern for the many challenges and problems this dramatic migratory
inflow brings for both the Italian society and the refugees themselves. In parti-
cular, by looking at the distribution of claims, we can notice that these reached
a peak in September 2015 (see Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4), thereby confirming that
selecting this month as a specific case study for the analysis of the European
refugee crisis is an empirically rational choice. In fact, the share of claims
decreased after September 2015 until the beginning of 2016, when they increased
again, reaching a second peak in April, 2016 (16.7%). This is consistent with
new records of sea arrivals registered in 2016.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the refugee crisis has become a highly con-
troversial issue in Italian politics and the media, questioning many aspects, such
as the Italian government’s capacity to handle the refugee influx, the fairness of
the quota system for distributing refugees among EU countries, EU responsi-
bility in the drowning tragedies and, more generally, the existence of solidarity
between EU member states. The contentiousness is marked, for instance, by
opposing positions fought out within the public sphere in line with the main
political parties: on the one hand, the centre-left Democratic Party (in govern-
ment during that time) adopting an open position towards refugees regarding
rescue boat missions and their ensuing welcome; on the other hand, the anti-
migrant positions taken by right-wing political parties, such as the Northern
League, together with the centre-right Forza Italia and the anti-establishment
Five Star Movement.
Our data mirror the specificity of this situation clearly, even while high-
lighting important differentiations. On the one hand, we see that a substantial
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segment of public debate was devoted to the question of how to manage the
emergency with which Italians and refugees were confronted. This is evidenced
in the dominance of state actors discussing measures and issues of migration
management in more or less neutral terms. In this segment, public discourse
within the print media was less polarised and aggressive. National newspapers
gave the lion’s share of space to subnational issues, such as the subject of
accommodating refugees in cities and municipalities, and paid less attention to
transnational issues, such as the EU quota system, rescue operations at sea, or
the EU–Turkey deal to stop the Balkan migratory route. We might thus speak
of a more managerial or technocratic discourse that dominated the core of the
public sphere, and relegated a more politicised discourse towards its margins.
Here, however, public debates were highly controversial and engaged in overt
contestation of solidarity. Within these politicised debates, we can detect two
opposing positions: positive attitudes towards refugees led by humanitarian
values, and negative attitudes towards refugees fostered by welfare chauvinism.
Positive frames prevailed over negative ones.
A closer look at our data confirms these patterns. First, Italian debates about the
refugee crisis were dominated by state actors as claimants (64.5%) (see Table 4.1 in
Chapter 4) and migration management issues (65.5%) (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4),
and thus by a debate strictly focusing on administrative, financial and regulatory
measures. Civil society organisations (21.4%) (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4) were
relegated to second place, as were issues related to the personal background of the
incoming refugees (15.4%) (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4). However, it is noteworthy
that this share of refugee-related issues is one of the highest among all countries
under analysis, thus illustrating the strong visibility of refugees, their personal
stories and hardships and the considerable sensitivity Italian claimants have
developed, considering that this country was confronted, almost overnight, by a
humanitarian tragedy of epic proportions.
Secondly, the centrality of a state-led debate about migration management
has implications for the contentiousness of the debates about solidarity with
refugees. This effect can be corroborated when looking at the way solidarity
with refugees is granted or rejected and how it is justified, evaluated and inter-
preted by organised publics. The most noticeable finding for the Italian case is
that the majority of claims have no justification, meaning that there is no
underlying value as to whether solidarity with refugees should be granted or
rejected (Maggini, 2018). More technical, regulatory or managerial issues
seemed to be centre stage, a position that does not require or mobilise argu-
mentative justifications. Only a small share of claims addressed core values to
be defended, and in this regard more diversity and opposition seemed to
emerge. Among claims with a clear justification, interest-based/utilitarian justi-
fications and rights-based justifications represented a similar share (19.8% and
21.1%, respectively). Only 5.6% of claims, conversely, were framed through
identity-based justifications (see Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4).
Thirdly, these diverging justifications are crucial for the contentiousness of
solidarity debates, because different justifications are endorsed by different
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actors. It is remarkable that 57.1% of claims were made by civil society and
human rights organisations, and 45.8% of the claims by advocacy groups
showed rights-based justifications, whereas 38.6% of claims by political parties
were characterised by utilitarian justifications (Maggini, 2018). As for the most
frequent actors (i.e. state actors), after the ‘no justification’ category, the most
frequent values were interest-based justifications (20.2%), followed by rights-
based justifications (12.8%). The diverging justifications promoted by these
actors were highly consequential for the contentiousness of solidarity debates,
since values are strongly correlated with the overall position of the actors
towards refugees: 87.2% of rights-based justifications supported general or
universal principles in favour of refugees, whereas 61.5% of identity-based jus-
tifications rejected solidarity with refugees. Interests-based/utilitarian justifica-
tions showed a less polarised situation, with a prevalence of anti-refugee
positions (41%) over pro-refugee positions (25.2%). Once again, the relation-
ship between justifications and positions is consistent with the polarisation of
main political parties on migration-related issues over time. On the one hand,
right-wing political actors, such as the Northern League, stand out for their
long-term mobilisation against migration and multiculturalism, while on the
other, the centre-left and the Catholic parties stand out for their humanitarian
positions.
A month of contestation on Facebook: Commenters’ responses to the
solidarity debate
By contrast with claims-making (with the prevalence of a more regulatory,
managerial or technocratic debate), bottom-up contestations on Facebook
showed that solidarity was clearly contested within national borders. Public
debates were particularly pronounced during September 2015, because claims-
making peaked in that month with almost 24% of all claims in the printed
sample under analysis (see Figure 4.2 in Chapter 4). Hence, it is important to
have a detailed look at September 2015, not only in relation to the claims of
more powerful organised publics that could easily reach the public sphere, but
also through the Facebook comments of ordinary citizens. The data evidence an
intense and critical engagement by news readers with the public debates repor-
ted in the mass media. Around 90% of the selected Facebook comments were
responses either to claims raised in the main article (71.1%), or to the general
issue of the main article (17.2%). This means that commenters were highly
‘responsive’ to the political debates between organised actors, avoiding inde-
pendent statements (Maggini, 2018). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Face-
book commenters showed confrontational attitudes towards claimants, with
82.4% of responses to claims showing a negative position towards the claim in
the posted article. Negative stances prevailed for issues raised in the posted
articles, though to a lesser extent.
These insights show that news readers engaged in critical reading of media
coverage, and raised their voices to make their dissenting views heard. In
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particular, we have found some considerable divergences and oppositions,
meaning that Facebook commenters engaged in public contestations subscribing
or opposing solidarity with refugees. It is interesting to see that the fragmenta-
tion of the Italian media system structures these contentions to a considerable
extent, as it provides opposing views with a privileged access point to the public
sphere. In fact, Facebook commenters were clustered according to the news-
paper they were reading: There was a strong distinction between commenters of
La Repubblica’s posts (79.6% had positive attitudes towards refugees) and
commenters of Libero’s posts (62.1% had negative attitudes towards refugees,
while only 3% had positive attitudes). Commenters of Corriere della Sera’s had
more mixed views, but with a prevalence of positive attitudes (52.5%) over
neutral and negative ones. This differentiation is perfectly consistent with the
political orientation of newspapers, showing that Italy stands out for a seg-
mented public sphere. Ideological preferences still matter in the choice of news
source.
The strong polarisation of the public debate on Facebook is confirmed
when looking at the way commenters justified their public interventions, and
the type of values or justifications they used to defend, qualify or oppose
solidarity. Indeed, the three most frequent justifications were ‘human rights/
humanitarian crisis’, ‘political capacities’ and ‘welfare chauvinism’. The first
and the third justification are polar opposites. All human rights-based justifi-
cations have a positive position towards refugees, whereas no comment
framed under welfare chauvinism is pro-refugees. Compared to these justifi-
cations, commenters who shared the ‘political capacities’ frame had more
mixed stances towards refugees (Maggini, 2018), but with a prevalence of
positive (60.9%) positions over negative ones (26.1%). Finally, our Facebook
comments were not populated predominantly by commenters supporting
populist parties and expressing hostile attitudes towards foreigners. A positive
position towards refugees remained predominant (44.1%), followed by neu-
tral/ambivalent positions (34.6%). The Italian case does not convey an overall
picture of social media as being a space for overwhelming hate speech and
political radicalisation.
Discussion
Italy has witnessed a parallelism of two types of debates: regulatory and tech-
nocratic discussions about the management of the refugee crisis on the one
hand, and, on the other, highly confrontational discussions about the extent to
which solidarity with refugees should be granted or denied. This parallelism is
evident twice within the mass media: We have found it within the field of mass-
mediated claims-making in the contraposition of a state-led debate of migration
management and polarised discussions between antagonistic forces, and we
have found it when comparing the field of claims-making in the news media
with the Facebook comments by news readers, given that the latter are much
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more opinionated and voice their dissenting views in opposition to claim-
making by organised actors in the news.
Both spheres of debate also diverge in relation to the level of solidarity con-
testation. Commenters on Facebook dealt with issues that have a national scope
primarily, while issues addressed by organised actors within the print media
were mostly sub-national, with national and transnational issues showing
similar shares. This means that public debates within the news media give more
space to subnational issues, where the management of migration emerged as an
immediate (administrative, regulatory or organisational) challenge, e.g., in
terms of cities and municipalities hosting refugees. This is consistent with the
Italian model for the accommodation of refugees, with the direct involvement
of local governments in migration management. Against this backdrop of
attention among claimants in the press, Facebook commenters were more
focused on national issues.
In spite of these differences, however, both spheres are interrelated quite
considerably, as in most of the other countries under analysis. Commenters on
Facebook expressed strong political views about the refugee crisis issue, and
were characterised by their engagement in contentious debates. This means that
they did not post inconsistent or decontextualised statements, but rather
engaged with content and arguments raised previously in the print media by
political actors and organised publics. This points to the agenda setting and
framing power of news media, as the content of the news articles remains the
main reference point of the debate of news readers; however, it shows that
Facebook commenters are a secondary definer of public opinion, given that they
critically engage with the issues and positions voiced in the news media, advo-
cating for diverging views that either support or oppose the needs and rights of
refugees. Moreover, our findings show that the contentious elements of public
debate relate to the fragmented structure of the Italian media system and the
respective segmentation of audiences.
Overall, public discourse in the print media was less polarised and aggressive,
but less favourable towards refugees, when compared to the Facebook debates.
It is here, in the more polarised spheres of public contestations, that conflicts in
regard to solidarity with refugees stood out most forcefully. We have detected
both security discourses supported by extreme-right and populist parties, but
also, to some extent, by centre-left parties (Colombo, 2013; Richardson and
Colombo, 2013), and utilitarian discourses based on economic interests. As
regards the latter, centre-left and centre-right parties have essentially accepted
‘the functionalist case for migration (necessary in terms of labour market
shortages)—a position also held by key economic actors such as employer
associations’ (Bigot and Fella, 2008, p. 306). Pro-solidarity discourses tend to
centre more strongly on humanitarian pleas and/or universal human rights.
These positions were certainly not located at the centre of public debates,
which were dominated by state actors and their policy agendas. Yet, it is
remarkable that these voices seem to have contributed to a public discourse that
Solidarity contestation in Italy 149
has shown little propensity for open hostility towards refugees, at least during
the period of time under observation.
Note
1 We would like to thank Nicola Maggini and Valentina Pagnanelli for valuable
research contributions. A detailed discussion of the findings of the Italian case can be
found in Maggini (2018).
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12 Solidarity contestation in Poland
The categorical denial of responsibility1
Refugee solidarity in context
Poland had long been considered a country with high rates of migration before
opening its borders in 1989 and the country’s accession to the EU in 2004
(Kępińska and Kindler, 2014). While immigration had not been as politicised an
issue as in other European countries, this political discourse shifted in the
second half of 2015 with the ‘refugee crisis’, fueled predominantly by the anti-
immigration stance of the right-wing populist Law and Justice Party (Prawo i
Sprawiedliwość, PiS) (Krzyz.anowski, 2018). While the previous government was
still willing to accept a small number of war refugees into Poland, the newly
elected PiS government had campaigned with demanding categorical exclusion
of refugees, politicising the issue of refugee solidarity before the national elec-
tions in September and October 2015 (Krzyz.anowski, 2018). In this position, it
was also backed by the newly elected parliament, the Sejm, where centre-left
MPs were no longer represented, and all remaining five parties tilted to the
right on issues of solidarity.
The harsh position of the newly elected government also explains why
Poland stands out in our sample as the country that experienced the lowest
intake of refugees, with 12,190 asylum applicants in 2015 and 12,305 in 2016
(Eurostat, 2018). The government claims that there is an unknown higher pre-
sence of non-documented migrants from Ukraine, Russia and Tajikistan, but
exact numbers of these groups are not confirmed (Petelczyc, 2018a). In regard to
refugees, however, it was obvious that the Polish government wanted to keep
the country on the margins of the events triggering the major inflow of refugees
from Syria in the summer and autumn of 2015. Refugees stayed away from
Poland, either because it was unattractive as a host country, or because the
government, which insisted on control of entry, managed to keep them out.
This policy orientation is not unusual among Eastern European governments,
which have been advocating a fierce defence of national sovereignty against the
prerogatives of European integration, thus rallying for anti-liberalism and
xenophobia, which have become mainstream within public debates, entering
official state rhetoric and practice during the refugee crisis (Szczerbiak, 2012).
As argued by Krastev and Holmes, the wave of populist xenophobia stems from
resentment-fueled reactions within parts of the Eastern-European populations
against the post-1989 imperative to become Westernised (Krastev and Holmes,
2019). In the Polish case, this applies to the PiS government, which since 2015
has been propagating the ‘refoundation of Poland’ through the defence of
national identity and traditional values, thus rejecting ‘liberal values’ such as
gender equality, LGBTQ rights or multiculturalism (Szczerbiak, 2019).
Before this backdrop, the very notion of solidarity had been severely con-
tested and reformulated. Solidarity is historically anchored in the trade union
movements (Solidarność) and the strong hold of the Catholic church (Brier,
2009). However, as the country of Solidarność, Poland has only reluctantly
embraced notions of transnational and global solidarity. During the transition
period, solidarity became increasingly narrowed down as applying primarily to
co-nationals, and only secondly to other Europeans and foreigners. The PiS
government propagated a kind of natural hierarchy of solidarity relationships
that puts family and nation first and defines solidarity towards strangers as
secondary or ‘unnatural’ (Petelczyc, 2018b). Immigration, which had been a
non-issue in public discourse before 2015 (Sadowski and Sczzaviska, 2019), thus
became increasingly framed as a threat to national identity defined in ethnic-
exclusive terms.
The lack of solidarity with refugees exhibited by the PiS government is lar-
gely echoed by public opinion at the present time. In fact, Poland is also the
country in our sample with the most negative opinion on the question of whe-
ther refugees fleeing from the war in Syria should be granted asylum. Thirty-six
per cent of the population, according to our own TransSOL survey, support the
most extreme position, demanding that the country should categorically reject
the intake of Syrian refugees, an additional 16% ask for lower numbers, while
only 9.6% wish that Poland would let in more refugees.2 One explanation for
this hostility towards refugees is provided by the deep religiosity and the wide-
spread anti-Islamism of the Polish population (Petelczyc, 2018b, p. 143). During
the 2015 election campaigns, refugees from Muslim countries were discussed as
a threat to Polish identity, and the newly elected Prime Minister Beata Szydło
declared that she would categorically reject the further intake of refugees, spe-
cifically those from Muslim countries (Petelczyc, 2018a, p. 413). A particularly
aggressive language against refugees was also used by the PiS leader Jaroslaw
Kaczynski, who warned that refugees from the Middle East could bring diseases
and parasites to Poland (Petelczyc, 2018b, p. 142). The same party also cate-
gorically rejected the principle of European solidarity that demanded burden-
sharing and refugee quotas, defining the influx of refugees as a ‘German pro-
blem’, and that Germany did not deserve solidarity with Poland (Petelczyc,
2018a, p. 413). The political climate against refugees also targeted grassroot
organisations, which were seen as agents of internationalism and as such, un-
Polish (Petelczyc, 2018a, p. 414).
Public opinion was thus largely committed to a discourse of national sover-
eignty and cultural identity. However, solidarity with refugees was not com-
pletely absent, even though it went largely unperceived. In fact, the denial of
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solidarity towards foreigners and refugees was met with resistance at grassroots
levels, where local support groups mobilised with the aims of building multicultural
dialogue and more positive attitudes towards refugees (Piłat and Potkańska, 2017,
p. 42). This mobilisation was echoed by our TransSOL survey, because one in four
Polish respondents (i.e., 27%) reported that they had been involved in support
activities for refugees or asylum-seekers, a number that is even slightly higher than
those in France or Great Britain, and not very distant from the share of engaged
Germans or Greeks (34% and 36%, respectively).
The Polish public sphere and solidarity
Poland’s media landscape can be described as being in transition. Two main
components of this transition merit particular attention: The privatisation of
the mass media system and the stronger plurality of media outlets on the one
side, and the growing influence of the Polish government on journalism and
news coverage, with decreasing degrees of tolerance towards dissent and diver-
sity (Zarycki et al., 2017). This double process is not contradictory, because in
several post-communist countries, privatising mass media systems remained
under the control of political elites. Since the transition period, the Polish media
has been marked by a high degree of politicisation in terms of allegiances
between media outlets and political parties. At the same time, it is characterised
by low rates of journalistic autonomy and a strong intervention by governments
in power. Polish mass media might thus be marketised and plural, but they
remain subordinated to elite groups (Sparks, 2008).
The political control and tutelage have proven to survive present times, when
considering the ongoing interventions from the PiS government, which has
changed broadcasting laws and imposed its own appointees to leading bodies.
The public media have been renamed ‘the national media’ and have been thus
transformed into government propaganda mouthpieces (ibid.). The transition
from state media to public media, and from public to national media is thus
currently leading to a revitalisation of the political elites’ mission to ‘repolonise’
media content (Glowacki, 2015; Klimkiewicz, 2017, pp. 201–202). According to
Reporters without Borders’ latest report from 2019, Press Freedom in Poland, is
in jeopardy.3 Little seems able to stop the conservative government in its
determination to ‘re-found Poland’ and ‘make the media Polish again’. Press
freedom is one of its main victims.
Until 2015, immigration discourse in Poland was not particularly present in
the media, which changed with the electoral success of PiS (Krzyz.anowski,
2020). The influence of the government in the Polish media landscape also
shows itself in migration news coverage: Pro-government newspapers follow
the anti-immigration stance of the government directly, framing refugees as
threats and outsiders (Szylko-Kwas et al., 2017). Our sample, however, is
represented by three country-wide distributed newspapers that cover the whole
ideological spectrum: Fakt – a tabloid, the newspaper with the highest circula-
tion in Poland (272,000 readers on average), Gazeta Wyborcza – a centre-left
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newspaper, critical of the government, with 133,000 readers on average and
‘Rzeczpospolita’ – a centre-right oriented newspaper with a focus on financial
and legal issues, which has also distanced itself from the government (ca. 52,000
readers on average).4
Patterns of political claims-making: The categorical rejection
of solidarity
Poland is a bystander that follows the Syrian refugee drama as a remote event
and as a potential threat to be kept out through preventive measures. This
general observation is remarkably clear and consistent along all variables and
dimensions of our dataset. First, public debates in Poland deal with the refugee
crisis and potential calls for solidarity as a purely external topic that has to be
kept at a distance. In fact, the issue cycle runs parallel to other countries with
peaks of attention in the month of September, but the intensity of the debates
throughout the period is very low. Moreover, the media cover the topic as for-
eign events, e.g., when reporting about the mass arrival of refugees in Greece
and Germany, even though these stories do not simply follow the pattern of
foreign news coverage, but show high engagement of domestic claims makers.
Second, public claims-making was strongly dominated by governmental
actors (46%) and political parties (11.3%). Levels of public contestation were
low because the government’s harsh stance towards refugees was not criticised
or qualified domestically. Polish state actors and parties monopolised the public
debate to such an extent that they were successful in silencing opposing groups
in favour of refugee solidarity. In fact, civil society and human rights organisa-
tions, who rallied for this cause, were largely without a voice within the media,
as they only account for 1.6% of all claims. The monopolisation of the public
sphere by the state, the marginalisation of pro-solidarity opposition groups and
the definition of the refugee crisis as an external threat were thus successful in
establishing public consensus and avoiding public contestation or polarisation
within the news. Even the low levels of contestation are to be attributed to the
activity of the PiS, which during the electoral campaign of 2015 mobilised
against the ruling government with a political manifesto that demanded even
harsher anti-refugee policies. Once in government, the PiS leaders started to
implement these new policies against the demands for inner-European solidar-
ity, voiced by the European Commission and other European member states,
such as Germany. Their promise to categorically ban Muslim refugees from
Polish territory may have caused irritations and criticisms in the rest of Europe,
but the level of domestic contestation after the electoral campaign of 2015
remained very low (Szczupak et al., 2018).
Third, the consensus within the Polish public debates is also true when
taking a closer look at the argumentative content of claims. Positions about the
deservingness of refugees in need of solidarity might have been equally dis-
tributed among claimants in the Polish media. However, positive statements
were mainly promoted by foreign actors (like German claimants, represented in
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18% of all claims), while the positionality of claims raised by Polish state actors
and political parties was on average decidedly more negative. The fact that pro-
refugee claims were mainly represented by foreign actors points to remarkable
polarisation in the debate between Polish and European (foreign) claimants.
Domestic actors supporting refugee solidarity could thus easily be blamed as
anti-Polish by government actors and political parties, and as illegitimate
attempts to prevent the government from defending national interests and a
unified Polish position against the rest of Europe. The ability of the PiS gov-
ernment to monopolise the tonality of the public debate was considerable, when
taking a closer look at the changes before and after electoral campaigns. While
the previous Civic Platform government still tried to argue for the moral and
legal obligations of the country to grant asylum to war refugees, the change in
government altered the positionality within the larger debate significantly. Since
November 2015, when PiS had started to impose its highly exclusive rhetoric
towards refugees, the average position of claims raised in the public sphere
shifted considerably to veer towards the negative (Szczupak et al., 2018).
A month of contestation on Facebook: Commenters’ responses to the
solidarity debate
Organised actors were the primary definers of public debates about solidarity
with refugees in Poland. They did not only play a crucial role in setting the
agenda of claims-making within the news coverage of Polish newspapers, but
basically also defined the agendas and positions of users’ comments within the
newspapers’ Facebook sites. Polish comments distinguish themselves most
clearly from the users of our other countries, because they express themselves
during September 2015 in an almost unanimously negative way (75.3% of all
comments), targeting refugees as undeserving and putting their own needs first.
In no other country in our sample have so few users spoken out in favour of
refugee solidarity (8.8%) (Szczupak et al., 2018). However, negativity towards
refugees among the Polish users is not only an echo of organised public claims-
making, but also a pure appendix of the electoral campaigns and government
policies publicised within the news media. As shown in the positionality of
comments posted on Facebook in response to news articles, it is true that users
partly amplified the negativity of representatives of the Polish government and
of political parties, and they rewarded the extremist opinions of some of their
leaders with highly supportive comments. Partly, however, Facebook users also
ran their own campaigns, criticising Germany or human rights’ associations for
their pro-refugee stance, when they engage in hate speech, or when they
undermine the legitimacy of pro-refugee claims-makers and claims. Further-
more, we find instances of openly racist and extreme speech in the comments,
an observation that stands out in comparison to the other national cases.
Poland is thus the only country in our sample where extremism in user com-
menting became manifest, confirming the hypothesis found in the literature
about a polarisation and radicalisation effect of social media commenting (Chen
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and Lu, 2017; Hughey and Daniels, 2013; Toepfl and Piwoni, 2015). However,
it needs to be added that this negativity in Polish comments is not limited to the
social media sites, but rather reflects the general public opinion within the
public sphere, as expressed through claims-making within the news media.
Negativity is thus defined and promoted by a public discourse dominated
clearly by state actors and political parties. Social media do not seem to provide
opportunities for a more open and contentious debate, as they tend to be
monopolised and stream-lined by users that largely share the views of those
actors already populating the public scene.
Discussion: The Polish exceptionalism – virtual debates, but
absent refugees
The Polish case stands out against the rest of our countries when considering
the high level of synchronisation of debates and the low level of internal con-
tentiousness. In fact, public debates within the news media are strongly mono-
polised by state actors and political parties, and the marginalisation of
dissenting voices is so strong that organisations and initiatives rallying for
solidarity with refugees are largely absent. The same applies for user comments
on the newspapers’ Facebook sites, where only a very small minority of readers
dares to express supportive opinions. The tone within Polish public debates is
negative, to some extent even aggressive. Government actors and political par-
ties overtly refuse to grant support to refugees, and users join in by rejecting
any kind of solidarity with them, given that both propagate the categorical
exclusion of refugees.
There are, however, limits to negativity and hate speech. Polish newspapers
try to countervail these tendencies to some extent in the way they cover the
news. In fact, Polish debates reported within the newspapers were balanced in
so far as foreign actors were given a voice to express solidarity with refugees
against the dominant views of domestic actors. The considerable share of these
claims highlights that journalists took their responsibilities seriously when cov-
ering the ‘refugee crisis’ from a broader perspective and bringing in plural
voices from other countries. The Polish media also struggled against the hate
speech of user comments, for instance, when Gazeta Wyborcza shut down the
commenting function on articles on the refugee issue on its own news website
after experiencing extremism in user comments during late 2016. Commenting
on the Facebook news page remained, however, unaffected by these measures.
Despite possible moderation effects, 80% of newsreaders left outspokenly
negative comments in response to the largely balanced views expressed in
Gazeta Wyborcza news articles.
These attempts to moderate public debates and ensure plurality of views have
proven to be negligible. In fact, the Polish data evidences a radicalisation of the
Polish public sphere on the issue of refugee solidarity. Part of this radicalisation
might be an echo of the electoral campaign of 2015 and the attempts of the PiS
party to mobilise its constituency by means of a xenophobic, right-wing
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nationalist rhetoric. This radicalisation is a matter of concern, as it does not
seem to mirror objective problems. Poland remains the country in our sample
with the lowest inflow of asylum seekers, which means that refugees from Syria
were highly visible virtually, but physically absent. Before this backdrop, we
might assume that the anti-refugee rhetoric was mainly an instrument to poli-
ticise and stream-line public opinion in support of the new government’s policy
agenda. The Polish mass media seem to have willingly lent themselves to this
political manoeuvre. It is true that they have granted room to foreign actors
that, however, could easily be discredited as non-Polish. More consequential is
the fact that Polish newspapers have contributed to the discursive exclusion of
dissenting domestic actors. The political control and tutelage of the Polish mass
media, and the politicisation of public debates along the political agendas and
interests of leading political elites is thus an obvious, albeit troubling finding of
our analyses.
Notes
1 We would like to thank Klaudyna Szczupak, Janina Petelczyc and Maria Theiss for
valuable research contributions. A detailed discussion of the findings of the Polish
case can be found in Szczupak et al. (2018).
2 Support to take in higher or equal numbers of refugees from Syria was lowest in
Poland compared to all other countries, and support for the extreme position that
categorically denies entry to refugees was highest.
3 https://rsf.org/en/poland
4 Numbers are for 2016 and taken from https://www.wirtualnemedia.pl/.
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13 Solidarity contestation in the UK
Reluctance during political uncertainty
Refugee solidarity in the British context1
The state of solidarity in the UK is weakening on regional, national as well as
transnational levels (Montgomery and Baglioni, 2018a, p. 189). Since the economic
crisis in 2010, the British welfare state has suffered consequences affecting the most
vulnerable groups in society. Beyond traditional class struggles, the cohesion of the
country has been shattered by new identity struggles and long-seated conflicts
between the English, Scottish, Irish and Welsh nations. Moreover, on the EU level,
the UK’s latest governments increasingly showed unwillingness to engage in
European solidarity and principles of burden-sharing, e.g. with regard to the
reallocation of refugees and asylum seekers.
Before the Brexit referendum of 2015, a major driver of anti-EU campaigning
was indeed the issue of immigration (Prosser et al., 2016). Public contentions
became even more amplified by the many attempts by migrants to cross the
Channel from France and the dramatic images of the refugee and migrant
encampment in Calais near the tunnel entry during the ‘refugee crisis’ from
2015/16. What is noteworthy in regard to British solidarity contestations is that
the UK received comparably moderate numbers of first-time asylum applica-
tions in 2015 (39,720) and 2016 (39,240) (Eurostat, 2018). Additionally, survey
data evidenced that public opinion was not generally hostile towards refugees
when compared with the other countries under study. According to our own
TransSOL survey from 2016 (Grasso, 2017; Lahusen and Grasso, 2018), public
opinion on the question of whether war refugees from Syria should be accepted
was split, with 18.1% accepting that the country should admit higher numbers
than previously, but 20% supporting that the country should not allow more
refugees to come to the country. Just over 58% of the population took a mod-
erate position. The UK government’s anti-immigration stance is therefore not
sufficiently explained by public opinion. Rather, it might be that a few but
highly influential actors who successfully played off notions of popular and
national sovereignty against principles of European solidarity and humanitarian
commitments during the ‘refugee crisis’, could place their messages on the
political agenda (see Gifford and Wellings, 2017). The populist right-wing anti-
immigration party UKIP, for example, instrumentalised the ‘refugee crisis’ to
the benefits of the Leave campaign, linking the traditionally strong notions of
sovereignty in the country’s political culture to the generally strong Eurosceptic
tendencies.
Due to its geo-political situation, the UK has always been an outsider in EU
cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs and has opted out of most of EU regula-
tion in the field of immigration and asylum policies (see Geddes, 2005). In fact, the
UK is not a member of the Schengen area, thus maintaining control of its national
borders within the EU, even though it participates in EU border policies to some
extent (see Costello and Hancox, 2014). Regarding asylum policies, the UK opted
in to the first phase of the Common European Asylum System which sets minimum
standards for asylum. Moreover, it also signed the Dublin Regulation, steering the
allocation of EU member states responsible for processing asylum applications.
However, it did not join the second phase, which brought common standards in
regard to asylum granting procedures for EU member states.
In spite of its partial integration into the European immigration and asylum
policies, the British approach is dominated by the issue of border control over
humanitarianism and solidarity. When the Conservative Party was elected into
government in 2015 in the wake of the ‘refugee crisis’, it made clear that it would
further curb migration (Geddes and Scholten, 2016, p. 39). Over the summer of
2015, David Cameron’s administration took a very restrictive stance with regard to
the intake of refugees arriving via the Mediterranean Sea, which was justified by
highlighting their financial support efforts in the region (Montgomery and
Baglioni, 2018b, pp. 472–473). The government further pushed for the eviction of
the Calais refugee camps in cooperation with the French government, which
eventually took place in October 2016.
The UK public sphere
While the BBC as public service broadcaster remains strong, the British newspaper
industry has come under high commercial pressure with the gradual shift towards
online media. Nevertheless, legacy media have been able to maintain considerable
influence in the political system with exclusive access to politicians and civil ser-
vants in Westminster (Chadwick 2013, p. 48). Degrees of political parallelism are
medium to low (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The news
press, however, is strongly divided between tabloids and broadsheet papers and is
typically less consensus-oriented than the Scandinavian press systems, for example.
Indeed, at least since 2012, some astute observers warned of an unhealthily close
relationship between politicians and the press (The Right Honourable Lord Justice
Leveson, 2012, p. 24). The British press has moved its traditionally Eurosceptical
orientation, which was especially strong among the tabloid segment, towards an
explicit anti-EU position – a development that started in the 1980s but has
accentuated until today (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Galpin and Trenz,
2017). The interdependencies between the press and politics have made pro-
European stances among politicians more difficult and less accepted among the
population (Daddow, 2012).
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In this sense, the UK public sphere is characterised by a high degree of con-
testation of European issues, one of the most dominant of which is immigra-
tion. Greenslade (2005, p. 13) shows how the tone of the tabloids about asylum
seekers runs parallel to the degree of negativity about European integration.
News coverage has portrayed immigration as a contested, sometimes threaten-
ing phenomenon, at least since the early 2000s. In part, this is connected to the
EU’s eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007, which provoked debates about
intra-EU migration, particularly from the new member states to the UK. Public
worries reached the level of moral panic about ‘welfare tourism’ (Fitzgerald and
Smoczynski, 2015), a perception fuelled most fervently by the strong tabloid
outlets. After the 2010 general election, which resulted in a conservative–liberal
coalition government headed by David Cameron, negative news coverage
towards immigrants, and especially towards EU working migrants from Central
and Eastern Europe, further increased (Blinder and Allen, 2016).
Although pro-immigration Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have exerted
some influence over national policy-making (Freeman, 2002), empirical evidence
from news content analysis points to the dominance of political elites not only
in news discourse, but also in Great Britain’s restrictive immigration policies
(Statham and Geddes, 2006). Leading up to the ‘refugee crisis’ the term ‘mass
migration’ was a dominant term used across newspapers (Allen, 2016).
Research further documents the rise and increasing visibility of the anti-immi-
gration UKIP in news coverage of the British press around that time, especially
among right-leaning newspapers (Berry et al., 2015, p. 34). Moreover, experts
widely contend that British newspapers have contributed to rationalising
human suffering before, during and after the ‘refugee crisis’ (Fotopoulos and
Kaimaklioti, 2016; Georgiou and Zaborowski, 2017).
The three newspapers selected for our analysis represent this tendency
towards conflict-oriented public debates. The Guardian and The Telegraph are
broadsheet/quality newspapers, with The Guardian being the leading centre-left
newspaper and The Telegraph, the equivalent on the right. The Daily Express
represents the typical tabloid style of newspapers with a combined anti-EU and
anti-immigrant stance. The average print circulation for The Guardian in April
2016 (i.e. at the end of our sampling period) amounted to 169,424 readers
(-3.82% to April 2015), for The Telegraph 498,474 (+2.56% to April 2015), and
for the Express 419,328 (-4.17% to April 2015) (Ponsford, 2016, reporting ABC
data2).
The UK debate about refugee solidarity in the press media
Our claims-analysis confirms the long-term trends of the British press in expressing
a ‘destructive dissent’ with Europe in combination with the mobilisation of anti-
immigration attitudes (see Daddow, 2012): public-claims making in the British
news was found to be mostly negative on the issue of refugee solidarity compared
to all other countries that were covered by our analysis. The negativity towards
refugee solidarity is complemented by a strong externalisation of the issue, as
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corroborated by the development of the debate. As is the case with the other
country samples, British press coverage peaks in September 2015 both in terms
of articles and claims within articles (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter 4).
After this period, salience decreases again, yet a second momentum ensues in
January 2016. It is noteworthy that both peaks are explained by external events
to which the UK was an outsider and hesitant to become involved in: The
humanitarian disaster in the Mediterranean in September 2015 and other events
on the continent, such as the conditions in the Calais refugee camp, the Swedish
government’s tightening of refugee intake, or the sexual assault by migrants on
31 December 2015 in Cologne, Germany. The UK press were keen to cover the
very events they were eager to sidestep. It is a coverage of a ‘crisis’ of others
that gains news value through some dramatic events but is not bound to longer
spans of public attention. The UK’s geographical location makes such a
detached framing of ‘crisis’ as ‘not belonging to us’ somehow credible. How-
ever, it needs to be added that the tonality of claims reported in the news
towards refugees remains highly negative, in fact, the most negative in our
sample of eight countries (see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4).
As in the other TransSOL countries, coverage is further dominated by voices
of elite actors, above all state and political actors (see Table 4.1 in Chapter 4):
Three out of five claims were pronounced by these actors (62.3%), as opposed
to one out of five by civil society actors (20.9%). The comparatively high share
of public interventions of supranational actors (11.7%) is indicative of the
strong externalisation of British debates. Expressions of solidarity towards
refugees are strongly divided across newspaper outlets, with The Daily
Express – and The Telegraph to some extent – taking particularly negative
positions (Montgomery et al., 2018). These observations support earlier
research that finds key differences between right-wing and left-wing UK news-
papers when it comes to the more general ‘presence (or absence) of humanitar-
ian themes’ (Berry et al., 2015, p. 42.). Overall, however, there is a rather
negative tone in the claims across the three selected British newspapers, which
is not a new development restricted to the ‘refugee crisis’, but reflects a more
persistent tendency in UK newspapers to highlight problematic issues and con-
cerns regarding migration (e.g., Allen, 2016; Philo et al., 2013).
The UK coverage of the ‘refugee crisis’ is mainly focused on political conflicts
and problematises domestic capacities to accommodate people in need, as is
true for the other countries in our sample. However, there are some specificities
that merit attention (see Table 4.2 in Chapter 4). The public agenda is centred
more strongly than in other countries on debates about migration management
(68.1%), even though claims addressing the personal background of refugees
(15.9%) are also slightly more prominent than in other countries. This runs
counter to issues related to civic initiatives (4.2%) and integration (3.2%),
which are below average when compared to other national debates. Priorities
are thus clearly stated, given that debates spotlighted the need for an adequate
(and restrictive) management of migration rather than on welcoming or inte-
grating refugees.
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The British approach dominating public debates thus pairs a strong focus on
internal policy issues with a significant externalisation of the ‘refugee crisis’.
This specificity is mirrored by the justifications provided by claimants for their
views or demands (see Figure 4.5 in Chapter 4). The strongest focus is on
interest-based justifications (47.1%) which underline the importance of domes-
tic costs or benefits as basis of these claimants’ often more negative stances
toward refugees. Rights-based justifications (22.0%), which are generally paired
with supportive dispositions towards refugee solidarity, are second in impor-
tance, but mostly attributed to civil society actors, while state actors clearly
lean towards a negative stance towards refugees. In this regard, we once again
find differences between newspapers. The Guardian hosted more supportive
claims, because from the 29.0% of total justifications, 25.4% made positive
statements. This is opposed to the 18.3% positive, rights-based claims (out of a
total of 23.0%) in The Telegraph, and 10.8% positive claims contributing to
only 14.0% of rights-based claims in The Express (Montgomery et al, 2018).
Facebook users’ comments: Segmented contentions
Social media users on British newspapers’ Facebook commenting pages express
themselves in a predominantly negative way with regard to the question of
refugee solidarity. However, the issue remains contested by a substantial min-
ority of users who express opinions in support of solidarity engagement with
refugees (see Table 5.4 in Chapter 5): 52.3% of all comments are negative, 10%
neutral and 37.7% positive. The way these opinions are distributed across
newspapers suggests a polarisation of different readership communities, which
means that we cannot speak of contestation in the form of an exchange of opinions
among users within the same forum. The group of supportive commenters is con-
stituted mainly of readers of The Guardian, whereas readers of The Daily Express
raise an almost exclusively anti-solidarity voice (Montgomery et al., 2018). How-
ever, it must be highlighted that social media commenting in the UK is not more
negative than the average of social media comments in other countries in our
sample (see Figure 5.4 in Chapter 5). The stronger diversity of opinions among
Facebook users might stand in contrast to the stark negativity of the UK govern-
ment towards refugees, and also to the dominant negativity expressed by political
representatives in the media. While the UK press is by far the most negative among
the selected newspapers and countries in our sample, the tonality of user com-
menting approaches European standards. British claims-makers in the news are
thus much more hostile than the European average, but not the people comment-
ing on Facebook.
Furthermore, our findings point to a relatively high level of responsiveness
and active engagement of users in Facebook commenting (see Figure 5.2 in
Chapter 5). By placing a Facebook comment, a majority of news readers engage
with the content of the main article, fewer even respond directly to claims in
the posted articles. Around a third of all comments are posted by news readers
to express their opinion, and do not relate directly to the content of the news
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article. However, also in these cases, comments do not necessarily need to be
out of context. Also here, patterns differ between Facebook pages, with Guar-
dian readers showing the highest degree of responsiveness and engagement with
the news.
Our analysis of Facebook comments indicates that solidarity contestations
are strongly patterned by the British media landscape. In the UK, differences in
ideological stances between newspapers translate from print to the online
sphere. As the high degree of responsiveness and user engagement indicates,
social media commenting pages are indeed becoming a forum for public
debates, yet these debates unfold among secluded publics of like-minded users.
Echo chambers are maybe not so much a new phenomenon in the UK, but
result from the ideological segmentation of the news media market and their
audiences. These differences enable pro-solidarity voices to find their own plat-
forms to be heard, most notably on The Guardian’s Facebook pages, where
more balanced discussions and a stronger engagement with news content seem
to take place.
Discussion
Our claims-making and social media analysis is in line with previous studies in
the UK, because it confirms that public debates within this country express very
negative attitudes toward immigration. As is the case with other countries in
our sample, domestic political actors dominate the news discourse during the
‘refugee crisis’ and impose an agenda that centres mainly on issues of migration
management and border control. Unlike other countries in our sample, how-
ever, British claims-makers predominantly reject a notion of transnational
(European) solidarity with refugees and asylum seekers. The percentage of
claimants who defend solidarity with refugees is, in fact, the lowest when
comparing the British press with other countries investigated (32.7% as com-
pared to a 40.2% across all countries in the sample; see Table 4.3 in Chapter 4).
This significant negativity of claims-makers in the news is also mirrored in our
social media analysis with over 50% of commenters rejecting solidarity with
refugees.
It should be noted, however, that this anti-solidarity stance towards refugees
is not expressed in a unanimous way across newspapers. The UK stands for an
ideologically divided news coverage more than any other country in our sample.
And this also implies that the readership is divided into two polarised camps,
depending on whether it supports or rejects solidarity with refugees. This
dividing line seems to correspond to the well-known cleavage between a liberal-
pro-European and a nationalistic-Eurosceptic camp that also dominated the
debates about Brexit (Brändle et al., 2019). Tabloid coverage, in particular,
seems to be an important driver of these cleavages. In fact, they were influential
agenda-setters during the ‘refugee crisis’, because they aroused moral panic in a
country whose refugee intake is lower than many of the other countries in our
sample, notably Greece, Italy and Germany. The interdependency between
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politics and the press seems to contribute to the polarisation of debates, given
that the media granted special attention to anti-immigrant and anti-European
sentiment in their coverage. The British tabloid press may have contributed to a
hostile anti-EU and anti-immigrant debate that marginalised moral claims in
favour of European solidarity (see also Daddow, 2012). Unsurprisingly then,
and in the absence of significant domestic opposition, the UK government
insisted on its restrictive stance in handling the ‘refugee crisis’ and was not
ready to engage in European solidarity with its partners.
We find similar tendencies of polarisation on Facebook comment debates,
where users tend to be largely negative toward refugees, but split into two
ideological camps. On the one side, users on The Guardian’s Facebook page
engage more directly with news content and express themselves in favour of
solidarity, while on the other side, readers of tabloid newspapers are the least
engaged with and most negative towards refugees. In this sense, we find that
two factors associated with the British media system – the newspapers’ political
positions and the difference between broadsheet and tabloid papers – clearly
help to predict how debates about solidarity with refugees unfold.
These findings are particularly interesting against the background of com-
paratively low numbers of first-time asylum applicants in the UK during this
period. This highlights the particular importance of news coverage in inter-
preting the facts and constructing the events, which largely were located outside
of the country. The ‘refugee crisis’ is externalised in a similar way to the
Danish and Polish debates. The decisive difference in the British case, however,
is that the UK government was effective in shielding the country from the
‘crisis’, due to its geographical position. It is a sad irony that despite the effec-
tiveness of these policies in keeping refugees out, the external threat narrative
became nevertheless most salient in the UK. It was propagated by the ‘Leave’
campaign in their endeavour ‘to brexit’ the EU, thus not only rejecting solidar-
ity with other EU member states, but most importantly, also with the people
most in need.
Notes
1 We would like to thank Tom Montgomery and Francesca Calò for valuable research
contributions. A detailed discussion of the findings of the British case can be found in
Montgomery et al. (2018).
2 Audit Bureau of Circulations, https://www.abc.org.uk/
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Conclusion
The divided Europe of solidarity contestation
European solidarity in the media
This book started out with the assumption that (the mass) media and the public
sphere through public claims-making play a constitutive role in the construction
or erosion of solidarity in modern society. Solidarity can never be taken for
granted, but remains a contested notion. It thus requires continuous effort to
reaffirm its value, mobilise commitments and ensure broad consensus in its
defence. The public sphere and the media are thus needed to reach out beyond
the intimate relationships of the private, and provide spaces for the arousal of a
collective sense of solidarity. This is particularly true with regard to the target
group under analysis in this book: refugees and asylum-seekers. Compassion
with the needy, the persecuted and displaced people is an immediate human
expression, but collective solidarity with strangers is a more politically con-
tested demand that needs to be morally grounded, with related commitments
and mutual interests in need of justification and negotiation, respectively. The
public sphere is thus of crucial importance for the relevance of solidarity as a
societal force, given that it is a privileged realm of conflict among stakeholders
with opposing views regarding whether and how to share our common resour-
ces in a way that is both just and solidary.
While solidarity relationships within nationally confined communities of co-
citizens can rely on ‘strong ties’ of ethnic and cultural belonging, the ties that
bind diverse and globalised societies are commonly held to be weaker and less
committed (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017). This study contributes important
insights into the potentials of transnational and global solidarity, in that it
shows that the public sphere and the mass media are not exclusively bound to
specific communities. They open a window onto the world, but to fulfil this
function, need to be understood as the horizon for the dynamic unfolding of
global solidarity among strangers (Trenz, 2020). The mediapolis embraces the
polis as constituted by the modern nation-state, but also reaches beyond it
(Silverstone, 2006). This is best reflected in the professional self-understanding
of journalism to make the world relevant to us, but at the same time to remain
open to diversity and the perspectives of others (McQuail, 2013). In this sense,
the media are the motor of a political morality of solidarity in the form of
public debates that allow for the confinement of forms of civic friendship in
light of global commitment (Brunkhorst, 2005).
As we have argued in this book, the mass media do not necessarily conform
to this ambition, as their contribution to the formation of (transnational) soli-
darity is rather ambivalent. The Janus face of the media and the public sphere
is related to their double role, as they are a transmission belt for universal
notions of justice (representing the world) and a filter for the consolidation of
thickened and contextualised relationships of solidarity within a community of
equals (representing the nations). This ambivalence, however, offers an oppor-
tunity for arousing transnational solidarity and for making solidarity mobilisa-
tion visible. Media representations of human suffering in distant parts of the
world are regularly used by charity organizations to mobilise humanitarian
support (Chouliaraki, 2013). Additionally, the mass media help to give these
initiatives and organisations visibility, thus contributing to the wave of soli-
darity mobilisations that have swept through many European countries since
the 2010s (Lahusen et al., 2021). Within the EU, however, such humanitarian
commitments and mobilisations went beyond charity, and placed the political
dimension of solidarity at centre stage by underlining the importance of human
needs and rights. This observation conforms in particular to the European
experience, where solidarity is an eminently political notion. This has to do
with the EU’s role as an actor in international relations, the EU’s external
borders and the internal regime of EU citizenship, which have all created a
political space in which economic, social or humanitarian challenges need to be
faced collectively, and in which solidarity thus becomes an important principle
and reference point for problem-solving (Eriksen, 2017).
It is thus no coincidence that European integration implies a commitment to
global justice, and that one of the fundamental values underpinning European
unification is the principle of solidarity (Eriksen, 2017). Before this backdrop,
solidarity has become an important reference point and a recurrent topic of
public debates across Europe. This salience underlines the importance of taking
a closer look at solidarity contestations within the public sphere. What makes
our focus on the public sphere even more cogent is that the term solidarity is
not only recurrent throughout the official EU documents and solidarity juris-
prudence (De Bùrca, 2005). It is especially fundamental for the public assess-
ment and political solution of a large number of crucial issues at stake for
Europeans, including the European Social Model, the recent economic crisis, the
potential dissolving of the Union with Grexit and Brexit, and of course, the
refugee crisis.
Our analysis of the public sphere can thus be seen as contributing to existing
knowledge about the state of union or disunion between Europeans and their
outside. It helps to better understand whether policy actors and European citi-
zens, throughout these intense debates, see themselves as being bound to one
other by solidarity, capable of playing a bonding role between national states
and the broader international order of human rights and global justice, or
whether they lean towards closed conceptions of solidarity that are restricted to
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national communities and introduce strong differentiations between duties vis-
à-vis their own compatriots, other EU citizens, and even refugees coming from
the rest of the world.
The refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016 provides an emblematic case of analysis,
because it allows us to focus on the contentiousness of solidarity and the
ambivalent role of the mass media in mediating and patterning related debates.
On the one hand, it is well known that in facing collective challenges that
require solidarity among Europeans, the European public sphere remains frag-
mented along national lines and is served mainly (or almost exclusively) by the
national media as the transmission belt of solidarity discourse. Solidarity con-
testation within the European Union therefore follows mainly intergovern-
mental logics through conflicts that are primarily carried out within each
member state with regard to the country’s readiness to help, and among gov-
ernments debating about their readiness to engage in burden-sharing activities.
This segmentation is responsible for a strong compartmentalisation of solidar-
ity debates, and distracts from shared problems and responsibilities. In fact,
while EU member states could agree that the humanitarian crisis triggered by
the war in Syria posed a European challenge to solidarity that had to be dealt
with collectively, the responses to the unfolding emergency were still largely
shaped by national executives.
On the other hand, however, national segmentations do not exclude Euro-
pean-wide debates about solidarity, as our analysis has shown. The dramatic
events related to the refugee crisis opened a public sphere of solidarity con-
testation in all European countries under study, with a significant mobilisation
of citizens and civil society, and a broad participation of diverse groups of
actors (Lahusen et al., 2021), thus generating considerable attention by the mass
media and the general public. While these debates triggered by the crisis were
clearly interlinked, the principal arena for selectively amplifying and framing
them was constituted by the national media. In this sense, solidarity contesta-
tion is marked by the apparent dilemma that public debates revolve around the
issue of European solidarity as a shared challenge, mechanism and value, but
that European solidarity is propagated and/or opposed to the perspective of
very diverse national spheres of contestation with their own agendas, concerns
and beliefs. This dilemma is the reason why we have opted in this book to
analyse European solidarity contestations on the basis of national newspaper
discourses as representative of national public spheres. On these grounds, we
are able to assess what effect the fragmented nature of the EU public spheres
has had on public contestations about European solidarity. Let us summarise
the main findings.
Contesting European solidarity
In our cross-country comparison of public claims-making in the news media,
the dramatic events that accompanied the refugee crisis of late summer 2015
could clearly be distinguished as a ‘humanitarian moment’ of peak attention. In
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our claims-making analysis of news covering the crisis in eight countries (Den-
mark, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, the UK and Switzerland) we
found converging patterns of debate. The most apparent findings refer to the
way refugee solidarity was contested, with tonality turning more positive
towards refugees during the month of September but then quickly changing
towards a more negative stance. These shifts are closely related to incidents and
developments in singular European countries. The early endorsement of soli-
darity has to do with the wave of solidarity mobilisation in various countries,
in particular the incipient welcoming culture in Germany that partly resonated
in other countries. During the months of September 2015, emotional reactions
to the media witnessing of human suffering were collectively expressed as a
‘politics of pity’ (Boltanski, 1999). This allowed for rapid changes of opinion
from indifference or even ‘antipathy’ towards refugees to attention and personal
engagement that was followed by possible forms of individual or collective
support action. The media also played a fundamental role in placing justice
high on the public agenda, which pushed public debates to go beyond concerns
about charity in terms of humanitarian assistance, and allowed political con-
testants and audiences to get involved in discussions about collective responsi-
bilities and the joint duty to take action. The solidarity agenda addressed by
public debates thus transcended questions about the immediate engagement
with refugees in need of assistance and expanded into a discourse about
common challenges, shared obligations and joint affairs among all Europeans
and their humanitarian commitment in the world.
In this way, the solidarity agenda helped to revive the contestation between
those who see Europe as an intergovernmental organisation (though endowed
with a relevant supranational dimension) on the one hand, and on the other,
those who see it as a transnational body that accounts for multiple and over-
lapping constituencies that may cut across territorial distinctions (Nicolaïdis
and Howse, 2001). This latter view, in its more inclusivist ambition, opens up
space for discussing the potential transformation of borders into ‘seams’
(Cinalli and Jacobson, 2020), driving cross-national networks and discourses
within Europe and beyond, as well as establishing the middle-ground position
of the EU between the national state and wide-spread transnational forces.
European solidarity, under this viewpoint, is a major element for sustaining
cross-cultural relationships, exchanges and discourses in the public sphere, as a
way to defuse a dystopic normative ideal which views the EU as a simple
instrument for realising the self-interest of each, separately taken, constituent
part (Bellamy, 2017). In fact, Europe may be taken as the privileged locus of
solidarity, where a Euro-wide demos could take the best of existent democratic
institutions at the EU level (Mertens, 1996).
It would, nevertheless, be an exaggeration to talk of late summer 2015 as a
wholly European momentum of solidarity. While attention peaked visibly across
Europe, the reception contexts remained sharply different. The European land-
scape of (domestic and cross-national) conflicts prompted by the ‘refugee crisis’
was complex. Solidarity contestation was triggered, firstly, cross-nationally by the
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positioning of each country as transit or final destination, as welcoming or
unwelcoming. Such cleavages were partly determined by ideological left–right
divides (e.g. the welcoming attitude of the Syriza government in Greece and the
hostile attitudes of Hungary and/or Denmark), partly resulted from more pro-
European and Eurosceptic attitudes of the respective countries, and partly reflected
long-term historical and cultural divides towards migration politics in general.
With regard to this last point, it has been argued that the refugee crisis has brought
to light internal frictions within the EU and re-opened the old cultural and political
cleavage between Eastern Europe and the West (Krastev, 2017b). The categorical
rejection of the welcoming rhetoric by countries such as Hungary, Slovakia and
Poland is in this sense also to be understood as an implicit denial of Western
lifestyles and values. The contestation about European solidarity does not
involve the incoming refugees alone, but is about redistribution and recognition
within the EU, about EU power politics, about quotas and burden-sharing and
about the defence of national sovereignty against a perceived European (or
German) hegemony.
Secondly, it should not be overlooked that solidarity towards refugees was
also heavily contested internally. Our country briefs give clear evidence of the
increase in domestic conflicts and the sharpening of cleavages in the aftermath
of the events of late summer of 2015. Research has repeatedly pointed at the
volatility of discourses and the instability of emotions that were triggered by
mediated images of pain (Chouliaraki and Stolic, 2017). In Germany, the soli-
darity moment at the first refugee reception in September did not impose itself
on public opinion permanently, because opposition voices, silenced by the
‘welcoming culture’, soon gained ground again (Vollmer and Karakayali, 2017).
The ‘welcoming culture’ did not, as it was sometimes claimed by the right-wing
opposition, establish a hegemony of discourse. Established, stereotypical frames
of security, threat, and economisation proved more powerful in the long run,
not least because political actors, as well as journalists, could routinely refer to
them in political contestations (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017).
Domestic solidarity contestations were largely determined by the position of
state-actors, in particular public authorities and parties in government. This
comes as no surprise, because news coverage privileges these actors system-
atically, and this means that they had the ability to set the agenda and define
problems and solutions in regard to the ‘refugee crisis’, as well. The centrality
of state-actors does not only explain the prominence of migration management
issues within public debates in all countries under study, to the detriment of
topics closer to the accounts, needs and rights of the refugees themselves. It also
explains why the public sphere was dominated everywhere by business-like,
technocratic or regulatory claims that did not need any kind of justification or
reasoning. The hegemonic position of state-actors, however, also helps to better
understand the differences between our countries in terms of solidarity with
refugees, given that the divergent position of national governments largely
determined the tonality of the public debates at large. In the case of Greece,
Germany and to a degree, France, state actors appeared to be more sensitive
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towards the humanitarian tragedies and personal hardships of incoming refu-
gees, thus providing debates about solidarity with refugees with more space and
visibility. On the contrary, public administrations in Great Britain, Denmark,
Poland, Italy and Switzerland were considerably more hostile, thus imprinting
the whole debate with a negative tonality. While right-wing parties strongly
contributed to a belligerent discourse, it was mainly civil society organisations
and civic initiatives that upheld the voice of solidarity with refugees and
engaged in justifications that placed rights and values at centre stage. The
refugees themselves were largely excluded from public debates, which meant
that their fate largely depended on the visibility of domestic actors propagating
their cause, and from the receptivity of policy-makers conforming to some of
their demands.
In these internal debates, as well, European solidarity assumed multiple
meanings. On the one hand, the humanitarian commitment towards refugees
was grounded in a principle of solidarity that is propagated as a European value
and defended by the forerunners of European integration against nationalist
backlashes. This has to do with the principle of free movement, which is taken
as the most crucial element in the building of the European Union. In fact,
opening borders to people is comparably more important in regard to the uni-
fication of Europe than opening borders to goods, capitals or services, because
free movement is the basis on which European citizens genuinely commit to
each other in a fully egalitarian way (Favell, 2014). At the same time, the fourth
freedom was primarily meant as an invitation for Europeans to build a soli-
darity community, which came at the price of erecting an external border
towards the outside world (Bigo et al., 2013). It might be true that the Dublin
regulations were installed as a complement to the Schengen treaty, thus ensur-
ing that free movement is restricted to European citizens, to the detriment of
non-Europeans. However, the contraposition of internal freedom and external
closure is an open wound of the European integration project, and thus a con-
stant thorn in the side of political, legal and ethical debates about the basic
values and constitutional rights of the European Union. It has caused the EU to
commit its members to refugee protection and asylum policies, and even though
the Common European Asylum System is one of the most contentious European
policy fields, it signals that open borders continue to be a fundamental element
of European values, among which lies the principle of European solidarity.
The call for solidarity articulated in the public debates under study thus
included two demands, the support of refugees in need of protection and shel-
ter, and the mutual support of Europeans to share the burden of welcoming and
sheltering the incoming refugees. Against this vision, numerous claimants raised
their voice in the mass media to propagate, on the other hand, a more exclusive
notion of solidarity, playing off exclusive, mono-ethnic traditions against
inclusive multicultural notions of community. These debates did not call for a
‘politics of pity’ but were driven by a ‘politics of fear’, because refugees were
defined as a threat to the national community in economic, political and/or
cultural terms. Refugees were not treated as victims but as predators that take
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away jobs, cheat on social benefits, transgress social order, engage in criminal
offences and subvert domestic values. This position not only denies support to
refugees, but it rebuffs mutual assistance between Europeans; in part, it sub-
verts the very idea of solidarity in the name of ‘omnis homo sibi’ – every
woman for herself, every man for himself. In its nationalistic and xenophobic
essence, the denial of solidarity with refugees was very often linked to the most
Eurosceptic position, which marks the EU as on the wrong path, with its
institutions doomed to failure and destruction (Malcolm, 1995).
These two opposite visions of (European) solidarity correspond partly to
different political projects of the left and the right, even though the left has
developed its own Eurosceptic positions (Streeck, 2014; Tuck, 2016). In part,
these opposite visions are also used to visualise a new domestic cleavage
between cosmopolitans and communitarians (Zürn and de Wilde, 2016). While
evidence for these new domestic cleavages along inclusive and exclusive notions
of solidarity were found in all countries analysed, our study challenges the
assumption of new geographical cleavages within the EU among winners and
losers of European integration (Teney et al., 2014) or among the south and
north of Europe (Grande et al., 2019; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Hutter et al.,
2016). Dividing lines of solidarity towards refugees run between Denmark and
Germany, while countries of first arrival in the south of Europe did not develop
particularly hostile attitudes towards refugees. Domestic partisan cleavages
therefore matter more than country cleavages to explain solidarity attitudes
towards refugees. What would need to be further analysed in this context is
how the crisis of 2015 and 2016 triggered debates about the project of European
integration, about European responsibilities in the world, and about future
trajectories of integration. We find that meta-frames were used in all countries
to discuss, for instance, Germany’s role in the European Union, the power
relationship among European member states and the broader role of Europe in
external relations and its position in the world. Our study does, however, not
allow us to trace such a meta-discourse over time. Extrapolating from our
findings, we would assume that such debates would not necessarily divide
member states, but rather allow for the construction of coalitions and alle-
giances across countries.
We further contest the idea that the refugee crisis of 2015 and 2016 has con-
tributed to a radicalisation of immigration debates, or has triggered a newly
politicised dynamic of European integration that is mainly driven by ethno-
nationalist or populist political forces (van Prooijen et al., 2017). Public debates
about solidarity were highly contentious, even though a considerable share of
interventions, issues and statements were moderate, regulatory, and in part even
technocratic in tone and argumentation. This mainly has to do with the type of
public debates under analysis here, given that newspapers grant prominence to
organisational actors, among them political parties, public authorities, agencies,
experts and commentators. This limits the focus, because public debates as
reported within the newspapers do only cover part of what we must consider to
be the public sphere. To provide a broader vision of solidarity contestations
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within the public sphere, we thus expanded the focus of analysis in order to
give news readers and newspaper users a proper voice. In particular, the Face-
book comments section of mainstream newspaper sites offered an excellent
opportunity to take a closer look at focused debates about the ‘refugee crisis’
from the media usage perspective. Our comparative examination of bottom-up
solidarity contestations at the height of the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ during the
month of September 2015 shows that citizen-users all over Europe actively
seized the opportunity provided by the Facebook sites. Most commenters
strictly engaged with the news content – the topics, claims and justifications
publicised in the posted articles, thus disproving the assumption that news
commenting sections are a space of diffuse, uncivilised or irrelevant commu-
nication. Commenters wish to actively participate in public debates, and thus
aim to have an impact on public opinion formation. The voices and views
articulated in these sections are as diverse as the positions detected in the news
articles themselves. Public Facebook sites were used by some to give testimonies
of the humanitarian disaster and the human suffering of refugees, while others
expressed their diffuse feelings of fear in light of a seemingly uncontrolled influx
of refugees. This contentiousness largely replicated the one found within the
news articles of the newspapers under analysis. More than that, the compara-
tive analyses highlighted that news readers actively engaged with the issues and
claims raised in the news articles, thus showing that bottom-up contestations
within the online media were strictly interrelated with the public debates
reported by the print media’s news coverage.
Our findings thus confirm the centrality of the media public sphere (both on-
and offline) for public debates about solidarity. Moreover, they point to a fairly
integrated public sphere of solidarity contestation, because online news and
online commenting remained strongly coupled. This observation, however,
needs to be complemented by two further findings that relate to the internal
structure of this public sphere. On the one hand, it is necessary to differentiate
the uneven impact of news coverage and online commenting on public opinion
formation. In regard to solidarity contestations, we identified primary definers
(claims-makers such as politicians, stakeholders or intellectuals), whose inter-
ventions were covered in the news media and were thus able to set the agenda
and define the main frames and messages of the news. Facebook sites provided
spaces for secondary definers (the news readers and commenters), who made
use of the online media to express their (dissenting) opinions. These linkages
between primary and secondary definers are significant, and help to explain the
divergence of public debates between the various countries under analysis. In
fact, we saw that the tonality of news coverage was largely replicated on the
level of Facebook comments, as news readers joined in a negative, in part hos-
tile rhetoric against refugees (Denmark, Poland and the UK), or amplified the
more positive or balanced discussions (Greece and Italy). In the other countries,
news readers used the opportunity to oppose the dominant debates, most often
by defending a hostile posture against a seemingly overly friendly stance among
policy actors (Switzerland, Germany and France).
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On the other hand, evidence suggests that the politicisation and parallelism
of the newspaper system has an effect on public contentions about solidarity, as
well. Facebook comments on the sites of tabloids were the most negative in
regard to refugees, followed at some distance by the conservative broadsheets,
while the more liberal or leftist newspapers tended to host comments that more
often expressed support for refugees and sympathy for their cause. This speaks
to the ability of newspapers – and the political parties and forces close to
them – to mobilise an ideologically akin segment of the audience, not only in
terms of passive readership, but also in regard to active grass-roots opinion-
formers. This observation indicates an ideological segmentation of the public
sphere, which limits the discursive potential of solidarity contestations. In fact,
public debates may allow engagement in argumentative reasoning – even in the
case of heated discussion – as long as contenders are involved in mutual dis-
putes and exchanges of views and arguments. The segmentation of solidarity
contestations in separate spaces of opinion-formation, however, does imply the
risk of fragmentation and radicalisation.
Conclusion: The contested future of European solidarity
The ‘refugee crisis’ was linked to real events of war, plight and violence, but it
was only through mediated images of human suffering that a ‘politics of pity’
could be triggered. It mobilised not only civil society and humanitarian organi-
sations, but also large parts of Western publics in solidarity with refugees. The
interpretation of the ‘refugee crisis’ as a media event is useful to understand
how public perceptions of refugees are formed (how refugees are made relevant
to us), and how policy agendas are set by the expression of opposing positions
(how collective responses are defined). The media can thus be seen as con-
stitutive to ‘crisis’ in two regards. First and at the most elementary level, media
discourse is decisive with regard to the definition of refugees as either victims or
threats, as people deserving solidarity or being unworthy of help. We have seen
how the media in different member states shifted across time between these two
perspectives. They made more salient the personal or humanitarian needs of the
refugees in the initial stage of the ‘crisis’, and turned to the alleged negative
consequences for the community in the later stage of the debate. Secondly,
media stories about the ‘refugee crisis’ form public opinions in terms of cogni-
tions, evaluations and emotions (Chouliaraki, 2013), because they nurture feel-
ings of sympathy or antipathy towards refugees, highlight or downplay their
rights and our obligations, and they propose potential causes and adequate
solutions. Our data has evidenced that news coverage fuels solidarity conten-
tions significantly because it grants visibility to different actors advocating for
diverging, very often opposing perceptions and interpretations of what the
‘refugee crisis’ means in terms of problems, causes and solutions.
The mass media has thus played a crucial role in defining, interpreting and
constructing the events during the summer of migration in 2015 as a ‘refugee
crisis’. In this regard, the most outstanding finding of our analysis is the strong
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volatility of public perceptions and opinions. The mass-mediated ‘refugee crisis’
aroused a strong momentum of European solidarity, but this momentum was
fragile and did not last for long. This has to do with the structure of public
debates within the European Union. The common political space continues to
be fragmented, and public opinion formation and contestation took place in
nationally confined media spheres. The refugee crisis remained, first of all,
heavily politicised internally, and this was particularly true in regard to the
contentiousness of solidarity with refugees. In countries like Germany, public
discourse of hospitality had a short-term impact on public opinion, but the
‘crisis media event’ was not prone to being restricted to a single or ‘hegemonic’
frame of interpretation. After the so-called Cologne attacks of New Year’s Eve
2015, a series of contrasting images was delivered, portraying dark-skinned
young men from North Africa, who formed gangs to go after defenceless
German women. As some of the German media were initially rather timid to
build a causal connection between the Cologne sexual assaults and the influx of
refugees, journalists who defended the refugee cause were increasingly met with
mistrust and charged with being biased, or even lying. In the long run, public
debates started to revolve around issues of threat and security, and it proved
impossible to shift the attention back from security and threat to hospitality
against the powerful political mobilisation by right-wing and populist actors
who undermined trust in journalism and immigration friendly politicians and
civil society groups (Greussing and Boomgaarden, 2017).
Secondly, the inability to build and maintain a lasting sense of solidarity with
refugees in the public sphere is linked to European contentions about the
‘refugee crisis’. In fact, while the initial moment of domestic solidarity in wel-
coming countries was linked to the hope of finding a joint European solution,
disillusionment soon prevailed within the public sphere, due to governments
that coupled a strong hand domestically with an uncooperative posture at the
EU level. The ‘refugee crisis’ thus became a crisis of European integration in the
way it made salient irreconcilable frictions and fundamental conflicts of values
among EU member states. When looking at media contestation, it thus became
clear that there is a wider connotation of the term ‘refugee crisis’, which is
quintessentially not about refugees, but about ‘us’ as Europeans. Ivan Krastev
encapsulated the idea in his essay ‘After Europe’, calling the ‘refugee crisis’
Europe’s September 11 (Krastev, 2017a).
The humanitarian disasters at Europe’s external borders in the Mediterra-
nean and in the Balkans do indeed challenge the foundations of Europe and the
values on which our liberal and inclusive democracies are based. European
integration has always been advanced as an expansive solidarity project: The
European social model, the EU as a humanitarian power, free flows of labour,
capital and people, or inclusive notions of citizenship are all committed to this
overarching goal (Trenz, 2016). However, even if the European Union was set
up as a community of solidarity, the related relationships among the European
partners have remained undefined and have assumed multiple and contested
meanings for a long time (Delanty, 2008; Jones, 2012; Silveira et al., 2013). This
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is particularly true in regard to the field of immigration, refugee protection and
asylum, which has been marked by contestations since its beginnings. Various
attempts to coordinate the politics of immigration have been made (Menéndez,
2016; Thielemann, 2004), especially in terms of harmonised measures to share
the responsibility of welcoming refugees. But repeated failures in negotiating
joint goals, quotas and allocation mechanisms provoked a shift in the definition
of European solidarity. While it initially demarcated a relationship among
equals, it has now become a principle of differentiation (Michailidou and
Trenz, 2019). In a European Union of differentiated integration, differentiated
solidarity redefines the relationship among European partners: It is no longer
reciprocal and equal, but shaped by power relations among non-equals.
Today, flexible arrangements among EU members are linked to discretionary
redistributive mechanisms that need to be constantly renegotiated. Solidarity
remains, therefore, more open depending on the constellations of power and
national interests at particular points in time. In this political space of
power and domination, there is an incentive for EU member states to give
further restrictive twists to their policies so as to pass on to other EU states
the burden of processing an increasing number of asylum applications.
Jurisdictions in the form of establishing legal or constitutional guarantees
are unwanted. Solidarity shall only be exceptionally granted, such as in the
case of Angela Merkel’s decision to temporarily open the borders. It is thus
redefined as a voluntary act of benevolence towards thirds, in other words,
as charity. At the same time, egalitarian solidarity becomes exclusively
defined as belonging to the national and not the European realm. This
implies that European partners have taken on an increasingly defensive
position at the European level in their constant renegotiation of the costs
and benefits of European integration.
The political debate about the refugee quotas was one of the issues where
such flexible European solidarity arrangements were discussed among the Euro-
pean partners. What is interesting to observe in these debates is that flexible
solidarity is strongly promoted by weaker European partners against the per-
ceived hegemony of the Commission or other members, especially Germany. At
the Bratislava EU summit meeting of September 2016, a joint statement was
issued by the four Visegrad countries introducing the new principle of flexible
solidarity to the EU’s refugee relocation scheme. Their intention was to invalidate
the idea of solidarity as mandatory and imposed by supranational authority.
Flexible solidarity should enable weaker member states, in particular, to decide
on specific forms of contribution, taking into account their cultural specificities
and potentials. The declaration further stressed that any refugee distribution
mechanism should be voluntary. This would imply that ‘solidarity’ and ‘respon-
sibility sharing’ would need to be negotiated case by case, e.g., through side
payments. Member states would ultimately have veto power to decide about
the degree of involvement in humanitarian assistance. Particularly in this case,
solidarity is reduced to an act of charity that depends entirely on the good will
of the donor.
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Ultimately, the European refugee crisis converts into a crisis of solidarity
(Grimmel and Giang, 2017). If solidarity is reduced to questions of first help in
a situation of emergency, then the debates that are unfolding within and across
national media spheres are deprived of their central element, namely that soli-
darity is, first and foremost, a reminder of our duties to correct structural
injustice (Eriksen, 2017). It is thus necessary to recombine claims for European
solidarity with claims for justice, and to grant more attention to those voices
that try to keep these principles alive in adverse times. Genuine solidarity might
have lost its vigour in political debates, but those who carried the strong
momentum of European solidarity during the dramatic events of 2015 and 2016
have just been pushed out of public visibility and will find their time to reinvi-
gorate the debate about what solidarity means to Europe.
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